Re: kern/145158: [boot] 8.0-RELEASE DVD hang on boot

2010-07-08 Thread Miah Clayton
The following reply was made to PR kern/145158; it has been noted by GNATS.

From: Miah Clayton 
To: bug-follo...@freebsd.org, m...@ferrousmoon.com
Cc:  
Subject: Re: kern/145158: [boot] 8.0-RELEASE DVD hang on boot
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 2010 03:07:34 -0500

 --002215048e77670034048adbc7cd
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
 
 Has there been any progress on this issue? I can't reasonably install any
 version of FreeBSD to do the revert myself. Moreover, why hasn't the revert
 been done in the mainline repository?
 
 --002215048e77670034048adbc7cd
 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
 
 Has there been any progress on this issue? I can't reasonably install any 
version of FreeBSD to do the revert myself. Moreover, why hasn't the revert 
been done in the mainline repository?
 
 --002215048e77670034048adbc7cd--
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Re: www/148427: [patch] ru/share/sgml/header.l10n.ent: point to Russian Security page

2010-07-08 Thread maxim
Synopsis: [patch] ru/share/sgml/header.l10n.ent: point to Russian Security page

State-Changed-From-To: open->closed
State-Changed-By: maxim
State-Changed-When: Thu Jul 8 09:02:19 UTC 2010
State-Changed-Why: 
Committed.  Thanks!

http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/query-pr.cgi?pr=148427
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Re: www/148427: commit references a PR

2010-07-08 Thread dfilter service
The following reply was made to PR www/148427; it has been noted by GNATS.

From: dfil...@freebsd.org (dfilter service)
To: bug-follo...@freebsd.org
Cc:  
Subject: Re: www/148427: commit references a PR
Date: Thu,  8 Jul 2010 09:02:04 + (UTC)

 maxim   2010-07-08 09:01:49 UTC
 
   FreeBSD doc repository
 
   Modified files:
 ru/share/sgmlheader.l10n.ent 
   Log:
   o Point to the Russian translation of the FreeBSD Security
   Information page.
   
   PR: misc/148427
   Submitted by:   pluknet
   
   Revision  ChangesPath
   1.7   +2 -2  www/ru/share/sgml/header.l10n.ent
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misc/148450: recent glib20 __STDC_ISO_10646__ fix causes pidgin to crash

2010-07-08 Thread Kyryll A Mirnenko

>Number: 148450
>Category:   misc
>Synopsis:   recent glib20 __STDC_ISO_10646__ fix causes pidgin to crash
>Confidential:   no
>Severity:   non-critical
>Priority:   low
>Responsible:freebsd-bugs
>State:  open
>Quarter:
>Keywords:   
>Date-Required:
>Class:  sw-bug
>Submitter-Id:   current-users
>Arrival-Date:   Thu Jul 08 11:30:03 UTC 2010
>Closed-Date:
>Last-Modified:
>Originator: Kyryll A Mirnenko
>Release:RELENG_8_1
>Organization:
>Environment:
FreeBSD notebook 8.1-RC2 FreeBSD 8.1-RC2 #7: Wed Jul  7 23:22:36 EEST 2010 
r...@miryanote:/usr/src/sys/i386/compile/MY-LITE  i386
>Description:
I've got devel/glib20 built WITH_COLLATION_FIX=yes . The last commit to 
devel/glib20/Makefile adds a __STDC_ISO_10646__ definition to configure 
arguments for that option. The problem is pidgin (net-im/pidgin) constantly 
crashes if all conditions below are met:
a) glib20 built WITH_COLLATION_FIX=yes
b) glib20 built after that commit (so with __STDC_ISO_10646__ definition)
c) pidgin is started with uk_UA.KOI8-U locale

, but works well when any of three requirements above is lifted, e.g. if i 
reset locale to C, or if the commit is reverted (as it was before) it works 
well.
 According to the `pidgin -d` log the crash occurs somewhere during 
constructing the buddy list (either read from the local configuration in 
~/.purple or after an account added and the server contact list is read when 
started from scratch with no ~/.purple existing).
 Also, the possible significant condition is that the buddylist contains 
non-latin group names (while buddy names are all latin)
>How-To-Repeat:

>Fix:
Revert the __STDC_ISO_10646__ definition commit
or
unset devel/glib20 WITH_COLLATION_FIX=yes option
or
run an application (pidgin) with C locale

>Release-Note:
>Audit-Trail:
>Unformatted:
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Re: kern/148050: 9.0-CURRENT panic when tcpdump ipfw0 and net.inet.ip.fw.verbose=0

2010-07-08 Thread glebius
Synopsis: 9.0-CURRENT panic when tcpdump ipfw0 and net.inet.ip.fw.verbose=0

State-Changed-From-To: open->patched
State-Changed-By: glebius
State-Changed-When: Thu Jul 8 12:35:11 UTC 2010
State-Changed-Why: 
Fixed in head/.


