[TLS]Additional Data in TLS 1.3

2024-08-15 Thread devi prasad
I've been reading about TLS 1.3, referring to RFC 8446, simply out of
technical curiosity.


While trying to figure out a few details from the mail archive, I couldn't
find conversations about the decision to include "additional data" (AD) in
the AEAD scheme. Trawling through the drafts I noticed something
interesting - AD went from being an empty input to being the record header,
from draft 24 to draft 25, in the span of about 15 days.

It's obvious I've no access to the technical conversations that must have
happened.

Can someone help me understand the reasons for including AD only in the
last few iterations of the draft. Why was AD an empty input, initially? Are
there any threads on the mailing list that I've missed?

Thank you very much.
Devi Prasad


Here's the reference for the text in drafts 24 and 25:

draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24, February 15, 2018

page 82

Section 5.2. Record Payload Protection

"... the additional data input is empty (zero length)."

draft-ietf-tls-tls13-25, March 02, 2018

page 82

5.2.  Record Payload Protection.

"... and the additional data input is the record header.

  I.e.,

 additional_data = TLSCiphertext.opaque_type ||

   TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version ||

   TLSCiphertext.length

... "
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[TLS]Re: Additional Data in TLS 1.3

2024-08-15 Thread devi prasad
Thank you, Chris, for the pointers! I wasn't aware of the paper nor the
GitHub issue.

It's such a coincidence that I'm reading Shrimpton's 2004 paper on
IND-CCA3!

I noticed you are one of the authors of the paper you cited. That makes it
even more interesting :)

Katz and Lindell (Third edition) present the authenticated-encryption
experiment, which I realised is what Shrimpton calls IND-CCA3. And that
triggered a few questions about TLS 1.3's choices.

Thanks again. I shall read the paper.

Regards
Devi Prasad


On Thu, 15 Aug, 2024, 21:59 Christopher Patton, 
wrote:

> HI Devi,
>
> This decision was made in large part due to the (arguably too
> conservative) analysis in this paper: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/634
> Here is the issue where it was discussed:
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1145
>
> I don't know why the AD was empty ... I'd also be very interested in this
> history.
>
> Chris P.
>
> On Thu, Aug 15, 2024 at 7:53 AM devi prasad  wrote:
>
>> I've been reading about TLS 1.3, referring to RFC 8446, simply out of
>> technical curiosity.
>>
>>
>> While trying to figure out a few details from the mail archive, I
>> couldn't find conversations about the decision to include "additional
>> data" (AD) in the AEAD scheme. Trawling through the drafts I noticed
>> something interesting - AD went from being an empty input to being the
>> record header, from draft 24 to draft 25, in the span of about 15 days.
>>
>> It's obvious I've no access to the technical conversations that must have
>> happened.
>>
>> Can someone help me understand the reasons for including AD only in the
>> last few iterations of the draft. Why was AD an empty input, initially?
>> Are there any threads on the mailing list that I've missed?
>>
>> Thank you very much.
>> Devi Prasad
>>
>>
>> Here's the reference for the text in drafts 24 and 25:
>>
>> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24, February 15, 2018
>>
>> page 82
>>
>> Section 5.2. Record Payload Protection
>>
>> "... the additional data input is empty (zero length)."
>>
>> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-25, March 02, 2018
>>
>> page 82
>>
>> 5.2.  Record Payload Protection.
>>
>> "... and the additional data input is the record header.
>>
>>   I.e.,
>>
>>  additional_data = TLSCiphertext.opaque_type ||
>>
>>TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version ||
>>
>>TLSCiphertext.length
>>
>> ... "
>>
>>
>>
>> ___
>> TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org
>> To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org
>>
>
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