[Logica-l] [OFF] IA e PLN
Inteligência artificial à brasileira http://www.mobiletime.com.br/03/02/2017/inteligencia-artificial-a-brasileira/466025/news.aspx "Finger, do IME-USP, ressalta que o Brasil tem tradição em pesquisa em outras áreas relacionadas à inteligência artificial, como lógica matemática, dedução automática e redes bayesianas." Inteligência artificial precisa ser debatida por toda a sociedade, recomenda professor da USP http://www.mobiletime.com.br/21/02/2017/inteligencia-artificial-precisa-ser-debatida-por-toda-a-sociedade-recomenda-professor-da-usp/466644/news.aspx JM -- Você está recebendo esta mensagem porque se inscreveu no grupo "LOGICA-L" dos Grupos do Google. Para cancelar inscrição nesse grupo e parar de receber e-mails dele, envie um e-mail para logica-l+unsubscr...@dimap.ufrn.br. Para postar neste grupo, envie um e-mail para logica-l@dimap.ufrn.br. Visite este grupo em https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/group/logica-l/. Para ver esta discussão na web, acesse https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/d/msgid/logica-l/CAO6j_LhD19G8T9xvWTkB1yU3ztva_PsjCp_QjF8doiGSz6nD1w%40mail.gmail.com.
[Logica-l] [off-topic] Segunda edição do Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics
Caros, Alguém teria e poderia me ceder a *segunda *edição do Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (Tarski)? Agradeço desde já. -- Yuri de Lima Rodrigues Bacharelando em Filosofia (UFC) Pesquisador Bolsista PIBIC/CNPQ facebook.com/yurirodrigues329 -- Você está recebendo esta mensagem porque se inscreveu no grupo "LOGICA-L" dos Grupos do Google. Para cancelar inscrição nesse grupo e parar de receber e-mails dele, envie um e-mail para logica-l+unsubscr...@dimap.ufrn.br. Para postar neste grupo, envie um e-mail para logica-l@dimap.ufrn.br. Visite este grupo em https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/group/logica-l/. Para ver esta discussão na web, acesse https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/d/msgid/logica-l/CAE3TnXp-bs%2BBwN2gQuWzZk%2BgkAt-OQExo1C52CqswJkzNR1K8A%40mail.gmail.com.
[Logica-l] Third call for papers: DARe at LPNMR'17
* Please accept our apologies if you receive multiple copies of this call * == Call for Papers DARe at LPNMR 2017 Date: 3 July 2017 Espoo, Finland *** Deadline: 3 April 2017 *** == The Fourth International Workshop on "Defeasible and Ampliative Reasoning" (DARe) https://sites.google.com/view/dare-17 held at the International Conference on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning (LPNMR 2017) -- Latest News -- There will be a special issue of the International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (IJAR) containing selected extended versions of papers that have been accepted at DARe. The call for this special issue is planned for late 2017. More information to follow. -- Workshop Description and Aims -- Classical reasoning is not flexible enough when directly applied to the formalization of certain nuances of human quotidian decision making. These involve different kinds of reasoning such as reasoning with uncertainty, exceptions, similarity, vagueness, incomplete or contradictory information and many others. It turns out that everyday reasoning usually shows the two salient intertwined aspects below: * Ampliative aspect: augmenting the underlying reasoning by allowing more conclusions. In practical contexts, this amounts to the ability to make inferences that venture beyond the scope of the premises, somehow in an unsound but justifiable way. Prominent examples are (i) default reasoning: jumping to conclusions deemed as plausible 'by default', i.e., in the absence of information to the contrary, like applying negation as failure or adopting the closed-world assumption; (ii) inductive and abductive reasoning: taking chances in drawing conclusions that implicitly call for further scrutiny or tests by empirical observations, like in making inductive hypotheses in scientific theories or finding abductive explanations in forensics, and (iii) analogical reasoning: extrapolating from very few examples (in the worst case only one) on the basis of observable similarities or dissimilarities. * Defeasible aspect: curtailing the underlying reasoning by either disregarding or disallowing some conclusions that somehow ought not to be sanctioned. In practice, this amounts to the ability to backtrack one's conclusions or to admit exceptions in reasoning. Some examples of this are (i) retractive reasoning: withdrawing conclusions that have already been derived, like in belief contraction or in negotiation, and (ii) preemptive reasoning: preventing or blocking the inference of some conclusions by disallowing their derivation in the first place, like in dealing with exceptional cases in multiple inheritance networks and in regulatory systems. Several efforts have been put into the study and definition of formalisms within which the aforementioned aspects of everyday reasoning