## Summary
Since Taproot (more generally any kind of MAST) spends have variable size which
depends on the path being used, the last such input to be signed in a multiparty
transaction can always use a larger than estimated signature to unfairly extract
a fee contribution from the other parties to
there are already images encoded in the chain using multisig. when we
eliminated the max-witness size in 2017, that made it a bit cheaper, that's
all (one tx instead of many)
https://www.righto.com/2014/02/ascii-bernanke-wikileaks-photographs.html
my favorite one is the javascript exploit for pe
The inscriptions are designed to be easy to use, they even specify that
mime types should be used. I'd say, the way the data is stored is anything
but 'obscure'. UIs will be popping up to make this really easy. The main
chain can't be censored, what's in a block is in a block. I'm predicting a
huge
its trivial to store images in such a way that they look like legit
transactions.
this was done, in the past, using large numbers of multisig output
addresses that encode the images.
given the goals of the project, introducing this sort of censorship into
bitcoin seems fundamentally undesirable
_
On Sat, Feb 4, 2023 at 6:28 PM Peter Todd wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 14, 2023 at 10:15:30PM +0200, Daniel Lipshitz wrote:
> > We have standard commercial information about the payment processors, non
> > custodial liquidity providers and merchants which become our clients - we
> > do not have any kyc/a
