>This "reserve" part of the fee will be paid to miners if the hashrate rises.
Anticipating ongoing hashrate rise shows that you have not yet thought about
moving outside of the current greed model, a model wherein mining will consume
all available resources within the colony's objective just to
(reposting to whole list instead of just him) @Moral Agent:
Interesting proposal though it introduces some elements
of proof of stake so it would be more controversial in my view. Also,
something needs to be explained about how this would not create an
attack where difficulty is frequently dropping
Thank you, and my apologies. I should have sent that link just to you and
not put everyone on cc.
On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 1:30 PM Andrew wrote:
> (reposting to whole list instead of just him) @Moral Agent:
> Interesting proposal though it introduces some elements
> of proof of stake so it would
Hi Erik,
Sorry, you're right - I thought we mentioned m-of-n as a footnote but that was
actually in the earlier pre-MuSig version of our multisig paper.
Threshold signatures -are- mentioned in the BIP which started this thread,
though.
At https://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnorr/bip-schnor
You might be interested in an idea I wrote about that is in a similar
spirit here:
https://medium.com/coinmonks/taming-large-miners-with-helper-blocks-6ae67ac242f6
>From the article:
When a block is solved, it randomly selects one satoshi from the utxo set
and gives whomever controls that satosh
I discussed this more at bitcointalk:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4998410.0
The attacks I'm interested in preventing are not only selfish mining
and collusion, but also more subtle attacks like block withholding,
and in general anything that aims to drive out the competition in
order t
The paper refers to either:
a) building up threshold signatures via concatenation, or. implicitly -
in Bitcoin -
b) by indicating that of M of N are valid, and requiring a validator to
validate one of the permutations of M that signed - as opposed to a scheme,
like a polynomial function, where
On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 01:37:59PM -0400, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> - Musig, by being M of M, is inherently prone to loss.
>
It has always been possible to create M-of-N threshold MuSig signatures for any
M, N with 0 < M ≤ N. This is (a) obvious, (b) in our paper, (c) implemented at
