[TLS]Weekly github digest (TLS Working Group Drafts)

[Repository Activity Summary Bot]

Issues
--
* tlswg/tls13-spec (+2/-0/💬35)
 2 issues created:
 - Should x25519 be made MTI? (by sftcd)
   https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1359 
 - Require sending MTI curves in CH.key_share (by ekr)
   https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1358 


 2 issues received 35 new comments:
 - #1359 Should x25519 be made MTI? (15 by Andrei-Popov, ekr, emanjon, kaduk, 
loganaden, richsalz, russhousley, sftcd, tomato42)
   https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1359 
 - #1358 Require sending MTI curves in CH.key_share (20 by Andrei-Popov, bwesterb, davidben, dennisjackson, dvorak42, ekr, emanjon, kaduk, sftcd, tomato42)
   https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/issues/1358 




Pull requests
-
* tlswg/tls13-spec (+1/-0/💬0)
 1 pull requests submitted:
 - X25519 MTI (by loganaden)
   https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/1360 



Repositories tracked by this digest:
---
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-semistatic-dh
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni
* https://github.com/tlswg/certificate-compression
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-flags
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec
* https://github.com/tlswg/dtls-conn-id
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts
* https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate
* https://github.com/tlswg/sniencryption
* https://github.com/tlswg/tls-exported-authenticator
* https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-ctls
* https://github.com/tlswg/external-psk-design-team
___
TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org
To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org

[TLS]Re: Curve-popularity data?

[Dennis Jackson]

On 08/06/2024 11:07, Peter Gutmann wrote:

when the dominant platform only offers 25519 then the the only option 
you have (unless you want to do the HRR dance) is to select that, 
whether you want it or not.


The recently adopted Key Share Prediction draft [1] allows servers to 
signal which key shares they'd like to see.


[1] 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-davidben-tls-key-share-prediction/
___
TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org
To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org

[TLS]Re: Curve-popularity data?

[Peter Gutmann]

Dennis Jackson  writes:

>The recently adopted Key Share Prediction draft [1] allows servers to signal
>which key shares they'd like to see.

Sure, but that both assumes you've got DNS in operation and that client and
server will go through the DNS backchannel to set up TLS parameters before
trying to connect.

Peter.
___
TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org
To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org