What are key helpers?

[Josef Carnap]

Hello mailing list members,

In the option desription of --exec-path and in some descriptions of
other options as well I can read of "Key helpers".
What kind of program is a key helpers? Are key helpers part of the GnuPG
suite oder are they external programs?
Does anybody know some examples and for wehat purposes one could use hey
helpers?

Best regards
 Josef

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Re: A problem in the web of trust model or a gnupg bug?

[Peter Lebbing]

On 25/02/16 00:45, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> so the reason for revocation should affect whether signatures made
> before the revocation are worthy of consideration.

Ah, thanks for the rectification!

Peter.

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Re: Possible values for --compress-level and --bzip2-compress-level

[Peter Lebbing]

On 24/02/16 15:11, Josef Carnap wrote:
> I have a question to the options --compress-level and
> --bzip2-compress-level. Which are the supportet (possible)
> values of each of the options? -- Numbers from 0 up to 6?

The canonical way to use the BZIP2 algorithm on Linux is through the
bzip2 program. Its man page lists the following:

>-1 (or --fast) to -9 (or --best)
>   Set  the  block size to 100 k, 200 k ...  900 k when 
> compressing.
>   Has no effect when decompressing.  See MEMORY  MANAGEMENT  
> below.
>   The --fast and --best aliases are primarily for GNU gzip 
> compati‐
>   bility.  In particular, --fast doesn't make things  
> significantly
>   faster.  And --best merely selects the default behaviour.

The other two require you to look a bit further than just lowercasing
:), but I think they both use the DEFLATE compression method. On Linux,
you will often use gzip to create archives with DEFLATE. Its man page says:

>-# --fast --best
>   Regulate the speed of compression using the  specified  digit  
> #,
>   where -1 or --fast indicates the fastest compression method 
> (less
>   compression) and -9 or --best indicates the  slowest  
> compression
>   method  (best  compression).  The default compression level is 
> -6
>   (that is, biased towards high compression at expense of speed).

This does however raise a question:

> Here is the description of the both options in the GPG Manual: 
> [...]
> --bzip2-compress-level sets the compression level for the BZIP2
> compression algorithm (defaulting to 6 as well). This is a different
> option from --compress-level since BZIP2 uses a significant amount of
> memory for each additional compression level.

The defaults are apparently different?

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
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You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 

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Re: Problem compiling 2.0.29

[Peter Lebbing]

On 24/02/16 22:45, Anthony Papillion wrote:
> ../../g10/gpg2: error while loading shared libraries: libgcrypt.so.20:
> cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory

Where did you install the library? Is that path in /etc/ld.so.conf?

Perhaps you need to run

# ldconfig

to update the library cache.

I must admit I haven't ever compiled GnuPG myself other than with
dpkg-buildpackage, though :).

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 

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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Lachlan Gunn]

Le 2016-02-03 21:12, Robert J. Hansen a écrit :
> Time for my semi-regular FAQ perusing and updating.  I plan on updating
> the FAQ to include a link to the FSF's email security guide, but that
> seems like such an unobjectionable change I'm not going to kick it
> around the list for pre-approval.  Beyond that, if there's anything
> you've always thought the FAQ should mention, now's a great time to
> suggest it.  :)

Hello,

I realise this is rather late, but I notice that under the section,
"Will GnuPG ever support RSA-3072 or RSA-4096 by default?", ECC is
referred to as Elliptical Curve Cryptography rather than Elliptic.

If this is intentional then please disregard.

Thanks,
Lachlan



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Description: OpenPGP digital signature
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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 02/05/2016 01:34 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> If somebody can create a long-keyID-collision...
> 
> That seems to be a big 'if' right now.  Short collisions are easy;
> long ones are nontrivial.  Or did I miss something?

https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/current/msg07195.html

.. but at least 1.4 and 2.0 won't be able to import a colliding 64 bit
certificate as it is used as internal identifier as shown later in the
thread iirc.

