Good morning Gloria, et al,
> > Removing the mempool would... naturally resolve all current issues inherent
> > in package relay and rbf rules.
>
> Removing the mempool does not help with this. How does a miner decide whether
> a conflicting transaction is an economically-advantageous replaceme
On Tue, Oct 26, 2021 at 07:44:45PM -0400, Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Such a list of endpoints couldn't be static otherwise it's an artificial
> barrier to enter in the mining competition, and as such a centralization
> vector. Dynamic, trust-minimized discovery of the mining endpoints a
Good Afternoon,
No. This has been discussed previously and eliminated as there is no proof that
the transaction can exist without population through the mempool. As a method
of payment not hearing about a transaction until it is possibly mined three
months later as I have experienced is non-fun
Hi Lisa,
Network mempools constitute a blockspace marketplace where block demand
meets the offer in real-time. Block producers are acting to discover the
best feerate bids compensating for their operational costs and transaction
proposers are acting to offer the best feerate in function of their
c
