Not strictly speaking a wallet but we (BlockCypher) will also go down the
segwit path as soon as the BIP and branch are mature enough. All
transactions built from our APIs should eventually be segwitted (just made
up a verb).
Thanks,
Matthieu
*CTO and Founder, Blockcypher*
I have been informed th
Indeed, anything which uses P2SH is obviously vulnerable if there is an attack
on RIPEMD160 which reduces it's security only marginally. While no one thought
hard about these attacks when P2SH was designed, we realized later this was not
such a good idea to reuse the structure from P2PKH. Hence
Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
writes:
> Yes, this is what I worry about. We're constructing a 2-of-2 multisig
> escrow in a contract. I reveal my public key A, you do a 80-bit search for
> B and C such that H(A and B) = H(B and C). You tell me your keys B, and I
> happily send to H(A and B), which
On Jan 7, 2016 5:22 PM, "Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jan 7, 2016 at 6:52 PM, Pieter Wuille
wrote:
>>
>> Bitcoin does have parts that rely on economic arguments for security or
privacy, but can we please stick to using cryptography tha
On Thu, Jan 7, 2016 at 8:26 PM, Matt Corallo
wrote:
> So just because other attacks are possible we should weaken the crypto
> we use? You may feel comfortable weakening crypto used to protect a few
> billion dollars of other peoples' money, but I dont.
>
No...
I'm saying we can eliminate one s
So just because other attacks are possible we should weaken the crypto
we use? You may feel comfortable weakening crypto used to protect a few
billion dollars of other peoples' money, but I dont.
On 01/07/16 23:39, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Thanks, Ethan, that's helpful and I'll stop
On Thu, Jan 7, 2016 at 6:52 PM, Pieter Wuille
wrote:
> Bitcoin does have parts that rely on economic arguments for security or
> privacy, but can we please stick to using cryptography that is up to par
> for parts where we can? It's a small constant factor of data, and it
> categorically removes
Thanks, Ethan, that's helpful and I'll stop thinking that collision attacks
require 2^(n/2) memory...
So can we quantify the incremental increase in security of SHA256(SHA256)
over RIPEMD160(SHA256) versus the incremental increase in security of
having a simpler implementation of segwitness?
I'm
> "The problem case is where someone in a contract setup shows you a
script, which you accept as being a payment to yourself. An attacker could
use a collision attack to construct scripts with identical hashes, only one
of which does have the property you want, and steal coins.
>
> So you really wa
>Ethan: your algorithm will find two arbitrary values that collide. That isn't
>useful as an attack in the context we're talking about here (both of those
>values will be useless as coin destinations with overwhelming probability).
I'm not sure exactly the properties you want here and determini
Based on current GH/s count of 775,464,121 Bitcoin tests 2^80 every 19 days.
log2(775464121*(1000*1000*1000*60*60*24*19)) = ~80.07
I don't fully understand the security model of segwit, so my analysis
will assume that any collision is bad.
>But it also requires O(2^80) storage, which is utterly i
Maybe I'm asking this question on the wrong mailing list:
Matt/Adam: do you have some reason to think that RIPEMD160 will be broken
before SHA256?
And do you have some reason to think that they will be so broken that the
nested hash construction RIPEMD160(SHA256()) will be vulnerable?
Adam: re: "
Maybe I'm being dense, but I don't see why 2**80 storage is required for
this attack. Also, I don't see why the attacker ever needs to get the
victim to accept "arbitrary_data". Perhaps I'm wrong about how the
collision attack works:
1. Create a script which is perfectly acceptable and would
I have been informed that Breadwallet has also committed to supporting segwit.
The list now includes Blocktrail, Breadwallet, GreenAddress, GreenBits, mSIGNA,
and NBitcoin.
---
Eric
On January 7, 2016 5:28:18 AM PST, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
>I am pleased to report that as of December 31, 2015 we
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