Now, the real question discussed here though isn't really collission
but preimage attack, that is a different story and far more difficult :)


- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Aquila non capit muscas
The eagle does not hunt flies
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWzwDdAAoJECULev7WN52F45EH/iuUsMpcQBnUMk8JGCAGDpAb
EnOu4EEfK8QnCdQw3ggc/4Q02cH51SSx7k46PtYj74ENAQoJ13N20zFSzbR/Kfkj
yVs6PVROLkVh48fmd12jho4BQ0wSUD02v8F0avtYnlt9IRy4neSX2L7ukeSGCiLB
HIbPtbxAj1NnpZa0qov9DfImSaUIfAydks5McQML/S/r5rbySEKv53sXOCsDzs3t
o/k0JH8b6/kkhlFfR8/3GyqETYW+Ty7jFs+HjxK2jdlTYIBhBUD+bv1xGXcqizkS
aNR1BFBj+dFlBxr/b3KT2UTAtUT6WTJviXcKy2hcKafi2uKg3I2ToUbkLRFrn4k=
=d5cw
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

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Re: status of ed25519 draft

[Werner Koch]

On Wed, 24 Feb 2016 18:31, br...@minton.name said:
> The next draft is due soon.  How long does it usually take the IETF to
> ratify a draft RFC?

There won't be an RFC for that I-D.  Instead it will hopefully be part
of rfc-4880bis (the updated OpenPGP specs which is in the works).

Given that there are no real complaints about the Ed25519 I-D I plan to
remove the extra prompt during key generation and go ahead with Ed25519.
RFC-4880bis will take too long to get published.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

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Re: A problem in the web of trust model or a gnupg bug?

[Werner Koch]

On Thu, 25 Feb 2016 00:45, d...@fifthhorseman.net said:

> according to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3.23 :
>
>If a key has been revoked because of a compromise, all signatures
>created by that key are suspect.  However, if it was merely
>superseded or retired, old signatures are still valid.  If the

If the key has been compromised and the attacker assumes that the
legitimate owner of the key is aware of that, the attacker may issue a
revocation certificate with "superceded" reason and and claim that a
later arriving "compromised" revocation has been done accidentally.
Thus I am not convinced that the revocation reasons are useful for any
automated evaluation.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

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Re: Decrypt without importing key to keyring

[Werner Koch]

On Wed, 24 Feb 2016 11:34, thecisso...@hotmail.fr said:
> Hi, is there a way to use a private key (PGP) to decrypt a message
> without adding it to the keyring. I don't want the private key to be

No there is no such way,  You may however delete the key after use.
gpgsm has a concept of ephemeral keys which are remove from the keyring
after a few hours.  This could be added to gpg as well, but I don't see
a real use case for this.

Note that OpenPGP often requires access to several keys to validate the
key.  This is not only due to the Web-of-trust but also for dedicated
revocation keys and of course to track revocations.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Peter Lebbing]

(If this feels like droning on to you, just stop reading and go do 
something fun!)


On 2016-02-25 14:25, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:

Now, the real question discussed here though isn't really collission
but preimage attack, that is a different story and far more difficult 
:)


Thanks for the link! But my approach to it wasn't really from "is it a 
problem in practice" but more "should this be the advice we give" and 
"what's wrong with just using the fingerprint and be done with it 
forever". We always tell users to use the fingerprint if they need to be 
sure of authenticity. Or if I'm mistaken about that, I think we should.


My 2 cents,

Peter.

--
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 



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Single GPG key and multiple yubikeys

[Richard Genthner]

So I have a single gpg key for work with 3 sub keys. I have copied it to 
a yubikey nano just fine. Removed the yubi and removed my gpg key and 
then reimported the gpg key and inserted yubikey number two and did 
keytocard again for the second yubikey. When ever I do


ssh -l git github.com

gpg-agent[99732]: chan_10 -> SETDESC Please remove the current card and 
insert the one with serial number:%0A%0A  "D276000124010201000604163260"


which is the nano. It seems that even killing the gpg-agent and 
inserting the other yubikey doesn't seem to work. Suggestions?



--
Richard Genthner

Sr DevOps Engineer

When I Work, Inc. 

St Paul, MN


Meet Sam orGet a free 
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Re: Single GPG key and multiple yubikeys

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 02/25/2016 02:38 PM, Richard Genthner wrote:
> So I have a single gpg key for work with 3 sub keys. I have copied
> it to a yubikey nano just fine. Removed the yubi and removed my gpg
> key and then reimported the gpg key and inserted yubikey number two
> and did keytocard again for the second yubikey. When ever I do
> 
> ssh -l git github.com
> 
> gpg-agent[99732]: chan_10 -> SETDESC Please remove the current card
> and insert the one with serial number:%0A%0A 
> "D276000124010201000604163260"
> 
> which is the nano. It seems that even killing the gpg-agent and 
> inserting the other yubikey doesn't seem to work. Suggestions?

