Re: Enable systemd hardening options for named

2018-02-07 Thread Ludovic Gasc
Hi, More below. 2018-02-06 21:49 GMT+01:00 Petr Menšík : > Hi, More below > > Dne 1.2.2018 v 01:36 Ludovic Gasc napsal(a): > > 2018-01-31 21:47 GMT+01:00 Petr Menšík > <mailto:pemen...@redhat.com>>: > > > > Hi Ludovic, > > > > > >

Re: Enable systemd hardening options for named

2018-01-31 Thread Ludovic Gasc
bt it would work with that. I > want them to still work if they worked until now. Normal variant might > use that, chroot already has its own empty /dev. > > There is some nice page about this on Fedora wiki: > https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Packaging:Systemd#Fields_to_avoid >

Re: Enable systemd hardening options for named

2018-01-16 Thread Ludovic Gasc
in major distributions without extra dependencies: 99% of people don't customize the default daemons config setup, and SELinux/AppArmor/SMACK aren't always used. > > Daniel > > On 16.01.18 12:21, Ludovic Gasc wrote: > > Hi, > > > > I have merged config fi

Re: Enable systemd hardening options for named

2018-01-16 Thread Ludovic Gasc
ithub.com/ageis/f5595e59b1cddb1513d1b425a323db04 SystemCallArchitectures=native MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true RestrictRealtime=true -- Ludovic Gasc (GMLudo) 2018-01-16 12:21 GMT+01:00 Ludovic Gasc : > Hi, > > I have merged config files from Tony, Robert, and me. > I have tried to be the most generic, the re

Re: Enable systemd hardening options for named

2018-01-16 Thread Ludovic Gasc
accessiblePaths=/home InaccessiblePaths=/opt InaccessiblePaths=/root ReadWritePaths=/run/named ReadWritePaths=/var/cache/bind ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/bind -- Ludovic Gasc (GMLudo) 2018-01-15 21:14 GMT+01:00 Robert Edmonds : > Tony Finch wrote: > > Ludovic Gasc wrote: > >

Re: Enable systemd hardening options for named

2018-01-16 Thread Ludovic Gasc
2018-01-16 11:58 GMT+01:00 Reindl Harald : > > > Am 16.01.2018 um 11:46 schrieb Tony Finch: > >> Robert Edmonds wrote: >> >>> >>> I would guess that retaining CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE and CAP_SYS_RESOURCE >>> during the process runtime permits open-ended reloading of the config at >>> runtime (e.g.,

Re: Enable systemd hardening options for named

2018-01-16 Thread Ludovic Gasc
2018-01-16 10:22 GMT+01:00 Reindl Harald : > > > Am 16.01.2018 um 10:20 schrieb Ludovic Gasc: > >> 2018-01-15 19:11 GMT+01:00 Reindl Harald > h.rei...@thelounge.net>>: >> >> >> ReadOnlyDirectories=/etc >> ReadOnlyDirectories=/usr >>

Re: Enable systemd hardening options for named

2018-01-16 Thread Ludovic Gasc
2018-01-15 19:11 GMT+01:00 Reindl Harald : > > ReadOnlyDirectories=/etc > ReadOnlyDirectories=/usr > FYI, you can use ProtectSystem=strict to have more strict rules for the root filesystem: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.exec.html#ProtectSystem= _

Re: Enable systemd hardening options for named

2018-01-15 Thread Ludovic Gasc
First, thank you a lot everybody, I didn't think to have several detailed e-mails like that. I need now to merge all of your ideas and a propose a new version of the config file. However, I answer first to Tony, because I have a remark below: 2018-01-15 19:15 GMT+01:00 Tony Finch : >

Enable systemd hardening options for named

2018-01-15 Thread Ludovic Gasc
nelModules=true ProtectKernelTunables=true ProtectControlGroups=true InaccessiblePaths=/home InaccessiblePaths=/opt InaccessiblePaths=/root ReadWritePaths=/run/named ReadWritePaths=/var/cache/bind ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/bind -- Ludovic Gasc (GMLudo) ___ Please visit https: