Re: [Bitcoin-development] Lexicographical Indexing of Transaction Inputs and Outputs

2015-06-08 Thread Kristov Atlas
> > As for IsStandard() rules - let alone soft forks - better to leave > discussion of them out for now. Removed that bit as well. Latest version: https://github.com/kristovatlas/rfc/blob/master/bips/bip-li01.mediawiki -Kristov --

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Lexicographical Indexing of Transaction Inputs and Outputs

2015-06-08 Thread Kristov Atlas
Hey Peter, thanks for your experienced feedback. On Sat, Jun 6, 2015 at 10:35 PM, Peter Todd wrote: > Why mention SIGHASH_SINGLE at all? Its use-case is highly specialized > protocols; you haven't taken into account the needs of those protocols. > For BIP's it's better to stick to the use-cases

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the blocksize limit

2015-06-08 Thread Raystonn .
> Bitcoin is a global consensus system - if you're (sic) bandwidth isn't > sufficient to keep up you are not part of the consensus. Bandwidth can be purchased. Infrastructure to handled increasing transaction volume can be purchased. The very fees being paid by a spammer will be used to incre

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the block size limit

2015-06-08 Thread Peter Todd
On Mon, Jun 08, 2015 at 06:06:00PM -0400, Bob McElrath wrote: > There was this wonderful technology invented a few years ago to deal with > spam. It's called Hashcash. All these hacky heuristics like block size are > just dancing around the problem, and the natural solution is already present >

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the block size limit

2015-06-08 Thread Peter Todd
On Mon, Jun 08, 2015 at 10:13:10PM +, Patrick Mccorry (PGR) wrote: > With the 0.01mBTC/KB minimum > relay fee and $230 USD/BTC that works out to about $2.3kUSD/GB of ram > > IIRC, the fee is 0.1mBTC, so it's $23/MB (assuming 1,000 tx * 2.3 cents) and > $23k/GB (assuming $23 * 1000, as each $2

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the blocksize limit

2015-06-08 Thread Peter Todd
On Mon, Jun 08, 2015 at 03:01:34PM -0700, Raystonn . wrote: > >There will always be a blocksize limit based on technological > >considerations - the network has a finite bandwidth limit. > > A bandwidth limit is not the same as a blocksize limit. Bandwidth > is unique to every individual. Miners

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the blocksize limit

2015-06-08 Thread Raystonn .
Not forgetting, simply deferring discussion on that. We’ve a much smaller limit to deal with right now. But even that limit would have to go to remove this attack. From: Btc Drak Sent: Monday, June 08, 2015 3:07 PM To: Raystonn . Cc: Peter Todd ; Bitcoin Dev ; Patrick Mccorry (PGR) Subject:

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the blocksize limit

2015-06-08 Thread Btc Drak
On Mon, Jun 8, 2015 at 11:01 PM, Raystonn . wrote: > No, with no blocksize limit, a spammer would would flood the network with > transactions until they ran out of money. I think you are forgetting even if you remove the blocksize limit, there is still a hard message size limit imposed by the p

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the block size limit

2015-06-08 Thread Bob McElrath
There was this wonderful technology invented a few years ago to deal with spam. It's called Hashcash. All these hacky heuristics like block size are just dancing around the problem, and the natural solution is already present in bitcoin: smaller blocks, (down to the point of individual transacti

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the blocksize limit

2015-06-08 Thread Raystonn .
> There will always be a blocksize limit based on technological > considerations - the network has a finite bandwidth limit. A bandwidth limit is not the same as a blocksize limit. Bandwidth is unique to every individual. Miners in China have different bandwidth and connectivity than miners i

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the block size limit

2015-06-08 Thread Peter Todd
On Mon, Jun 08, 2015 at 02:33:54PM -0700, Raystonn . wrote: > > the attack would be expensive. > > For attacks being waged to destroy Bitcoin by filling all blocks with spam > transactions, the attack succeeds when the attacker is well funded. This > gives well-funded private and/or public enti

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the blocksize limit

2015-06-08 Thread Raystonn .
> the only way a transaction can be removed from a Bitcoin Core mempool is > through it getting mined, double-spent, or the node restarting. Right. And that results in some transactions with insufficient fees getting dropped today after many hours. > The protection that we have against that at

Re: [Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Canonical input and output ordering in transactions

2015-06-08 Thread Peter Todd
On Mon, Jun 08, 2015 at 02:25:40PM -0700, Danny Thorpe wrote: > FWIW, The Open Assets colored coin protocol (CoinPrism) places special > significance on the zeroth input and the position of the OP_RETURN colored > coin marker output to distinguish colored coin issuance outputs from > transfer outpu

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the block size limit

2015-06-08 Thread Raystonn .
> the attack would be expensive. For attacks being waged to destroy Bitcoin by filling all blocks with spam transactions, the attack succeeds when the attacker is well funded. This gives well-funded private and/or public entities the means to destroy Bitcoin if they desire. This is only true

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the block size limit

2015-06-08 Thread Peter Todd
On Mon, Jun 08, 2015 at 02:14:01PM -0700, Raystonn . wrote: > > there is no memory pool cap currently > > Real hardware does not have an infinite amount of RAM. Memory pool sizes > cannot grow unbounded. Some transactions with insufficient fees do get > dropped today after many hours. Actuall

Re: [Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Canonical input and output ordering in transactions

2015-06-08 Thread Danny Thorpe
FWIW, The Open Assets colored coin protocol (CoinPrism) places special significance on the zeroth input and the position of the OP_RETURN colored coin marker output to distinguish colored coin issuance outputs from transfer outputs. Reordering the inputs or the outputs breaks the colored coin repre

Re: [Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the block size limit

2015-06-08 Thread Raystonn .
> If I were a miner under this attack, I would just use the spam to fill up > blocks alongside normal transactions maximising my profit. You are assuming here that you can identify which transactions are spam, and which are not, and then segregate the spam into a separate channels of transactio

[Bitcoin-development] New attack identified and potential solution described: Dropped-transaction spam attack against the block size limit

2015-06-08 Thread Raystonn .
When implemented, the block size limit was put in place to prevent the potential for a massive block to be used as an attack to benefit the miner of that block. The theory goes that such a massive block would enrich its miner by delaying other miners who are now busy downloading and validating