Delete the stubs and do gpg --card-status to learn of the new smartcard


- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Aquila non capit muscas
The eagle does not hunt flies
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWzxQsAAoJECULev7WN52FVoIIAMSkMuc0/v01e9qHYsC7GL+K
eVbUBKtZlmOQIhigVs9dU5hXYVMs9kGLDkCmPQJ8M38VzkpELtwOXUiZq7Bm/4rn
5NEvzL+PBbHfYo+yAn5ddhUv/usQP3dxVjKNDAF7vsf7arETiddDcuz3xJ6xdDaJ
A3DlqfTAMqzZaOi0iSMMniXcyn/YsMzoB+WXF0FAKzWZQRuh/BOdfV9h/jZTRShe
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0lZqQrVHciJRSOClL4Tr8T5lp2dlVGVb2QepMfsFZNX1JXVBqkgCnBCId/EIxKQ=
=xZws
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 02/25/2016 02:38 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> (If this feels like droning on to you, just stop reading and go do 
> something fun!)
> 
> On 2016-02-25 14:25, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>> Now, the real question discussed here though isn't really
>> collission but preimage attack, that is a different story and far
>> more difficult :)
> 
> Thanks for the link! But my approach to it wasn't really from "is
> it a problem in practice" but more "should this be the advice we
> give" and "what's wrong with just using the fingerprint and be done
> with it forever". We always tell users to use the fingerprint if
> they need to be sure of authenticity. Or if I'm mistaken about
> that, I think we should.
> 

Well, it depends. Sure, should always use full fingerprint for
certificate validation etc, no question asked. But the internal keyid
and the packet structure use 64 bit keyid as identifier, so using
fingerprint in quite a number of other cases is more resource
intensive without necessarily improving too much (in particular in
cases where action from yourself is required, default key for signing
etc).

- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Aquila non capit muscas
The eagle does not hunt flies
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWzxTNAAoJECULev7WN52FJFsIAKiJj4s233uBIXQ8quGpD8Gz
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a1J9hCvpKEyFClEvlK/MY9iUXyG6TreHKfLlN606f0Ui/4em3tqJNnitrwCeYQPJ
XSsLeR+G3nhGsbKE3kJWLDQjwkJvGdRkJRQqaIk21d5malJ6zXT4dHMactMKvvoF
0xEgZXkgyqyNWGNFe+DgacLhlji0KEHwinBeFsWjOZH1+mQZiuKv5gMv6scwvKk=
=nhfW
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

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Re: Single GPG key and multiple yubikeys

[Richard Genthner]

How do I delete the stubs with out deleting key? and when I do gpg 
--card-status never updates the application id.



Kristian Fiskerstrand 
February 25, 2016 at 9:48 AM
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Delete the stubs and do gpg --card-status to learn of the new smartcard


- -- 
- 

Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Aquila non capit muscas
The eagle does not hunt flies
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWzxQsAAoJECULev7WN52FVoIIAMSkMuc0/v01e9qHYsC7GL+K
eVbUBKtZlmOQIhigVs9dU5hXYVMs9kGLDkCmPQJ8M38VzkpELtwOXUiZq7Bm/4rn
5NEvzL+PBbHfYo+yAn5ddhUv/usQP3dxVjKNDAF7vsf7arETiddDcuz3xJ6xdDaJ
A3DlqfTAMqzZaOi0iSMMniXcyn/YsMzoB+WXF0FAKzWZQRuh/BOdfV9h/jZTRShe
4WKP26KBwCKViJQGfOzdwIfsSUG54eCh5nL+sMmkBBR942hDQceLcJtw1QRLZc5e
0lZqQrVHciJRSOClL4Tr8T5lp2dlVGVb2QepMfsFZNX1JXVBqkgCnBCId/EIxKQ=
=xZws
-END PGP SIGNATURE-


--
Richard Genthner

Sr DevOps Engineer

When I Work, Inc. 

St Paul, MN


Meet Sam orGet a free 
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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Peter Lebbing]

On 2016-02-25 15:50, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:

(in particular in
cases where action from yourself is required, default key for signing
etc).


