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At 09:49 PM 7/26/00 -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
...
>That works, though I think I'd include a counter or some such in the
> hash, so that the same r was not used for two identical messages.
Actually, for signatures, this is just fine. It just means that
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <4.1.2721150740.00
[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, John Kelsey writes:
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>
>At 10:37 PM 7/19/00 -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>>The important thing is that the random number really has to be
>>random and unguessable.
>
>There was a cle
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At 10:37 PM 7/19/00 -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>The important thing is that the random number really has to be
>random and unguessable.
There was a clever trick for doing signatures like this without a
random number generator, using the one way hash fu
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Simon Aronson" w
rites:
>In an implementation of the ElGamal cryptosystem, is it acceptable to always
>use the same prime and generator for every transmission? Or should a new
>prime/generator pair be chosen for each communication?
>
At 21:02 00/07/19 +0100, Simon Aronson wrote:
>In an implementation of the ElGamal cryptosystem, is it acceptable to always
>use the same prime and generator for every transmission? Or should a new
>prime/generator pair be chosen for each communication?
Yes, in fact you pretty muc
In an implementation of the ElGamal cryptosystem, is it acceptable to always
use the same prime and generator for every transmission? Or should a new
prime/generator pair be chosen for each communication?
Also does anyone know of where I can find suitable parameters to test the
system with
Am I right in thinking that ElGamal is entirely unencumbered by patents
etc?
Also, is there any good source of info for legal issues pertaining to
distribution of crypto products in the UK?
thanks
si
Are there any kinds of primes I should avoid when picking a modulus for
an ElGamal system?
--
Mike Stay
Programmer / Crypto guy
AccessData Corp.
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
At 2:00 PM -0400 on 8/17/99, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Title: Security Firm to Revive Computer-Defense Site
> Resource Type: News Article
> Date: August 17, 1999
> Source: NYT (Free Registration Required)
> Author: PETER WAYNER
> Keywords: KROLL-O'GARA,PACKET STORM,WEBSITE TAKEOVER,HACK
Safuat Hamdy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> G: generator
> a: secret value
> A: public value G^a
>
> and for the signature
>
> k: secret random value
> R: G^k
> and
> s = a h(m) + k g(R) mod n (*)
>
> where h is a hash-function, n is the group order, a
Hi,
suppose we use an ElGamal-variant where we do not need to compute inverses
modulo the group order. Such variants exists and they are explained in the
Handbook of Cryptography, for instance, let
G: generator
a: secret value
A: public value G^a
and for the signature
Hi Folks,
I need an implementation of ElGamal simple... but efficient! :o) I know
that ElGamal is quite simple but I was just wonder if someone of you know
where to find one for encryption only. There is a lot of library like
Crypto++ 3.1, but I need just ElGamal (and the Big Num to support
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