Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO

[Christopher Wood]

On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wrote:
> As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in 
> conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have 
> had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it 
> were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any specific 
> name.
> 
> ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW. 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH

ECH also works for me.

Best,
Chris (no hat)

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Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO

[Erik Nygren]

ECH works for me.  (I really don't care between ECH and ETCH and thing both
are fine.)

Erik


On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood 
wrote:

> On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wrote:
> > As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in
> > conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have
> > had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it
> > were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any specific
> > name.
> >
> > ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW.
> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH
>
> ECH also works for me.
>
> Best,
> Chris (no hat)
>
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Re: [TLS] Working group last call for draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-07

[Russ Housley]

> This is the Working Group Last Call for "Delegated Credentials for TLS" 
> available at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts/ 
> .  Please review 
> the document and respond to the list with any comments by June 2, 2020.  

I just reread draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-07.  I have a few comments.


MAJOR

In section 3, the document says:

   The secret key used to sign ...

Please change "secret" to "private".  Later in the sentence, [RFC5280]
is referenced, and it talks about "private key" in this context.


MINOR

Section 1 says:

   This allows server operators to limit the exposure of keys
   in cases where they do not realize a compromise has occurred.

I suggest an alternative:

   This allows server operators to limit the exposure of keys
   in cases where it might be difficult to determine whether a
   compromise has occurred.


Section 1 also says:

   Because the above problems do not relate to the CA's inherent
   function of validating possession of names, ...

The CA is responsible for confirming that the public key in the
certificate corresponds to a private key that can be used by the
certificate subject.  This is usually done by a proof of possession
mechanism.  So, I think that the start of this sentence should be
reworded to avoid the impression that the CA only validates the
name.


QUESTION

While I have no objection to the DelegationUsage extension,
I wonder is an extended key usage would provide the same
confidence in the certificate.


ASN.1 MODULE

After assigning a place holder vale for "TBD", I compiled the
module, and it works just fine.

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Re: [TLS] Bikeshedding ECHO

[Tommy Pauly]

ECH is good. Go for it!

Tommy

> On May 20, 2020, at 11:34 AM, Erik Nygren  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> ECH works for me.  (I really don't care between ECH and ETCH and thing both 
> are fine.)
> 
> Erik
> 
> 
>> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 2:20 PM Christopher Wood  
>> wrote:
>> On Tue, May 19, 2020, at 8:18 PM, Filippo Valsorda wrote:
>> > As a data point, I was fairly confused when ECHO came up in 
>> > conversation, and had to stop to ask what it was. I think I would have 
>> > had a better chance of figuring it out from context or search if it 
>> > were called ECH, but don't have a strong preference for any specific 
>> > name.
>> > 
>> > ECH does have a remarkable short Wikipedia disambiguation list, FWIW. 
>> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECH
>> 
>> ECH also works for me.
>> 
>> Best,
>> Chris (no hat)
>> 
>> ___
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>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
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