I agree. Note that the discussed case, encrypt-to, silently encrypts to 
unvalidated keys that happen to be on a keyring. Just pick any key on 
your keyring that isn't valid, say it's mine, AC46EFE6DE500B3E, and put 
this in your gpg.conf (watch out what you're doing here, though!):


encrypt-to AC46EFE6DE500B3E

Now encrypt a test message to anyone, something like:

echo "I'm talking to myself" | gpg2 -o test.gpg -r E3EDFAE3 -e

Note how happy GnuPG is to do all this, and then do

gpg2 --list-only --list-packets test.gpg

Note how the unvalidated key is silently encrypted to without a peep 
from GnuPG.


HTH,

Peter.

--
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 



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Re: Single GPG key and multiple yubikeys

[Peter Lebbing]

On 2016-02-25 15:44, Richard Genthner wrote:

How do I delete the stubs with out deleting key? and when I do gpg
--card-status never updates the application id.


gpg --delete-secret-keys XXX

But don't do this when your primary key is on-disk, only do this when 
all your secret key material is stubs.


Note that it is very impractical to regularly use two smartcards on the 
same computer because of all this. You should probably stick to using a 
single smartcard on any single computer.


HTH,

Peter.

--
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 



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Re: Single GPG key and multiple yubikeys

[Richard Genthner]

Yeah, what I'm hoping to do is be able to carry my card with me and jump 
on a terminal while traveling and sign and login to things.



Peter Lebbing 
February 25, 2016 at 9:56 AM


gpg --delete-secret-keys XXX

But don't do this when your primary key is on-disk, only do this when 
all your secret key material is stubs.


Note that it is very impractical to regularly use two smartcards on 
the same computer because of all this. You should probably stick to 
using a single smartcard on any single computer.


HTH,

Peter.

Kristian Fiskerstrand 
February 25, 2016 at 9:48 AM
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Delete the stubs and do gpg --card-status to learn of the new smartcard


- -- 
- 

Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Aquila non capit muscas
The eagle does not hunt flies
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWzxQsAAoJECULev7WN52FVoIIAMSkMuc0/v01e9qHYsC7GL+K
eVbUBKtZlmOQIhigVs9dU5hXYVMs9kGLDkCmPQJ8M38VzkpELtwOXUiZq7Bm/4rn
5NEvzL+PBbHfYo+yAn5ddhUv/usQP3dxVjKNDAF7vsf7arETiddDcuz3xJ6xdDaJ
A3DlqfTAMqzZaOi0iSMMniXcyn/YsMzoB+WXF0FAKzWZQRuh/BOdfV9h/jZTRShe
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0lZqQrVHciJRSOClL4Tr8T5lp2dlVGVb2QepMfsFZNX1JXVBqkgCnBCId/EIxKQ=
=xZws
-END PGP SIGNATURE-
Richard Genthner 
February 25, 2016 at 9:44 AM
How do I delete the stubs with out deleting key? and when I do gpg 
--card-status never updates the application id.



Richard Genthner 
February 25, 2016 at 8:38 AM
So I have a single gpg key for work with 3 sub keys. I have copied it 
to a yubikey nano just fine. Removed the yubi and removed my gpg key 
and then reimported the gpg key and inserted yubikey number two and 
did keytocard again for the second yubikey. When ever I do


ssh -l git github.com

gpg-agent[99732]: chan_10 -> SETDESC Please remove the current card 
and insert the one with serial number:%0A%0A  
"D276000124010201000604163260"


--
Richard Genthner

Sr DevOps Engineer

When I Work, Inc. 

St Paul, MN


Meet Sam orGet a free 
T-Shirt here. 

