Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_BEFOREBLOCKVERIFY - discussing and opcode that invalidates a spend path after a certain block

2021-06-10 Thread Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev
As it stands today, in order to double spend a transaction during a reorg, one must take an active role of recognizing that a reorg has happened, hope that the new branch has completely omitted your spending transaction, and then quickly broadcast a replacement transaction with a higher fee to outb

Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_BEFOREBLOCKVERIFY - discussing and opcode that invalidates a spend path after a certain block

2021-06-10 Thread Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev
@Russell In that thread, you quoted Satoshi there, but neither he nor you really deeply explained the concern. Would you mind elaborating on a situation that calls for concern here? Some deeper explanation of the "reorg safety" property would also be helpful. I'd very much like to know what your th

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques : Input-Based vs Child-Pay-For-Parent

2021-06-10 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Lloyd, Thanks for this tx mutation proposal extending the scope of fee-bumping techniques. IIUC, the serves as a pointer to increase the output amount by value to recover the recompute the transaction hash against which the original signature is valid ? Let's do a quick analysis of this schem

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques : Input-Based vs Child-Pay-For-Parent

2021-06-10 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> So something like `or(and(pk(FB),pk(A)),and(pk(FB),pk(B)),and(pk(FB),pk(C)))` with each `or` in their own leaf? I think it works, but only if the keys `A`, `B`, `C` are "hot", as in available to the fee-bumper. For Revault it means introducing a key for each watchtower in the vaults descriptors,

Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_BEFOREBLOCKVERIFY - discussing and opcode that invalidates a spend path after a certain block

2021-06-10 Thread Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev
This is a continuation of the thread at https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-April/018760.html on this topic. I still remain unconvinced that we ought to give up on the "reorg safety" property that is explicitly part of Bitcoin's design. On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 1:56 PM Bil

[bitcoin-dev] OP_BEFOREBLOCKVERIFY - discussing and opcode that invalidates a spend path after a certain block

2021-06-10 Thread Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev
Hi Everyone, I'd like to open a discussion of an opcode I call OP_BEFOREBLOCKVERIFY (OP_BBV) which is similar to ones that have been discussed before (eg OP_BLOCKNUMBER). The opcode is very simple: the it takes as a parameter a number representing a block height, and marks the transaction invalid

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques : Input-Based vs Child-Pay-For-Parent

2021-06-10 Thread darosior via bitcoin-dev
Hi, Another thing to consider when comparing these two techniques is anti-fee sniping protection. If you are going to feebump directly your revocation transaction by adding inputs to it, the nLockTime has already been signed in advance. Therefore your are sponsoring a transaction that could be i

[bitcoin-dev] BIP proposal: Anti-fee-sniping protection with nSequence in taproot transactions to improve privacy for off-chain protocols

2021-06-10 Thread Chris Belcher via bitcoin-dev
See https://gist.github.com/chris-belcher/903feab321bf41055c91eaec46581e89 for the latest version of this BIP. BIP: TBD Layer: Applications Title: Anti-fee-sniping protection with nSequence in taproot transactions to improve privacy for off-chain protocols Author: Chris Belcher Statu