could adequately be captured at different levels. Despite the progress that has been achieved, a large avenue remains open for exploration. Indeed, the literature on non-monotonic reasoning has focused almost exclusively on defeasibility of argument forms, whereas belief revision paradigms are restricted to an underlying classical (Tarskian) consequence relation. Moreover, even if some of the issues related to uncertainty in reasoning have been studied using probabilistic approaches and statistical methods, their integration with qualitative frameworks remain a challenge. Finally, well-established approaches are largely based on propositional languages or haunted by the undecidability of full first-order logic. Modern applications require formalisms with a good balance between expressive power and computational complexity. DARe aims at bringing together researchers and practitioners from core areas of artificial intelligence, cognitive sciences, philosophy and related disciplines to discuss these kinds of problems and relevant results in a multi-disciplinary forum. The goal of the workshop is to present latest research developments, to discuss current directions in the field, and to collect first-hand feedback from the community. -- Scope of the Workshop -- DARe welcomes contributions on all aspects of defeasible and ampliative reasoning such as (but not limited to): - Abductive and inductive reasoning - Explanation finding, diagnosis and causal reasoning - Inconsistency handling and exception-tolerant reasoning - Decision-making under uncertainty and incomplete information - Default reasoning, non-monotonic reasoning, non-monotonic logics, conditional logics - Specific instances and variations of ampliative and defeasible reasoning - Probabilistic and statistical approaches to reasoning - Vagueness, rough sets, granularity and fuzzy-logics - Philosophical foundations of defeasibility - Empirical studies of reasoning - Relationship with cognition and language - Contextual reasoning - Preference-based reasoning - Analogical reasoning
[Logica-l] Fwd: [LOGIC] Research Fellowship in Mathematics, Prague (Czech Republic), Deadline: 17 Apr 2017
Camilo Thorne Mannheim, Germany mobile: +49(0)15202380352 http://camilothorne.com "Exegi monumentum aere perennius" (Horatius, Ode III-30) -- Forwarded message -- From: [LOGIC] Mailing List Date: Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 2:20 PM Subject: [LOGIC] Research Fellowship in Mathematics, Prague (Czech Republic), Deadline: 17 Apr 2017 To: A two year "Research Fellow" position is open in the Institute of Mathematics in Prague. The position starts June 1; the deadline for applications is April 17. See http://www.math.cas.cz/recrutements/postes.php?lang=0 Pavel Pudlak -- [LOGIC] mailing list http://www.dvmlg.de/mailingliste.html Archive: http://www.illc.uva.nl/LogicList/ provided by a collaboration of the DVMLG, the Maths Departments in Bonn and Hamburg, and the ILLC at the Universiteit van Amsterdam -- Você está recebendo esta mensagem porque se inscreveu no grupo "LOGICA-L" dos Grupos do Google. Para cancelar inscrição nesse grupo e parar de receber e-mails dele, envie um e-mail para logica-l+unsubscr...@dimap.ufrn.br. Para postar neste grupo, envie um e-mail para logica-l@dimap.ufrn.br. Visite este grupo em https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/group/logica-l/. Para ver esta discussão na web, acesse https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/d/msgid/logica-l/CAJPxwsdqvDaXd60jLAPX0CkEM2mTQU7rBha3_sNCsBBxr41XmA%40mail.gmail.com.
[Logica-l] Research Fellowship: Institute of Mathematics in Prague
Repassando a pedidos (sic): A two year "Research Fellow" position is open in the Institute of Mathematics in Prague. The position starts June 1; the deadline for applications is April 17. See http://www.math.cas.cz/recrutements/postes.php?lang=0 Pavel Pudlak http://www.dvmlg.de/mailingliste.html Archive: http://www.illc.uva.nl/LogicList/ provided by a collaboration of the DVMLG, the Maths Departments in Bonn and Hamburg, and the ILLC at the Universiteit van Amsterdam -- --- Walter Carnielli Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science and Department of Philosophy State University of Campinas –UNICAMP 13083-859 Campinas -SP, Brazil Phone: (+55) (19) 3521-6517 Institutional e-mail: walter.carnie...@cle.unicamp.br Website: http://www.cle.unicamp.br/prof/carnielli -- Você está recebendo esta mensagem porque se inscreveu no grupo "LOGICA-L" dos Grupos do Google. Para cancelar inscrição nesse grupo e parar de receber e-mails dele, envie um e-mail para logica-l+unsubscr...@dimap.ufrn.br. Para postar neste grupo, envie um e-mail para logica-l@dimap.ufrn.br. Visite este grupo em https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/group/logica-l/. Para ver esta discussão na web, acesse https://groups.google.com/a/dimap.ufrn.br/d/msgid/logica-l/CA%2Bob58MGcowfS56OWymtDq0omW3gw5%3D8uaSMgBm%3D3erq0_M6HA%40mail.gmail.com.