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Specify UID for --sign-key

[Muri Nicanor]

hello gnupg-users,

is it possible to specifiy the uid for --sign-key (so i don't have to go
through the gpg --edit dialog)? i tried using
=Name 
or just

as described on [0], but i always get asked if i want to sign all the
uids and then i have to say no and choose the one i specified...

thanks & cheers,
muri
[0] https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Specify-a-User-ID.html

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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 02/25/2016 03:54 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 2016-02-25 15:50, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>> (in particular in cases where action from yourself is required,
>> default key for signing etc).
> 
> I agree. Note that the discussed case, encrypt-to, silently
> encrypts to unvalidated keys that happen to be on a keyring. Just
> pick any key on your keyring that isn't valid, say it's mine,
> AC46EFE6DE500B3E, and put this in your gpg.conf (watch out what
> you're doing here, though!):

Yeah, the no validation mode of encrypt-to really does call for
prudence in this specific case

- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Aquila non capit muscas
The eagle does not hunt flies
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWz0PWAAoJECULev7WN52FzHkIAKX4xajf5KpXJOXw5dnvd2qi
1246DTAAKs1kqpOMvGWtmJ6cHVB5oAzhrClu93iceCfIYBuOl5GPSruvKfm8A0gt
dS/FKyofu3lkyVHhmrwVNsl+zwNYgYdbgTxtzI6GDIj2iP0HywwXbCoBm0JmGVun
FOeba0/zD82QncDcSVTq6dX7x3bP6tXwszzh9zOzUwjHTw6gPYtj34dOFd+a6fBW
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1YZkZImz+hAoj/a7Fn/Xb3CSpzG59PsCO1KJsdyt5BD/sjX+ofA/yqUHI3LUmdg=
=jMFi
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Peter Lebbing]

On 25/02/16 19:11, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> If an attacker can control your gpg.conf file, there are so many worse
> things to do that it's hard for me to take this seriously.

I never, ever, once, argued the opposite. I sure hope you're not implying I am,
or that Kristian is. If you recall, I talked about public keys being attached to
e-mail messages, adding as a mitigating factor that your own key would probably
be earlier on the keyring. By now, we can add the mitigating factor that GnuPG
will bork on the key import. Plus, as was already established, the rather major
fact that as far as we know, nobody has pulled off a second-preimage attack
against a long keyID.

But take things as seriously as you see fit. As I indicated, this is more of the
variety of "what is prudence in user education", not "oh my God they are
H4xx0rzing our keez".

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 

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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Robert J. Hansen]

> Yeah, the no validation mode of encrypt-to really does call for
> prudence in this specific case

If an attacker can control your gpg.conf file, there are so many worse
things to do that it's hard for me to take this seriously.

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Re: Possible values for --compress-level and --bzip2-compress-level

[David Shaw]

On Feb 24, 2016, at 9:11 AM, Josef Carnap  wrote:
> 
> Hello everyone,
> 
> I have a question to the options --compress-level and
> --bzip2-compress-level. Which are the supportet (possible)
> values of each of the options? -- Numbers from 0 up to 6?

1 through 9, with 1 being the least compression (but generally runs faster) and 
9 being the most compression (but generally runs slower).

David
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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 02/05/2016 12:23 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:


> Furthermore, I think a reasonably often asked question is "Why
> can't I provide the password in a pipe to GnuPG anymore?". Old 1.4
> allowed this, but 2.0 is incapable of it and 2.1 needs a loopback
> pinentry. But of course, the answe

2.0 supports --batch --passphrase-fd 0

- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Aquila non capit muscas
The eagle does not hunt flies
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWz1TxAAoJECULev7WN52F/fsH/0nf7didqSH/QIM53PloxKRY
KzbItT5yhma2LZwRyWEukQfYJLi2RUJ0LGCoupSsnSIr0WC5267BmCSZucpx2892
3C7510uchV0tA3SKkbkc3uqXD9tH/3HQU0rRxgI3wf9Zl/ko9jg5ajjGgyK2Ci2e
0TyGpMdd+XNlmoVyCexOdXl/cMKSZru3M302T6Usnkz9to2QO5Dt0M9DOH+4wQiW
8O645zeT8i/fEeUjRW1abXpK/9T+4NsY6n8Bsc83iBEmfOmOsvPUlnx6/D55ItMe
LS1vu9jVvE6TVPP0u3B+s5/y/zwDhSmc2cecjaWlCsL+6zwQ372mrPES5yEL/dQ=
=D0ZZ
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Peter Lebbing]

On 25/02/16 20:24, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
> 2.0 supports --batch --passphrase-fd 0

Oh! I must have mixed up some things.

Thanks for the rectification!

I think perhaps I was thinking of entering a smartcard PIN, for which you do
need a loopback pinentry (right??), and which was impossible to do on 2.0
(right??). Oh man, let's hope I don't start to question everything now. I might
end up like Kyle in The Toothfairy's Tats episode of South Park...

