wiki.gnupg.org theme?

[Bernhard Reiter]

Hi there, 

on the OpenPGP Summit last weekend, people suggested to me
that we could make the wiki look better.

Help with adding or creating a better theme is appreciated,
this is something you can do for the GnuPG Community. ;)

How do you like any of the 1.9 themes from https://moinmo.in/ThemeMarket ?

Best Regards,
Bernhard
ps.: please discuss on gnupg-users@ and cc me.
-- 
www.intevation.de/~bernhard (CEO)www.fsfe.org (Founding GA Member)
Intevation GmbH, Osnabrück, Germany; Amtsgericht Osnabrück, HRB 18998
Owned and run by Frank Koormann, Bernhard Reiter, Dr. Jan-Oliver Wagner


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Re: wiki.gnupg.org theme?

[Neal H. Walfield]

At Tue, 21 Apr 2015 10:26:19 +0200,
Bernhard Reiter wrote:
> on the OpenPGP Summit last weekend, people suggested to me
> that we could make the wiki look better.
> 
> Help with adding or creating a better theme is appreciated,
> this is something you can do for the GnuPG Community. ;)
> 
> How do you like any of the 1.9 themes from
> https://moinmo.in/ThemeMarket ?

I like Solenoid, if only because it appears to impose a maximum width
on the main content, which is my main complaint with the current
theme.

Neal

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Re: wiki.gnupg.org theme?

[Werner Koch]

On Tue, 21 Apr 2015 10:26, bernh...@intevation.de said:

> on the OpenPGP Summit last weekend, people suggested to me
> that we could make the wiki look better.

I'd appreciate if it looks similar to gnupg.org.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

-- 
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.


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Re: Passphrases for SSH connections not accepted via pinentry

[Peter Lebbing]

On 21/04/15 02:12, aslam karachiwala wrote:
> I know the passphrase I enter is correct because it works when entered
> into the the graphical app's (e.g., Dolphin, Eclipse IDE) prompt which
> appears after pinentry fails three times.

Note that this is not necessarily true: you can configure SSH to accept
both public key and passphrase authentication. If you fail to unlock the
private key, it could still allow you to login using the passphrase
associated with the account. There is no relation between the passphrase
protecting the private key and the passphrase associated with the login
account.

But "Operation cancelled" is not what I'd expect for entering a wrong
passphrase; I'm not sure though. It could refer to the whole process of
pubkey auth being cancelled as you failed to unlock the private key, in
which case it does make sense for a wrong passphrase.

Sorry I can't be of more help at this time.

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 

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Re: Passphrases for SSH connections not accepted via pinentry

[aslam karachiwala]

On 04/21/2015 05:34 AM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> Note that this is not necessarily true: you can configure SSH to
> accept both public key and passphrase authentication. If you fail to
> unlock the private key, it could still allow you to login using the
> passphrase associated with the account. There is no relation between
> the passphrase protecting the private key and the passphrase
> associated with the login account.
If by "passphrase associated with your login account" you mean the
system password for my username, then that is not why my SSH connection
succeeds when I enter the passphrase in the dialogs presented by
graphical apps. My SSH passphrase is not the same as my system password.
Secondly, when initiating the SSH connection on the command line, I get
a prompt explicitly asking for the password associated with my username
after three failed SSH attempts, which is how I have been working around
the issue. IOW, the SSH connection is indeed failing.

Also, why is the pinentry-qt4/gtk-2 dialog appearing at all when I am
SSHing from the command line? Shouldn't I get a command-line prompt?

--
aslam
PGP key  fingerprint: 736C D83E 32DB A2FD 0208
9113 0FC8 BA7D FECF 84FB

/Join World Community Grid
.
Help power cutting-edge research in health, poverty and sustainability./



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Re: Passphrases for SSH connections not accepted via pinentry

[Peter Lebbing]

On 21/04/15 15:29, aslam karachiwala wrote:
> If by "passphrase associated with your login account" you mean the
> system password for my username

Yes, that is what I mean. So I agree with your analysis then.

> Also, why is the pinentry-qt4/gtk-2 dialog appearing at all when I am
> SSHing from the command line? Shouldn't I get a command-line prompt?

No, if it is able to show the preferred pinentry, it will do that. If
that is a graphical pinentry, you'll get a graphical pinentry if possible.

HTH,

Peter.

-- 
I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail.
You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy.
My key is available at 

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Yubikey NEO OpenPGP advisory

[Jose Castillo]

I haven’t seen this posted to the list yet, and thought it would be important 
for people who use the Yubikey NEO's OpenPGP functionality with GnuPG. It 
regards a vulnerability in the Yubikey NEO implementation of the OpenPGP smart 
card application: 

https://developers.yubico.com/ykneo-openpgp/SecurityAdvisory%202015-04-14.html

Yubikeys running the vulnerable software will generate signatures and decrypt 
session keys unconditionally, i.e. without verifying the user’s PIN. I reported 
this vulnerability to Yubico on 4/11, and to their credit it was quickly fixed. 
Still, if you are using a Yubikey that you obtained prior to the fix being 
issued, you should be aware that this vulnerability could affect your security. 

This issue also affected the upstream javacardopenpgp project [1], which has 
been updated with a fix as well. 

[1]: http://sourceforge.net/projects/javacardopenpgp/

-- 

Joey Castillo
www.joeycastillo.com


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Unsubscribe

[Saxena, Deepak]

Please tell me how to unsubscribe from your mailing list?

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Re: Unsubscribe

[Robert J. Hansen]

> Please tell me how to unsubscribe from your mailing list?

It's located right at the end of each message:

> Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org 
> http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Visit that web page.  At the bottom you'll see, "To unsubscribe from
GnuPG-users, get a password reminder, or change your subscription
options...".  That's what you want to use.



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Re: Unsubscribe

[William Jimenez]

You can unsubscribe here:
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 9:59 AM, Saxena, Deepak <
deepak.sax...@safenet-inc.com> wrote:

> Please tell me how to unsubscribe from your mailing list?
>
> The information contained in this electronic mail transmission
> may be privileged and confidential, and therefore, protected
> from disclosure. If you have received this communication in
> error, please notify us immediately by replying to this
> message and deleting it from your computer without copying
> or disclosing it.
>
>
> ___
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Re: Yubikey NEO OpenPGP advisory

[Thomas Harning Jr.]

On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 1:49 PM Jose Castillo 
wrote:

> I haven’t seen this posted to the list yet, and thought it would be
> important for people who use the Yubikey NEO's OpenPGP functionality with
> GnuPG. It regards a vulnerability in the Yubikey NEO implementation of the
> OpenPGP smart card application:
>
>
> https://developers.yubico.com/ykneo-openpgp/SecurityAdvisory%202015-04-14.html
>
> Yubikeys running the vulnerable software will generate signatures and
> decrypt session keys unconditionally, i.e. without verifying the user’s
> PIN. I reported this vulnerability to Yubico on 4/11, and to their credit
> it was quickly fixed. Still, if you are using a Yubikey that you obtained
> prior to the fix being issued, you should be aware that this vulnerability
> could affect your security.
>
> This issue also affected the upstream javacardopenpgp project [1], which
> has been updated with a fix as well.
>
> [1]: http://sourceforge.net/projects/javacardopenpgp/
>
> --
>
> Joey Castillo
> www.joeycastillo.com
>

Thanks for the notice and the fix! :)
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