Hi ZmnSCPxj,
1. If all miners are rational and non-myopic, they will support the attack.
They don't need to cooperate, it's not the end of Bitcoin, but they all
have to know everyone is rational and non-myopic. If you want to be secure
in a situation like this then mad-htlc helps. Otherwise you ca
Hi ZmnSCPxj,
That's a good point. Basically there are two extremes, if everyone is
non-myoptic (rational), they should wait even for a small fee (our mad-htlc
result), and if everyone else is myopic (rational), a non-myopic miner
should only wait for a fairly large fee, depending on miner sizes an
Of course the order at the end should have been switched:
Consider first the case where Alice *does not* publish preimage "A": Bob
can safely publish preimage "B" and get both the Deposit and Collateral
tokens after the timeout.
Now, consider the case where Alice *publishes* preimage "A": If Bob
p
Hi ZmnSCPxj,
Thank you for taking the time to respond, these are very good points.
Responses inline.
On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 12:48 PM ZmnSCPxj wrote:
> Good morning Itay, Ittay, and Matan,
>
> I believe an unstated assumption in Bitcoin is that miners are
> short-sighted.
>
> The reasoning for
Hi all,
We'd like to bring to your attention our recent result concerning HTLC.
Here are the technical report and a short post outlining the main points:
* https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.12031
* https://ittayeyal.github.io/2020-06-22-mad-htlc
Essentially, we find that HTLC security relies on miners
