Re: [bitcoin-dev] Centralizing mining by force

2017-11-09 Thread Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev
It is not the case in practice that there exists no incentive to disrupt the market for transaction confirmation. Statism is profitable, and a primary source of revenue is seigniorage. Given Bitcoin's threat to that privilege, its destruction presents a hefty incentive. The security model of Bi

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Centralizing mining by force

2017-11-08 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
mining the anti-cartel chain in return for fees and valuable block rewards. Regards, ZmnSCPxj Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email. > Original Message > Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Centralizing mining by force > Local Time: November 7, 2017 11:55 AM &

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Centralizing mining by force

2017-11-08 Thread Marc Bevand via bitcoin-dev
What you describe is an example of a majority attack ("51% attack"). No technical mechanism in Bitcoin prevents this. However in practice, miners are not incentivized to perform this attack as it would destroy confidence in Bitcoin, and would ultimately impact their revenues. -Marc On Mon, Nov 6,

[bitcoin-dev] Centralizing mining by force

2017-11-06 Thread Robert Taylor via bitcoin-dev
Forgive me if this has been asked elsewhere before, but I am trying to understand a potential failure mode of Bitcoin mining. A majority of miners can decide which valid blocks extend the chain. But what would happen if a majority of miners, in the form of a cartel decided to validly orphan any bl