AES attack calculations (money and time)

2013-11-17 Thread Hauke Laging
Hello,

from time to time someone asks how secure (a)symmetric crypto really was and 
then our math and physics teacher Rob has his performance.

Somebody just pointed me at this:
http://2012.sharcs.org/slides/biryukov.pdf

Of course, they say "No practical impact due to reliance on related 
keys" because they had to stay below 2^100 but considering that they refer to 
real hardware whereas here the theoretical lower energy limits are used I am a 
bit surprised.

Is this paper correct? I am not an expert in these areas. The only point that 
came to my mind is that if you need energy of the magnitude of the US overall 
electricity consumption than you cannot ignore the energy costs. :-) Not even 
the impact on the prices for oil, gas and uranium at the world market. They 
calculated the price for chip fabs but not the one for power plants.

So what may be the upport bound there: The NSA will never have access to more 
than 1% (or rather 10%?) of the US electricity consumption? IIRC then 
electricity generation costs is supposed to be about 4ct (Euro cent) per kWh 
in Germany. Lower for the old nuclear plants but even higher if you build new 
ones. So the 4TW mentioned in the paper would result in about four billion 
(10^9) EUR per year for electricity if I calculated that correctly.

So maybe the rising energy prices turn out to at least protect our privacy... 
;-)

Another question as I am not familiar with crypto attacks: They are talking 
about plaintext there. Does that mean they need both plaintext and ciphertext 
to tun this kind of attack? If so then I assume the real computational effort 
is higher by orders of magnitude because you have to check whether each key is 
the right one. Is that correct?


BTW:
OpenPGP key generation on European TV again (starting at 28:30, 33:20 
respectively)
in German: http://www.arte.tv/guide/de/048515-004/tracks
in French: http://www.arte.tv/guide/fr/048515-004/tracks


Hauke
-- 
Crypto für alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5


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unable to use gnupg on a read-only filesystem

2013-11-17 Thread Martin Vegter

Dear list,
I am working on a read-only filesystem and I am using following command:

echo "hello" | gpg -e -a -r mar...@example.com

This command fails with the following errors:

gpg: failed to create temporary file `/root/.gnupg/.#lk0x847421':
Read-only file system
gpg: fatal: can't create lock for `/root/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg'

I don't have the option "use-temp-files" enabled in my config. Even when
I explicitly disable it, I get the same errors:

echo "asdf" | gpg --keyserver-options no-use-temp-files -e -a -r
mar...@example.com

Could somebody please advice how I can use gpg without temporary files ?

many thanks,
Martin



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Re: unable to use gnupg on a read-only filesystem

2013-11-17 Thread Hauke Laging
Am So 17.11.2013, 19:02:12 schrieb Martin Vegter:

> gpg: fatal: can't create lock for `/root/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg'

> Could somebody please advice how I can use gpg without temporary files ?

That is a lock file. Try --lock-never


Hauke
-- 
Crypto für alle: http://www.openpgp-schulungen.de/fuer/unterstuetzer/
OpenPGP: 7D82 FB9F D25A 2CE4 5241 6C37 BF4B 8EEF 1A57 1DF5


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Re: [tor-talk] BitMail.sf.net v 0.6 - Secure Encrypting Email Client

2013-11-17 Thread dan

 | ...  Further, getting two  
 | computers to generate the exact same binary code from the exact same  
 | source code is a surprisingly difficult challenge.  It requires a  
 | perfect match of everything from compiler versions to C library  
 | versions right down to identical *clocks* -- because often, compilers  
 | will incorporate timestamps into the output.
 | 
 | Doing checksum validation of source code is feasible.  Of binary code,  
 | not really.


Well said.  Two binaries can be execution identical except for their
use of registers -- their use of registers being an artefact of the
compiler.

--dan


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Re: [tor-talk] BitMail.sf.net v 0.6 - Secure Encrypting Email Client

2013-11-17 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 11/17/2013 11:44 AM, d...@geer.org wrote:
> Well said.  Two binaries can be execution identical except for their
> use of registers -- their use of registers being an artefact of the
> compiler.

In fact, it goes even deeper than that: many architectures allow their
processor to dynamically reorganize and/or modify the code being
executed.  (Out-of-order execution is one example of this.)  So even if
you're running two binaries that are completely identical, the CPU may
process them quite differently depending on the state of the system.
This has some extraordinary implications for those who are trying to
guarantee their CPU is operating exactly the same as another CPU!

Every couple of years I look at this problem, read a couple of papers,
and walk away muttering about now is a great time to start drinking
heavily...


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Re: [tor-talk] BitMail.sf.net v 0.6 - Secure Encrypting Email Client

2013-11-17 Thread Johan Wevers
On 18-11-2013 6:21, Robert J. Hansen wrote:

> So even if
> you're running two binaries that are completely identical, the CPU may
> process them quite differently depending on the state of the system.
> This has some extraordinary implications for those who are trying to
> guarantee their CPU is operating exactly the same as another CPU!

> Every couple of years I look at this problem, read a couple of papers,
> and walk away muttering about now is a great time to start drinking
> heavily...

Dijkstra's goal of formally prooving entire programs more complicated
than hello world seems further away than ever. Don't loose any sleep
over it, noone even tried that in practice anyway.

-- 
ir. J.C.A. Wevers
PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html


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