On Tue, Mar 30, 2021 at 09:31:32PM +0200, Pier Carlo Chiodi wrote:
> Hi,
>
> > Let's assume an IXP has member A who has customer B, who propagates some
> address range. Who is responsible for originating blackhole route for IP
> addres from such range propagated to the IXP?
>
> FWIW, my understan
Hi,
> Let's assume an IXP has member A who has customer B, who propagates some
address range. Who is responsible for originating blackhole route for IP
addres from such range propagated to the IXP?
FWIW, my understanding of "Local Scope of Blackholes" from
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7999#sect
Hi Ondrej!
Your analysis is correct, based on RF7999, considering the Well-Know
BlackHole community.
But each Autonomous System can have its own Traffic Engineering
Communities, including RTBH.
This is a very useful resource for some type of reaction to attacks.
Let's say that I'm an ISP here in
On Tue, Mar 30, 2021 at 10:04:08AM -0300, Douglas Fischer wrote:
> It does make sense! A LOT!
>
> It is the only way I see that is possible to use RPKI as a source of
> information to validate RTBH with the available information existent now.
>
> P.S.: I even mentioned some about that on SIDROPS
Hi,
We use this option in production environment (2.0.7 with patches) ,
started in 2020.
Some side effects: Doubled number of tcp sessions with validator,
doubled number of roa tables (per each BIRD instanse).
Wbr, Milkhail,
MSK-IX
Douglas Fischer пишет 30.03.2021 16:04:
It does make sens
It does make sense! A LOT!
It is the only way I see that is possible to use RPKI as a source of
information to validate RTBH with the available information existent now.
P.S.: I even mentioned some about that on SIDROPS
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/vbfKT9yduwAtTNQVBoc5KCRPkmM/
T
