On Tue, May 23, 2017 at 3:22 PM, Paul Sztorc wrote:
>
> If you haven't seen http://www.truthcoin.info/blog/drivechain/ , that is
> probably the most human-readable description.
>
I guess I was looking for the detail you get in the code, but without
having to read the code.
My quick reading give
On Wed, May 24, 2017, at 04:42, Erik Aronesty wrote:
> Instead of block thresholds, use utxo bits to coordinate size changes
> (larger and smaller should be allowed).>
> There is no reason for miners to be involved in a decision to change
> this aspects of the protocol. Plenty of other ways to
On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 9:50 AM, Tier Nolan wrote:
> OP_BRIBE_VERIFY could then operate as follows
>
>OP_BRIBE_VERIFY
>
> This causes the script to fail if
>does not match the block height, or
>is not the hash for the sidechain with , or
> there is no hash for that sidechain in the
Responses below.
On 5/23/2017 7:26 PM, ZmnSCPxj wrote:
> Good morning,
>
>
>>>
>>> How is OP_BRIBE superior to just using a OP_RETURN script? Cannot
>>> a sidechain scan the block for OP_RETURN attesting that the block hash
>>> is present in the block?
>>
>>The sidechain software can indeed, b
I think we should go for 75%, same Litecoin. As I have said before, 95%
threshold is too high even for unconventional soft forks.
> 在 2017年5月24日，04:58，Andrew Chow via bitcoin-dev
> 写道：
>
> Ah. I see now. It wasn't very clear to me that that is what will happen.
>
> Also, shouldn't the timeout
I would be fine with that, since segwit is widely deployed on the
network already a lower activation threshold should be safe.
On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 12:02 PM, Wang Chun <1240...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I think we should go for 75%, same Litecoin. As I have said before, 95%
> threshold is too high e
Yes, 75% seems fine - given that there is a already a wide deployment of
segwit enforcing nodes
This implementation is 100% compatible with a "UASF movement" since, if
triggered, it essentially turns all supporting miners into equivalent
BIP148 enforcers. This should allay any fears that this wo
Your assumptions of the bribe process are indeed correct you seem to
have a pretty good handle on all of that.
Hopefully I can clear up a few things. BMM among other things is still a
work in progress so you'll have to wait a
bit longer before any reorg code is on github. The "ratchet" system on
g
Hello Bitcoin-Dev,
A quick update that CVE-2017-9230 has been assigned for the security
vulnerability commonly called ‘ASICBOOST’:
"The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack
methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte
chunks follo
