Hello,
On 7/13/2017 9:17 AM, Hampus Sjöberg wrote:
> In softforks, I would argue that 100% of all nodes and miners need to
> upgrade to the new rules.
> This makes sure that trying to incorrectly spend an "AnyOneCanSpend"
> will result in a hardfork, instead of a temporary (or permanent)
> chains
Greg is still conflating two different usages of the word "theft":
1. Whether the soft fork rules have been followed, and
2. Whether the WT^ submitted by a majority hashrate matches the one
calculated by sidechain nodes.
In his message he claims to uniquely adopt definition #2, saying
(emphasis ad
In softforks, I would argue that 100% of all nodes and miners need to
upgrade to the new rules.
This makes sure that trying to incorrectly spend an "AnyOneCanSpend" will
result in a hardfork, instead of a temporary (or permanent) chainsplit.
With drivechains, it seems like the current plan is to o
Dear Paul,
> In point of fact, he is wrong, because nodes do the counting. When miners
> find a block, they can choose to move the counter up, down, or not at all.
> But nodes do the counting.
I may very well have confused who counts what, but for this discussion on
*theft* it's irrelevant, so
I will repeat that Drivechain can sometimes be confusing because it is
different things to different people.
Here is my attempt to break it down into different modes:
[DC#0] -- Someone who does not upgrade their Bitcoin software (and is
running, say, 0.13). However, they experience the effects of
Paul,
> The confusion below stems from his conflation of several different ideas.
I'm right here, are you having a conversation with me or are you on a stage
talking to an audience?
> FYI that document is nearly two years old, and although it is still
> overwhelmingly accurate, new optimizatio
The confusion below stems from his conflation of several different ideas.
I will try to explicitly clarify a distinction between several types of
user (or, "modes" of use if you prefer):
[DC#0] -- Someone who does not upgrade their Bitcoin software (and is
running, say, 0.13). However, they exper
Paul,
I'm assuming it's OK with you that I pick up from where we left off in the
"Scaling Roadmap" thread [1], so as to be on-topic per your request. (For
others reading, part of my reply to the previous email in this thread is here
[2]).
For reference, I said:
> Isn't it different in the cas
On 6/23/2017 10:19 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
> > They would certainly not be cheap, because they are relatively more
> > expensive due to the
> extra depreciation cost.
>
> If you design the inflation schedule correctly, it should be balance
> transaction costs *precisely*.
You have not explained
>Miners who are able to deal with the bandwidth caused by drivechain coffee
transactions will profit from these transactions, whereas smaller and more
geographically distributed miners will not. Those miners will, in turn,
build faster ASICs and buy more electricity and drive out smaller players.
> They would certainly not be cheap, because they are relatively more
expensive due to the extra depreciation cost.
This depends on how long you expect to keep money on a side chain and how
many transactions you plan on doing. Inflation is a great way of paying
PoS / PoB miners - that cannot in
Responses inline.
On 6/22/2017 9:45 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
> Users would tolerate depreciation because the intention is to have a
> cheap way of transacting using a two-way pegged chain that isn't
> controlled by miners. Who cares about some minor depreciation when
> the purpose of the chain is
Users would tolerate depreciation because the intention is to have a cheap
way of transacting using a two-way pegged chain that isn't controlled by
miners. Who cares about some minor depreciation when the purpose of the
chain is to do cheap secure transactions forever?
Add in UTXO commitments an
Hi Erik,
I don't think that your design is competitive. Why would users tolerate
a depreciation of X% per year, when there are alternatives which do not
require such depreciation? It seems to me that none would.
Paul
On 6/20/2017 9:38 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
> - a proof-of-burn sidechain is the
- a proof-of-burn sidechain is the ultimate two-way peg. you have to burn
bitcoin *or* side-chain tokens to mine the side chain. the size of the
burn is the degree of security.i actually wrote code to do randomized
blind burns where you have a poisson distribution (non-deterministic
selecte
Hi Erik,
As you know:
1. If a sidechain is merged mined it basically grows out of the existing
Bitcoin mining network. If it has a different PoW algorithm it is a new
mining network.
2. The security (ie, hashrate) of any mining network would be determined
by the total economic value of the block.
Hi Greg,
Responses below:
On 6/18/2017 5:30 PM, Tao Effect wrote:
> In Drivechain, 51% of miners have total control and ownership over all
> of the sidechain coins.
It would not be accurate to say that miners have "total" control. Miners
do control the destination of withdrawals, but they do not
In Drivechain, 51% of miners have total control and ownership over all of the
sidechain coins. The vision of Drivechain is to have many blockchains "plugged
in" to the main chain.
Today, well over 51% of miners are under the jurisdiction of a single
government.
Thus the effect of Drivechain ap
Hi everyone,
It has been 3 weeks -- responses so far have been really helpful. People
jumped right in, and identified unfinished or missing parts much faster
than I thought they would (ie, ~two days). Very impressive.
Currently, we are working on the sidechain side of blind merged mining.
As you
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