Responsible-Changed-From-To: freebsd-bugs->glebius
Responsible-Changed-By: glebius
Responsible-Changed-When: Thu Jul 8 12:35:11 UTC 2010
Responsible-Changed-Why: 
Fixed in head/.

http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/query-pr.cgi?pr=148050
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Re: ports/148450: devel/glib20: recent glib20 __STDC_ISO_10646__ fix causes pidgin to crash

2010-07-08 Thread remko
Old Synopsis: recent glib20 __STDC_ISO_10646__ fix causes pidgin to crash
New Synopsis: devel/glib20: recent glib20 __STDC_ISO_10646__ fix causes pidgin 
to crash

Responsible-Changed-From-To: freebsd-bugs->freebsd-ports
Responsible-Changed-By: remko
Responsible-Changed-When: Thu Jul 8 14:57:18 UTC 2010
Responsible-Changed-Why: 
reassign to ports

http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/query-pr.cgi?pr=148450
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Re: kern/131597: [kernel] c++ exceptions very slow on FreeBSD 7.1/amd64

2010-07-08 Thread John Baldwin
The following reply was made to PR kern/131597; it has been noted by GNATS.

From: John Baldwin 
To: Kostik Belousov 
Cc: bug-follo...@freebsd.org,
 guilla...@morinfr.org,
 k...@freebsd.org,
 davi...@freebsd.org
Subject: Re: kern/131597: [kernel] c++ exceptions very slow on FreeBSD 7.1/amd64
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 2010 11:29:50 -0400

 On Friday, April 23, 2010 10:41:11 am Kostik Belousov wrote:
 > On Fri, Apr 23, 2010 at 10:21:41AM -0400, John Baldwin wrote:
 > > On Friday 23 April 2010 9:47:40 am Kostik Belousov wrote:
 > > > On Fri, Apr 23, 2010 at 08:43:41AM -0400, John Baldwin wrote:
 > > > > On Friday 23 April 2010 8:25:01 am Kostik Belousov wrote:
 > > > > > On Thu, Apr 22, 2010 at 04:09:34PM -0400, John Baldwin wrote:
 > > > > > > I tracked the sigprocmask() system calls down to the operations to
 > > > > > > acquire a write lock in the runtime linker. The lock was added to 
 > > > > > > fix
 > > > > > > an earlier bug with throwing exceptions in multithreaded C++ apps. 
 > > > > > > The
 > > > > > > relevant commit that added the lock is this:
 > > > > > >
 > > > > > >http://svn.freebsd.org/viewvc/base?view=revision&revision=178807
 > > > > > >
 > > > > > > Are exceptions permitted during a signal handler? If not, then in
 > > > > > > theory we would not need to invoke sigprocmask() for this 
 > > > > > > particular
 > > > > > > lock perhaps? I'm not sure how easy that would be to achieve given 
 > > > > > > the
 > > > > > > hooks to allow the thread library to overload the locking routines.
 > > > > > > Also, this doesn't explain the lack of sigprocmask() calls under 
 > > > > > > i386.
 > > > > > > FreeBSD/i386 should be using the same locking code and thus 
 > > > > > > invoking
 > > > > > > sigprocmask() for each exception as well.
 > > > > > 
 > > > > > Throwing an exception during asyncronous signal execution rises 
 > > > > > undefined
 > > > > > behaviour, AFAIK. sigprocmask() is there to support libc_r, and 
 > > > > > cannot
 > > > > > be removed as far as we need to provide FreeBSD 4.x compatibility.
 > > > > 
 > > > > Hmmm.  Why does libthr use sigprocmask() for its rtld locks then?  Is 
 > > > > that 
 > > > > just a copy-paste from libc_r that can be removed now?
 > > > 
 > > > Hmmm^2. It seems it is there to prevent recursive entry into rtld from
 > > > signal handler, that may reference yet unresolved symbol, e.g. libc
 > > > syscall wrapper, from PLT. So my patch is wrong.
 > > 
 > > Presumably we could use a different type of lock that doesn't use
 > > sigprocmask() to serialize calls do dl_iterate_phdr()? I'm not sure if
 > > libthr would really need to overwrite the behavior of that lock or if
 > > a simple atomic_cmpset()-based mutex would always be fine.
 > During my porting of libunwind, I was told by libunwind maintainer
 > that they have to call dl_iterate_phdr() from signal context to
 > unwind, if libunwind is called from signal context.
 > 
 > Apparently, glibc' dl_iterate_phdr() is not signal-safe, while our is.
 
 [Revisiting this]
 
 Do we know of any use cases where libunwind would be used from a signal
 handler?  Could we instead simply declare it to be an unsafe API in a signal
 context?  longjmp(3) isn't safe in a signal context and throwing exceptions
 in a signal handler is undefined, so declaring libunwind to similarly be
 unsafe may be fine.
 
 > > OTOH, I'm not sure why libthr needs to use non-standard lock hooks at
 > > this point as they don't seem to be markedly different from the ones
 > > rtld uses.
 > 
 > libthr locks provide exclusion both for other kernel-executed threads
 > and signal handlers, while the rtld-default locks only protect against
 > signal handlers and thus libc_r-style threads.
 
