I have the following lytex file, test.lytex:
\begin{document}
\begin{lilypond}
melodyone = \relative { \time 4/4 \key c \major c1}
\book {\bookOutputName "melody1" \bookpart { \score { << \new Staff
{\transpose c c \melodyone } >> } } }
\end{lilypond}
\end{document}
and run the command C
> That means: There only is a real and severe security problem if
> lilypond-invoke-editor is installed to handle non-textedit URIs.
>
> Does anybody do that? Probably not.
>
> I think we simply should nuke run-browser and do nothing
> if lilypond-invoke-editor is called with a non-textedit URI.
Am 15.11.2017 um 00:12 schrieb Gabriel Corona:
In fact, in lilypond-invoke-editor's case it's even worse than that as
lilypond-invoke-editor can be used to execute arbitrary commands:
BROWSER="chromium" /usr/bin/lilypond-invoke-editor
"http://www.example.com/ & xterm"
BROWSER="chromium" /usr/bi
Jonathan Shamblen writes:
> In other words, if there is a \bookOutputName or \bookOutputSuffix can
> lilypond check in the lilypond included directories for already created
> converted files
> with the bookOutputName /bookOutputSuffix and skip the compilation process
> for the snippet if the alre
In other words, if there is a \bookOutputName or \bookOutputSuffix can
lilypond check in the lilypond included directories for already created
converted files
with the bookOutputName /bookOutputSuffix and skip the compilation process
for the snippet if the already compiled files like
melody1.pdf
m
