Re: Understanding Kaminsky exploit w/bind

2013-04-16 Thread Matus UHLAR - fantomas
On 15.04.13 09:44, Jamie Ostrowski wrote: But that is the point of my question. Since it is relying on it's cached entry for the auth. nameserver for mydomain.com, the attacker, once the auth. nameserver for mydomain.com was cached, would have to wait until that cached NS entry for mydomain.com e

Re: Understanding Kaminsky exploit w/bind

2013-04-15 Thread Jamie Ostrowski
On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 9:44 AM, Jamie Ostrowski wrote: > > > > On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 2:57 AM, Mark Elkins wrote: > >> On Sun, 2013-04-14 at 21:30 -0500, Jamie Ostrowski wrote: >> > >> > >> > >> > Hello, >> > >> > >> > I hope this isn't too off-topic, but I've been studying the Kaminsky >> >

Re: Understanding Kaminsky exploit w/bind

2013-04-15 Thread Jamie Ostrowski
On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 2:57 AM, Mark Elkins wrote: > On Sun, 2013-04-14 at 21:30 -0500, Jamie Ostrowski wrote: > > > > > > > > Hello, > > > > > > I hope this isn't too off-topic, but I've been studying the Kaminsky > > DNS exploit and I have a question. > > > > > > According to what I've read

Re: Understanding Kaminsky exploit w/bind

2013-04-15 Thread Mark Elkins
On Sun, 2013-04-14 at 21:30 -0500, Jamie Ostrowski wrote: > > > > Hello, > > > I hope this isn't too off-topic, but I've been studying the Kaminsky > DNS exploit and I have a question. > > > According to what I've read on the topic, the Kaminsky exploit > hijacks a whole domain, and that

Understanding Kaminsky exploit w/bind

2013-04-14 Thread Jamie Ostrowski
Hello, I hope this isn't too off-topic, but I've been studying the Kaminsky DNS exploit and I have a question. According to what I've read on the topic, the Kaminsky exploit hijacks a whole domain, and that you can launch the attack on a nameserver over and over. It seems to imply you can do t