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 

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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 02/25/2016 08:30 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 25/02/16 20:24, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>> 2.0 supports --batch --passphrase-fd 0
> 
> Oh! I must have mixed up some things.
> 
> Thanks for the rectification!
> 
> I think perhaps I was thinking of entering a smartcard PIN, for
> which you do need a loopback pinentry (right??), and which was
> impossible to do on 2.0 (right??). Oh man, let's hope I don't start
> to question everything now. I might

smartcard pin is a different story, indeed, I don't recall the details
sufficiently to say "impossible" and frankly I have not tried it with
a loopback pinentry, but it seems probable.

- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public OpenPGP key at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Aquila non capit muscas
The eagle does not hunt flies
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWz1k9AAoJECULev7WN52FGUYIAMA1YawzRo0DZcwCxrI/D/tq
01tJpxM3t384jtv/tHOu2fFnh9HdvS+DFTRZGBi6Iy+lHUTpv7mMuITiBJnIG7tM
MCiUtj/B3nM7EmwQpXdRHa00c69NLOPYcMHxvwXFWNeVuccQqYjGc1nJmJfGxpTg
LlLN4N+f97tGPH82slanlGAdfvUP4RVgdxb25OMD+egkCUzYSY9LWH/hk9RaBFKK
cNW00VQTZSAmz2Lfb6hmPU+9M4juOs46x+LfQNLlMUJXjeDH4Jl6Lc58wDLSivvh
eqlU8Afh5V0SPJoDHNmsIcx6Z9/N0WT6mIP77N4+ehohm6EFsWL7MGyoD+mgkbY=
=mENj
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

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cipher used when both --encrypt and --symmetric is specified

[Martin Ilchev]

I am looking for some help to figure out what cipher is used for symmetric
encryption when both pass phrase and public keys are used. I have
configured my gpg.conf with my preferred cipher algorithms as follows:
personal-cipher-preferences AES256 TWOFISH CAMELLIA256 AES192 CAMELLIA192
AES CAST5 CAMELLIA128 BLOWFISH IDEA 3DES

I have ran the following tests:
1. Symmetrically encrypt a file:
$gpg2 --symmetric somefile
decrypting that file shows the correct cipher being used (I am looking at
symkey enc packet field cipher 9 - aes256):
$ gpg2 -vvv --decrypt somefile.gpg
gpg: using character set `utf-8'
:symkey enc packet: version 4, cipher 9, s2k 3, hash 10
salt 7ff4f273bd71e14e, count 24117248 (231)
gpg: AES256 encrypted data
:encrypted data packet:
length: 360
mdc_method: 2
gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase
:compressed packet: algo=1
:literal data packet:
mode b (62), created 1456410134, name="somefile",
raw data: 1551 bytes
gpg: original file name='somefile'

2. Symmetrically encrypt and also encrypt for my own public key:
gpg2 -vvv --symmetric --encrypt --sign -r 0x1234567890ABCDEF somefile
decrypting the file shows that the cipher used is CAST5 (again looking at
the same symkey enc packet field cipher 3 - CAST5):
$ gpg2 -vvv --decrypt somefile.gpg
gpg: using character set `utf-8'
:pubkey enc packet: version 3, algo 1, keyid 1234567890ABCDEF
data: [4096 bits]
gpg: public key is 0x1234567890ABCDEF
gpg: using subkey 0x1234567890ABCDEF instead of primary key
0x1234567890ABCDEF
gpg: selecting openpgp failed: Card not present
:symkey enc packet: version 4, cipher 3, s2k 3, hash 10, seskey 256 bits
salt 7fa903ae28975d77, count 24117248 (231)
gpg: CAST5 encrypted session key
:encrypted data packet:
length: unknown
mdc_method: 2
gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase
gpg: using subkey 1234567890ABCDEF instead of primary key 1234567890ABCDEF
gpg: encrypted with 4096-bit RSA key, ID 1234567890ABCDEF, created
2018-13-34
  "Martin"
gpg: public key decryption failed: Operation cancelled
gpg: AES256 encrypted data
:compressed packet: algo=2
:onepass_sig packet: keyid 1234567890ABCDEF
version 3, sigclass 0x00, digest 10, pubkey 1, last=1
:literal data packet:
mode b (62), created 1456410193, name="somefile",
raw data: 1551 bytes
gpg: original file name='somefile'

To get the cipher name from the cipher numbers I check RFC4880 (
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-9.2).

