On Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 11:18 PM, Matt Whitlock wrote:
> To be more in the C++ spirit, I would suggest changing the (const
> std::vector &sig, size_t &off) parameters to
> (std::vector::const_iterator &itr, std::vector char>::const_iterator end).
I agree that is more in the spirit of C++, but p
To be more in the C++ spirit, I would suggest changing the (const
std::vector &sig, size_t &off) parameters to
(std::vector::const_iterator &itr, std::vector::const_iterator end).
Example:
bool ConsumeNumber(std::vector::const_iterator &itr,
std::vector::const_iterator end, unsigned int len)
{
Seems like a good change to me.
On Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 7:32 PM, Rusty Russell
wrote:
> Pieter Wuille writes:
> > Hello everyone,
> >
> > We've been aware of the risk of depending on OpenSSL for consensus
> > rules for a while, and were trying to get rid of this as part of BIP
> > 62 (malleabil
Hi there,
some thoughts in-line:
> >
> > Finally, distributors of consumer wallets can use this research in
> > order to distribute their wallet with policies which may be less prone
> > to Tor-specific attacks. Or leave this out altogether if their
> > audience has different expectations for conn
Pieter Wuille writes:
> Hello everyone,
>
> We've been aware of the risk of depending on OpenSSL for consensus
> rules for a while, and were trying to get rid of this as part of BIP
> 62 (malleability protection), which was however postponed due to
> unforeseen complexities. The recent evens (see
I'm really glad to see this proposal. We already treat non-DER
signatures as non-standard in btcd and agree that extending them be
illegal as a part of a soft fork is a smart and sane thing to do.
It's also good to see the explicit use of signature parsing since it
matches what we already do as w
On Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 3:37 PM, Gavin Andresen wrote:
> DERSIG BIP looks great to me, just a few nit-picky changes suggested:
>
> You mention the "DER standard" : should link to
> http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf (or
> whatever is best reference for DER).
>
> "t
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On 2015/1/21 15:30, Pieter Wuille wrote:
> Thanks for the comments. I hope I have clarified the text a bit
> accordingly.
You're welcome. All the revisions look good to me.
- ---
Douglas Roark
Senior Developer
Armory Technologies, Inc.
d...@bitcoi
I've read this and it looks A-OK to me.
Andrew
On Tue, Jan 20, 2015 at 07:35:49PM -0500, Pieter Wuille wrote:
> Hello everyone,
>
> We've been aware of the risk of depending on OpenSSL for consensus
> rules for a while, and were trying to get rid of this as part of BIP
> 62 (malleability prot
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On 2015/1/21 15:37, Gavin Andresen wrote:
> You mention the "DER standard" : should link to
> http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf
>
>
(or whatever is best reference for DER).
The link you gave is to the 2002 revision
DERSIG BIP looks great to me, just a few nit-picky changes suggested:
You mention the "DER standard" : should link to
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf (or
whatever is best reference for DER).
"this would simplify avoiding OpenSSL in consensus implementations" -
On Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Douglas Roark wrote:
> Nice paper, Pieter. I do have a bit of feedback.
Thanks for the comments. I hope I have clarified the text a bit accordingly.
> 1)The first sentence of "Deployment" has a typo. "We reuse the
> double-threshold switchover mechanism from BIP
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On 2015/1/20 19:35, Pieter Wuille wrote:> Hello everyone,
> Comments/criticisms are very welcome, but I'd prefer keeping the
> discussion here on the mailinglist (which is more accessible than
> on the gist).
Nice paper, Pieter. I do have a bit of
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3rd party / web wallets are no longer viable except as means to burn
customers and divulge (or be forced to divulge) their data to
governments and corporations.
Rather than restate what I have already posted on this matter I'll
leave it there. It's
On Tue, Jan 20, 2015 at 07:35:49PM -0500, Pieter Wuille wrote:
I read this and it's boring, now that all my objections have been met. :)
I'll try get a chance to actually test/review this in detail; in SF for
the next three weeks with some ugly deadlines and a slow laptop. :(
> Hello everyone,
>
On Tue, Jan 20, 2015 at 11:45 PM, Rusty Russell wrote:
> // Null bytes at the start of R are not allowed, unless it would otherwise be
> // interpreted as a negative number.
> if (lenS > 1 && (sig[lenR + 6] == 0x00) && !(sig[lenR + 7] & 0x80))
> return false;
>
> You mean "null bytes at th
Bitcoin has a major crossroad ahead regarding a suitable platform for the
average non technical main stream user. Until now the majority of the
available solutions were at two extremes, or DIY your security and privacy
*OR* let a 3rd party service do it for you. The DIY solution is obviously
not sc
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