> using nothing at stake
I see from the way you're using this term now that you mean something
completely different by it than I usually understand the phrase. You seem
to mean it as that minters can check whether they can mint a block without
any cost. By contrast, I generally understand the phr
Hi,
This post is pursuing a wider discussion around better fee-bumping
strategies for second-layer protocols. It draws out a comparison between
input-based and CPFP fee-bumping techniques, and their apparent trade-offs
in terms of onchain footprint, tx-relay bandwidth rebroadcast, batching
opportu
Problems with proof-of-stake:
- A single CVE can tear down the network and hacked nodes can result
in transferring all mining power to one group
- PoS is vulnerable to DOS attacks (increasing latency reduces the
cost of mining attacks)
- PoS is vulnerable to stakers colluding to punish/drive ou
Hi,
> ## Input-Based
>
> I think input-based fee-bumping has been less studied as fee-bumping
> primitive for L2s [1]. One variant of input-based fee-bumping usable today is
> the leverage of the SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY/SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability flags.
> If the transaction is the latest stage of