My expectation is that symmetric encryption should use the same cipher
(AES256) in both cases.

Can someone please explain if the above is the expected behaviour or if my
expectations are wrong?

I am running Debin 8.3 with gnupg2 2.0.26-6. I use gpg2 because my 4096b
public/private keys are on a smart card.

I also apologies for the really long e-mail.

Kind Regards,
Martin
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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Doug Barton]

On 02/25/2016 06:50 AM, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:

On 02/25/2016 02:38 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:

(If this feels like droning on to you, just stop reading and go do
something fun!)



On 2016-02-25 14:25, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:

Now, the real question discussed here though isn't really
collission but preimage attack, that is a different story and far
more difficult :)



Thanks for the link! But my approach to it wasn't really from "is
it a problem in practice" but more "should this be the advice we
give" and "what's wrong with just using the fingerprint and be done
with it forever". We always tell users to use the fingerprint if
they need to be sure of authenticity. Or if I'm mistaken about
that, I think we should.



Well, it depends. Sure, should always use full fingerprint for
certificate validation etc, no question asked. But the internal keyid
and the packet structure use 64 bit keyid as identifier, so using
fingerprint in quite a number of other cases is more resource
intensive without necessarily improving too much (in particular in
cases where action from yourself is required, default key for signing
etc).


There is a value in future-proofing advice. It's true *today* that the 
64-bit key ID is used internally, but that may not be the case tomorrow.


There is also value in giving consistent advice. "Use the full 
fingerprint everywhere you need to identify a key" is much easier for 
users to understand than for them to try to remember which places they 
can/should use which method. Keep in mind that users are not going to be 
"doing PGP" on a day to day basis with the FAQ open in a neighboring 
window. If we can provide clear, consistent advice that's easy for users 
to remember we're way ahead of the game.


Doug

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Re: FAQ maintenance

[Daniel Kahn Gillmor]

On Thu 2016-02-25 09:50:57 -0500, Kristian Fiskerstrand 
 wrote:
> Well, it depends. Sure, should always use full fingerprint for
> certificate validation etc, no question asked. But the internal keyid
> and the packet structure use 64 bit keyid as identifier

I consider it a bug that GnuPG uses the 64-bit keyid as the internal
identifier, and that the packet structure uses the 64-bit keyid as well.
there's simply no justification for "saving those bits" on any modern
hardware.  We shouldn't embed the assumption that these limits will be
permanent in our documentation.

> so using fingerprint in quite a number of other cases is more resource
> intensive without necessarily improving too much (in particular in
> cases where action from yourself is required, default key for signing
> etc).

Why is it more resource intensive?  the user will be copying and pasting
this string one way or another, we should have them copy/pasting
something cryptographically strong, not something that is marginal and
only getting weaker with time.

 --dkg

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Re: Specify UID for --sign-key

[Daniel Kahn Gillmor]

Hi Muri--

On Thu 2016-02-25 18:59:53 +0100, Muri Nicanor  
wrote:
> is it possible to specifiy the uid for --sign-key (so i don't have to go
> through the gpg --edit dialog)? i tried using
> =Name 
> or just
> 
> as described on [0], but i always get asked if i want to sign all the
> uids and then i have to say no and choose the one i specified...

In GnuPG 2.1:

   --quick-sign-key fpr [names]

   --quick-lsign-key fpr [names]
  Directly sign a key from the passphrase without any further user
  interaction.  The fpr must be the verified  primary  fingerprint
  of a key in the local keyring. If no names are given, all useful
  user ids are signed; with given [names]  only  useful  user  ids
  matching  one  of theses names are signed.  The command --quick-
  lsign-key marks the signatures as  non-exportable.   If  such  a
  non-exportable  signature  already  exists  the --quick-sign-key
  turns it into a exportable signature.

  This command uses reasonable defaults and thus does not  provide
  the  full  flexibility of the "sign" subcommand from --edit-key.
  Its intended use is to help unattended key signing by  utilizing
  a list of verified fingerprints.

hth,

--dkg

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