Forgive the long-windedness, but there are some misunderstandings I'd
like to straighten out, and I'd like to be thorough. Off-topic for
bug-hurd; Mail-Followup-To set. Feel free to ignore this, but in that
case please don't hold too dearly to any bad impressions you have
about slashpackage, beca
Thomas Schwinge <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I chose "open source" because I'm aware that e.g. Dan Bernstein's
> software does not comply to the GNU definition of "free software".
Well, it doesn't fit the Open Source Definition either.
http://opensource.org/docs/definition.php
This hornet's nest i
"Alfred M. Szmidt" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>I have to use './configure [...] --prefix=[...]
>--with-headers=[...]' because I have every package installed into
>its own hierarchy of
>
> Then your system is broken.
Well, it's different. That doesn't make it broken necessarily. It
h
Roland McGrath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Anyhow, the point is a good one with respect to environment variables,
>> and perhaps we should enable EXECSERVERS with the suggested tweak,
>> that it is off for secure exec and for euid!=ruid.
>
> EXECSERVERS has to be excised from the environment, not
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Thomas Bushnell, BSG) wrote:
> We don't want to change other execs, because there is no reason to
> think there is any kind of security implication for them.
Why not? Doesn't ruid!=euid have the same implications as in Unix?
(I.e., that a setuid program was executed, and no cod
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Thomas Bushnell, BSG) wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Jarc) writes:
>> I don't know this Hurd stuff very well (or at all, nearly), but in
>> Unix terms, I'd say whatever code sets uid=euid (if any) in a setuid
>> situation should take respon
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Thomas Bushnell, BSG) wrote:
> Well, a setuid exec itself should disable EXECSERVERS. But the
> environment variable might still get inherited, and seven layers of
> fork/exec later, do something nasty. So that means that setuid exec
> should in fact clear EXECSERVERS in the pa
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Thomas Bushnell, BSG) wrote:
> Oystein Viggen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> Combined with umask 002 (suggested by yourself), this gives members of
>> the wheel group write access to all files created in /tmp by default, as
>> these files will be writable for group root.
...
> I
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Thomas Bushnell, BSG) wrote:
> (You only inherit gid if you are a member of the group.)
False.
$ ls -ld foo
drwxr-sr-x2 prj 12348 Apr 26 17:21 foo
$ id
uid=500(prj) gid=65534(default) groups=65534(default),500(prj),300(users)
$ mkdir foo/bar
$ ls -ld foo/ba
Oystein Viggen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The difference is that the SysV way won't work for more than one level
> of directories. Once you start making dirs within dirs[1], your sgid is
> not inherited, and group ownership falls back to your default group,
> instead of what you want.
False.
$
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Thomas Bushnell, BSG) wrote:
> A given project might be group "foobie", and all the people working on
> that project are in the group. They use a umask of 002. Everything
> works Just Great! Because when they create files or directories
> inside the project, they automaticall
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