Good morning Dmitry, and list,
> > > I wonder if there's a cryptographic way to prove that muSig and
> > > 2P-ECDSA have not been used to create a certain pubkey/signature.
> >
> > In the second scheme, to revoke/spoil the bond, the entity that
> > controls one TXO participating in this bond needs
В Thu, 08 Aug 2019 09:35:24 +
ZmnSCPxj wrote:
> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
> OP_CHECKSIG
This anti-snitch protection won't work if there are two snitches, which
is concievable in the case of a large-scale consolidated bonds (one
entity can pretend to be two independent entities with two different
T
В Wed, 7 Aug 2019 20:10:17 +0500
Dmitry Petukhov via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> In shared ownership rent scheme that ZmnSCPxj described in [1],
> the 'TXO rentier' has a signed timelocked 'backout' transaction that
> spends the locked TXO, and assigns the reward to rentier.
>
> If we say that any tran
Good morning Dmitry,
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‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On Thursday, August 8, 2019 7:37 PM, Dmitry Petukhov wrote:
> В Thu, 08 Aug 2019 09:35:24 +
> ZmnSCPxj zmnsc...@protonmail.com wrote:
>
> > OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY
> > OP_CHECKSIG
>
> This anti-snitch prot
Hello list,
Two points:
* The V^2 term is the only thing in the whole scheme that provides any
sybil protection. I've already gone through the reasoning in an earlier
email and the maths is clear; in a scheme with linear V honest makers
have no economic advantage over sybil attackers. This is bec
