John,
I for one support your rallying cry of decentralization.
If you are implying that even 10,000 full nodes seems far, far too few for a
distributed system that may ultimately face a very well-connected and
well-funded threat model, I agree with you completely. However, I took Gavin's
state
On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 2:13 AM, Peter Todd wrote:
> In any case given that SPV peers don't contribute back to the network
> they should obviously be heavily deprioritized and served only with
> whatever resources a node has spare.
Well, I'm glad we're making progress towards this kind of model
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On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 12:59 AM, Gavin Andresen
wrote:
> Peter said:
> "In any case given that SPV peers don't contribute back to the network
> they should obviously be heavily deprioritized and served only with
> whatever resources a node has spar
On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 10:59:18AM +1000, Gavin Andresen wrote:
> Peter said:
> "In any case given that SPV peers don't contribute back to the network
> they should obviously be heavily deprioritized and served only with
> whatever resources a node has spare."
>
> This seems very much like a "cut
Peter said:
"In any case given that SPV peers don't contribute back to the network
they should obviously be heavily deprioritized and served only with
whatever resources a node has spare."
This seems very much like a "cut off your nose to spite your face" solution.
SPV peers are INCREDIBLY IMPORT
Did some tests with a varient of attack... In short it's fairly easy to
saturate a node's disk IO bandwidth and when that happens the node
quickly falls behind in consensus, not to mention becomes useless to
it's peers. Note that the particular varient I tried is different, and
less efficient in ba
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