This seems like something that might be better dealt with by modifying
the RBF eviction policy to calculate feerate separation between the
transactions in the mempool and opportunistically evict the sweep
transaction+parent if it has a sufficiently different feerate from the
bumped fee replacement.
> Perhaps I am not following what you"re saying here.
> If the receiver is paying a higher feerate than your replacement,
> he"ll get it confirmed as fast or faster than your replacement in any
> case.
It actually doesn't really matter much.
Let's say I want to pay Alice and Bob (unrelated entitie
On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 9:01 PM, Rhavar wrote:
> That's not really realistic. In practice some receivers do big sweeps and
> include unconfirmed inputs. Replacing the transaction means you need to pay
> the cost of the sweep, which you probably don't want to do (can be in the
> order of $100s of do
Hi,
Sorry for the delay, I overlooked this email until now. I see that Chris
and CryptAxe both answered but I will also answer, because the message
was addressed to me.
On 6/30/2017 12:00 AM, ZmnSCPxj wrote:
> >Your way is actually very similar to mine. Mine _forces_ the bribe to be
> >in the ear
This isn't BIP material, as it merely describes a local policy.
(BIP125 itself is also local policy, but one that involves standardisation
since it expresses how wallets interoperate with nodes with that policy.)
If you wish to suggest this policy change, you should just implement it and
open a
> I don"t really see how this is desirable: Just replace it-
That's not really realistic. In practice some receivers do big sweeps and
include unconfirmed inputs. Replacing the transaction means you need to pay the
cost of the sweep, which you probably don't want to do (can be in the order of
$1
On Sun, Jul 2, 2017 at 8:35 PM, Rhavar via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> ==Abstract==
>
> BIP125 allows transactions to opt into replaceability with a primary use
> case
> of allowing users to increase the fees of unconfirming transactions, helping
> create
> a more efficient fee market place.
I don't rea
==Abstract==
BIP125 allows transactions to opt into replaceability with a primary use case
of allowing users to increase the fees of unconfirming transactions, helping
create
a more efficient fee market place.
However this goal is hindered when the receiver of a transaction spends from the
unconfi