 Oh, bah.  The rtld locks do use atomic operations that are thread safe,
 but I missed that the 'oldsigmask' global needs to be per-thread.
 
 -- 
 John Baldwin
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Re: misc/148444: intel driver freezes system

2010-07-08 Thread Sergey Shavandin
The following reply was made to PR misc/148444; it has been noted by GNATS.

From: Sergey Shavandin 
To: bug-follo...@freebsd.org, sers...@yahoo.com
Cc:  
Subject: Re: misc/148444: intel driver freezes system
Date: Thu, 8 Jul 2010 09:40:27 -0700 (PDT)

 --0-1066443832-1278607227=:18453
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
 
 discussion in forum:
 http://forums.freebsd.org/showthread.php?p=91597#post91597
 
 
 
 --0-1066443832-1278607227=:18453
 Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii
 
 discussion in forum:http://forums.freebsd.org/showthread.php?p=91597#post91597";>http://forums.freebsd.org/showthread.php?p=91597#post91597
 
 --0-1066443832-1278607227=:18453--
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Re: i386/148444: [hang] intel driver freezes system with 855gm

2010-07-08 Thread linimon
Old Synopsis: intel driver freezes system
New Synopsis: [hang] intel driver freezes system with 855gm

Responsible-Changed-From-To: freebsd-bugs->freebsd-i386
Responsible-Changed-By: linimon
Responsible-Changed-When: Thu Jul 8 21:52:07 UTC 2010
Responsible-Changed-Why: 
This may be hardware-specific.

http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/query-pr.cgi?pr=148444
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misc/148463: ARP cache can be poisoned or polluted with ease.

2010-07-08 Thread Paul-Andrew Joseph Miseiko

>Number: 148463
>Category:   misc
>Synopsis:   ARP cache can be poisoned or polluted with ease.
>Confidential:   no
>Severity:   non-critical
>Priority:   low
>Responsible:freebsd-bugs
>State:  open
>Quarter:
>Keywords:   
>Date-Required:
>Class:  sw-bug
>Submitter-Id:   current-users
>Arrival-Date:   Fri Jul 09 06:20:03 UTC 2010
>Closed-Date:
>Last-Modified:
>Originator: Paul-Andrew Joseph Miseiko
>Release:8.1-PRERELEASE
>Organization:
>Environment:
FreeBSD teardrop.ca 8.1-PRERELEASE FreeBSD 8.1-PRERELEASE #1: Wed Jul  7 
22:18:16 EDT 2010 esote...@teardrop.ca:/usr/obj/usr/src/sys/TEARDROP  i386
>Description:
FreeBSD will add to the kernel ARP cache the source hardware address associated 
with the source protocol address when an ARP request packet or ARP reply packet 
is received and the target protocol address is the same as the interface 
protocol address.

A malicious user could use this behavior to alter the hardware address 
associated with a particular protocol address.  FreeBSD will accept the new 
hardware address associated with a particular protocol address that is known in 
the ARP cache.

A malicious user could use this behavior to perform a denial of service against 
the kernel ARP cache when a FreeBSD device is bound to a large network.  
FreeBSD will create a kernel ARP cache entry for each ARP request packet and 
ARP reply packet received.
>How-To-Repeat:
Send an ARP request packet or ARP response packet to the physical broadcast 
address (or physical interface address) with the target protocol address set to 
a FreeBSD device and the source hardware address and source protocol address 
set to the desired protocol address to poison in the FreeBSD device kernel ARP 
cache or populate the FreeBSD kernel ARP cache with excessive entries.
>Fix:
#1.
FreeBSD should not permit alteration of a kernel ARP cache entry if it has not 
made an explicit ARP request for the protocol address associated with the 
kernel ARP cache entry.  The time-to-live for a kernel ARP cache entry might 
need to be shortened for this to work well in heterogeneous environments.  Some 
of the risk involved with malicious intent to redirect a protocol address to a 
specific hardware address will be mitigated through this change.  To perform a 
malicious action with this constraint would result in a race condition for when 
a FreeBSD device has made an ARP request to be the first to produce the 
expected ARP reply.  In theory a malicious user might send several ARP replies 
in anticipation of an ARP request.  The FreeBSD device could detect such 
behavior and log a message, remove the kernel ARP cache entry due to the 
suspicious circumstance, or accept the least frequency ARP reply.

#2.
FreeBSD should not create a kernel ARP cache entry for a protocol address it 
has not made an ARP request for.  The risk of a remote malicious user 
triggering a potential denial of service against the kernel ARP cache would be 
eliminated through this change.

Note.
The suggested solution(s) above could have a sysctl option to enable them.  A 
FreeBSD device on a trusted network would not require protection from malicious 
intent through the ARP protocol.

>Release-Note:
>Audit-Trail:
>Unformatted:
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