Re: username and groupname prone to overflowing

2024-12-23 Thread Paul Eggert
On 2024-12-23 14:27, exploit dev wrote: In decode_header(), assign_string_n() takes input from header.uname as value and also as size_t. [image: image.png] I didn't look at the images, for what I hope are obvious security reasons. If they contain important info please resend as text. (In gene

Re: username and groupname prone to overflowing

2024-12-23 Thread exploit dev
my bad, I missed that uname is of max size 31. Le lun. 23 déc. 2024 à 15:37, exploit dev a écrit : > Hello, > > In decode_header(), assign_string_n() takes input from header.uname as > value and also as size_t. > [image: image.png] > If value and n are both controlled, the "l" variable is prone

username and groupname prone to overflowing

2024-12-23 Thread exploit dev
Hello, In decode_header(), assign_string_n() takes input from header.uname as value and also as size_t. [image: image.png] If value and n are both controlled, the "l" variable is prone to overflowing inside the xmalloc(l+1) which will under-allocate p, and over-copy value into it. [image: image.