Re: gpg in a cybercafé
On 05.03.2015, Robert Deroy wrote: > How could i do for use gpg on a usb key, because i have no computer, i only > go in cybercafé. Don't do it, it's not safe. In case you're allowed to boot from an external medium, this still won't be secure. Because you have no control over the hardware built into the computer, a keylogger could read your input (read: passphrase), and somebody else with remote access could copy your secret key. After all, it boils down to what your thread model is, and how much unsecurity you can live with. If your data is crucial: don't do it. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpg in a cybercafé
On Fri, 6 Mar 2015 09:12, htd...@fritha.org said: > In case you're allowed to boot from an external medium, this still won't be > secure. Because you have no control over the hardware built into the computer, Does not even need to be hardware: A (remotely) modified firmware might first boot you into a virtual machine and only then boot the OS from disk or USB. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Trezor - Could this be the model for a PGP crypto device?
Yesterday in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, I attended a [talk][1] by Marek Palatinus, one of the relatively early Bitcoin miners and cofounder of [SatoshiLabs][2]. He gave an introduction to his path into Bitcoin, and things that went wrong, and then he presented the [Trezor][3] crypto device. The Trezor has a little display and two buttons. It generates and stores your private key which is used for identifying your address in the Bitcoin network. The Bitcoins that you own are associated with your address. Connected via USB to a computer, the Trezor signs Bitcoin transactions. Marek later explained to me that the Bitcoin crypto standard is different from those used with PGP. After the talk, I hammered him with questions: * What if I lose the device or if it breaks? For backup, the device presents a list of 24 English words, that the user should write down and keep on paper in a safe place. Using this list, the private key can be recreated. * What if Eve wants to access the device without my authorization? There is a PIN. * How is the key generated? With an RNG on the device, using entropy gathered from the connected computer. * There’s no PIN pad on the device; Couldn’t malware sniff the PIN? The device has a little screen that displays a matrix of nine numbers. On the computer’s screen appears the same matrix without numbers, and one clicks on these with the mouse. * Do I have to enter the PIN for every transaction? Only once, then the device remains activated. * Once the device is activated, couldn’t malware do arbitrary transactions? For every transaction there is information displayed on the device’s display, and it has to be confirmed with the press of a button on the device. * Can I trust the firmware? [Source code][4] is available. Users can check the code, compile it, and flash their own version. * What if Eve modifies the firmware in a malignant way and flashs it to the device? Flashing unsigned firmware causes the private key to be erased by the bootloader. * Can I trust the bootloader? Source code is available as well. Of course there could still be backdoors. However, at the moment I cannot see what can be done better, other than building your own hardware, ideally down to chip manufacturing level. [1]: http://www.meetup.com/lpa-tech/events/220413356/ [2]: http://satoshilabs.com/ [3]: http://satoshilabs.com/trezor/ [4]: https://github.com/trezor/ ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Trezor - Could this be the model for a PGP crypto device?
Hi Felix, I've got one of this device ! Work like a charm ! Love the idea that everything was encrypt inside of the device, nothing on the computer. Try to restore my wallet, again no problem !!! I will love to see one of this device for PGP. I'm thinking to use a smartcard inside Gemalto K50 but on a computer without GPG is useless... Same thing about NitroKeys Last thing: For Trezor, you have to install a bridge compatible on Windows, MacOSX and Linux. Of course, source code is available: https://github.com/trezor/trezord 2015-03-06 13:50 GMT+01:00 Felix E. Klee : > Yesterday in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, I attended a [talk][1] by Marek > Palatinus, one of the relatively early Bitcoin miners and cofounder of > [SatoshiLabs][2]. He gave an introduction to his path into Bitcoin, and > things that went wrong, and then he presented the [Trezor][3] crypto > device. > > The Trezor has a little display and two buttons. It generates and stores > your private key which is used for identifying your address in the > Bitcoin network. The Bitcoins that you own are associated with your > address. Connected via USB to a computer, the Trezor signs Bitcoin > transactions. > > Marek later explained to me that the Bitcoin crypto standard is > different from those used with PGP. > > After the talk, I hammered him with questions: > > * What if I lose the device or if it breaks? For backup, the device > presents a list of 24 English words, that the user should write down > and keep on paper in a safe place. Using this list, the private key > can be recreated. > > * What if Eve wants to access the device without my authorization? > There is a PIN. > > * How is the key generated? With an RNG on the device, using entropy > gathered from the connected computer. > > * There’s no PIN pad on the device; Couldn’t malware sniff the PIN? > The device has a little screen that displays a matrix of nine > numbers. On the computer’s screen appears the same matrix without > numbers, and one clicks on these with the mouse. > > * Do I have to enter the PIN for every transaction? Only once, then > the device remains activated. > > * Once the device is activated, couldn’t malware do arbitrary > transactions? For every transaction there is information displayed > on the device’s display, and it has to be confirmed with the press > of a button on the device. > > * Can I trust the firmware? [Source code][4] is available. Users can > check the code, compile it, and flash their own version. > > * What if Eve modifies the firmware in a malignant way and flashs it > to the device? Flashing unsigned firmware causes the private key to > be erased by the bootloader. > > * Can I trust the bootloader? Source code is available as well. > > Of course there could still be backdoors. However, at the moment I > cannot see what can be done better, other than building your own > hardware, ideally down to chip manufacturing level. > > [1]: http://www.meetup.com/lpa-tech/events/220413356/ > [2]: http://satoshilabs.com/ > [3]: http://satoshilabs.com/trezor/ > [4]: https://github.com/trezor/ > > ___ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > -- Antoine Michard ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: where can one find an official gnupg project statement on the state of sub project?
