On 31 Dec 2022, at 10:28 am, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
>
>> This way:
>>
>> 1. system cannot be played
>> 2. only in case of destructive halving: system waits for the recovery of
>> network security
>
> The immediate danger we have with halvings is that in a competitive market,
> prof
On Thu, Jun 30, 2016 at 09:36:57AM -0400, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Encrypting links in a network without identity doesn't really seem to help
> enough for the costs to be justified.
Passive is still better than none.
> I would like to see a PGP-like "web of trust" proposal for both
On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 06:45:58PM +0200, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > then we should definitively use a form of end-to-end encryption between
> > nodes. Built into the network layer.
>
> Widespread application of this model is potentially problematic. It is a
> non-trivial problem to d
On Thu, Jun 09, 2016 at 08:57:29AM +0200, Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > Are there any links to discussions on how authentication may be done?
>
> I'm currently working on the Auth-BIP which is not worth reviewing it
> right now (I will post it to the mailing list once it has been reach
On Thu, Jun 09, 2016 at 01:24:09AM +, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> Reduction to plaintext isn't an interesting attack vector for an active
> attacker: they can simply impersonate the remote side.
>
> This is addressed via authentication, where available, which is done by a
> separate specification
Hi folks,
Overall I think BIP 151 is a good idea. However unless I'm mistaken, what's to
prevent someone between peers to suppress the initial 'encinit' message during
negotiation, causing both to fallback to plaintext?
Peers should negotiate a secure channel from the outset or backout entirely
w
