Re: [bitcoin-dev] Treating ‘ASICBOOST’ as a Security Vulnerability

2017-05-24 Thread Cameron Garnham via bitcoin-dev
Hello Bitcoin-Dev, A quick update that CVE-2017-9230 has been assigned for the security vulnerability commonly called ‘ASICBOOST’: "The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks follo

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Drivechain -- Request for Discussion

2017-05-24 Thread CryptAxe via bitcoin-dev
Your assumptions of the bribe process are indeed correct you seem to have a pretty good handle on all of that. Hopefully I can clear up a few things. BMM among other things is still a work in progress so you'll have to wait a bit longer before any reorg code is on github. The "ratchet" system on g

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Reduced signalling threshold activation of existing segwit deployment

2017-05-24 Thread Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
Yes, 75% seems fine - given that there is a already a wide deployment of segwit enforcing nodes This implementation is 100% compatible with a "UASF movement" since, if triggered, it essentially turns all supporting miners into equivalent BIP148 enforcers. This should allay any fears that this wo

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Reduced signalling threshold activation of existing segwit deployment

2017-05-24 Thread James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev
I would be fine with that, since segwit is widely deployed on the network already a lower activation threshold should be safe. On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 12:02 PM, Wang Chun <1240...@gmail.com> wrote: > I think we should go for 75%, same Litecoin. As I have said before, 95% > threshold is too high e

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Reduced signalling threshold activation of existing segwit deployment

2017-05-24 Thread Wang Chun via bitcoin-dev
I think we should go for 75%, same Litecoin. As I have said before, 95% threshold is too high even for unconventional soft forks. > 在 2017年5月24日,04:58,Andrew Chow via bitcoin-dev > 写道: > > Ah. I see now. It wasn't very clear to me that that is what will happen. > > Also, shouldn't the timeout

[bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Re: Drivechain -- Request for Discussion

2017-05-24 Thread Paul Sztorc via bitcoin-dev
Responses below. On 5/23/2017 7:26 PM, ZmnSCPxj wrote: > Good morning, > > >>> >>> How is OP_BRIBE superior to just using a OP_RETURN script? Cannot >>> a sidechain scan the block for OP_RETURN attesting that the block hash >>> is present in the block? >> >>The sidechain software can indeed, b

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Drivechain -- Request for Discussion

2017-05-24 Thread Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev
On Wed, May 24, 2017 at 9:50 AM, Tier Nolan wrote: > OP_BRIBE_VERIFY could then operate as follows > >OP_BRIBE_VERIFY > > This causes the script to fail if >does not match the block height, or >is not the hash for the sidechain with , or > there is no hash for that sidechain in the

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal to allow users to configure the maximum block weight based on a support threshold

2017-05-24 Thread Tomas via bitcoin-dev
On Wed, May 24, 2017, at 04:42, Erik Aronesty wrote: > Instead of block thresholds, use utxo bits to coordinate size changes > (larger and smaller should be allowed).> > There is no reason for miners to be involved in a decision to change > this aspects of the protocol. Plenty of other ways to

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Drivechain -- Request for Discussion

2017-05-24 Thread Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, May 23, 2017 at 3:22 PM, Paul Sztorc wrote: > > If you haven't seen http://www.truthcoin.info/blog/drivechain/ , that is > probably the most human-readable description. > I guess I was looking for the detail you get in the code, but without having to read the code. My quick reading give