> Wow at last someone has said it. What a good idea !! For gnupg > 2.1.2 as well ... I think this is a bad idea. Third-party software repositories are beyond the capabilities of many users, particularly casual ones. Their distro came with certain repositories pre-configured. So for us to say, "oh, and by the way, you need to add this new third-party distro, and then do these steps to replace your old distro-provided package with a new one," runs smack in the face of > At present, the [consensus] of many threads is that encryption in > general is just too difficult for the average email user to use > willingly and successfully. The 'average email user' just has his > burden increased exponentially if he has to build everything from > source as well in order to follow the progress of the 'industry'. We're not going to make things better by demanding casual users develop even more skills. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Trezor - Could this be the model for a PGP crypto device?
On 03/06/2015 09:50 PM, Felix E. Klee wrote: > Marek later explained to me that the Bitcoin crypto standard is > different from those used with PGP. Do you mean the curve of secp256k1? GnuPG modern 2.1.x with development version of libgcrypt support secp256k1. Development version of Gnuk also supports secp256k1. It was introduced to GnuPG and Gnuk, so that we can sign the transactions of Bitcoin with GnuPG (and using Gnuk Token, if you have). That was the intention. I also asked Kristian for SKS server. And the support was added. I considered some enhancement to existing Bitcion client (such as Electrum), so that it can ask signing to GnuPG. However, nothing more happened beyond these lower level implementation enhancement. Perhaps, there wouldn't be enough demand (other than my own hack value). I had to stop my development for Bitcoin, because of infamous "BITTOKOIN" fraud in Japan. After all, their customers had no idea about controlling their own private keys and their computation by themselves, it could never be the potential market of Gnuk Token (or GnuPG). ... and I think that there is some interoperability issue(s) for handling of secp256k1 key in GnuPG implementation which doesn't support the specific curve (or ECC at all) and/or some? keyservers. I got report that my key on keyservers are huge, and it seems because of the subkey of secp256k1. I haven't examined the detail of this issue yet, and I don't know the cause of this trouble. So, I never recommend to join the experiment of secp256k1, now. If some people still want this direction, a person can check my subkey of secp256k1 (available in keyservers) with GnuPG modern and development version of libgcrypt. Then, he can see my Bitcoin address by a tool I posted last year (gpgkey2bc) [0]. And if he really wish to do so, he can send some Bitcoin to that address. When the amount of Bitcoin into the specific address will be much, it will be perhaps enough pressure to move my development to this area, back again. Well, I don't believe the device with good UI, in general. UI is (or can be) most complex component in a system. If there is a better UI, it means (for me, at least) that the system is more complex to make audit more difficult. And, in general, the hardware (MCU) requirement from good UI is rather bigger than the one from ECC itself. If a system will have a much power, power will corrupt. We could learn from the architecture of phone (with better UI). [0] gpgkey2bc: Generating address of Bitcoin from public key: https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2014-January/028147.html -- ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Anything that just works easily for folks?... without knowing this stuff.
Anything that just works easily for folks?... without knowing this stuff. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
A beautiful banker woman talks about the failed war on drugs in Latin America
She is on some global council to change drug policy: http://www.ted.com/talks/ilona_szabo_de_carvalho_4_lessons_i_learned_from_taking_a_stand_against_drugs_and_gun_violence#t-380552 Clif ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
