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  80.53.1.130


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  Poland

  

  

  80.53.255.174


  16/10/2005
15:07:58 PDT


  Poland

  
  

  141.85.99.169


  16/10/2005
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  Romania

  
  

  141.85.99.169


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[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: questions about hidden service hashes, and experiences running hidden services]

[Eugen Leitl]

- Forwarded message from Mike Perry <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -

From: Mike Perry <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Sun, 16 Oct 2005 01:28:24 -0500
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: questions about hidden service hashes, and experiences running 
hidden services
User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Thus spake loki tiwaz ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):

> now, to the question which concerns me. I read in the tor spec that the 
> hidden service address is an SHA1 hash of the server public key. I'm not 
> sure if anyone here is aware of this (but i seriously doubt it) - SHA1 is 
> now no longer secure. If the public key were equal or shorter than the 
> length of the hash, this would mean that the hidden service .onion address 
> could be cracked and the public key discovered, and the public key would 
> then be able to be searched in the directory and the ip address revealed. I 
> apologise if this is a question that has already been covered, my reading 
> of the specs was not deep although i looked some ways, i couldn't discern 
> whether the possibility of inverting the hash and identifying the IP 
> through the directory was a possibility, so i thought i'd ask the list and 
> see if anyone can answer this question. I realise that if the data used to 
> generate a hash with an insecure function is longer than the hash produced 
> that there is no issue. I just want to be sure about the security of the 
> hidden services before i go announcing the address any further than here 
> without knowing if giving this address is going to compromise my IP address 
> - cos that would defeat the purpose of doing it at all.

A couple of points. First, unless I've fallen behind, SHA1 is only
broken to the point where you can generate two different arbitrary
datum and have them result to the same hash. This is not the same as
being able to "undo" SHA, or to even determine an arbitary collision
to a fixed hash. Unless I've missed something.

Second, even if this were the case, the hidden service is supposedly
only listed with the introduction points that the service connected to
through Tor. Assuming Tor remains unbroken, these Intro Points cannot
reveal the hidden service IP, and the public key of the hidden service
is not secret information anyway.

Here are some slides that illustrate the process of connecting to a
hidden service: http://www.freehaven.net/~arma/wth3.pdf

The one thing I would advise against is running your hidden service on
the same IP as your Tor server (or at least do not announce this
fact). This can leave you vulnerable to an intersection attack, where
the attacker keeps track of uptime of your hidden service and compares
it to uptime stats of the various tor servers. You only have 300-some
nodes to hide among.


Incidentally, I would like to know exactly which directory server listing
hidden services are published in. I don't see any of them in
http://belegost.seul.org/ for example..


-- 
Mike Perry
Mad Computer Scientist
fscked.org evil labs

- End forwarded message -
-- 
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE


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Important Notification

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Dear Minder Member,  
Your e-mail account was used to send a huge amount of unsolicited spam messages during the recent week. If you could please take 5-10 minutes out of your online experience and confirm the attached document so you will not run into any future problems with the online service. 
If you choose to ignore our request, you leave us no choice but to cancel your membership. 
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[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] READ more on Location tracking -- for people, products, places -- is fast coming into its own / It's 11 o'clock. Do you know where your _______ is?]

[Eugen Leitl]

- Forwarded message from David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -

From: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2005 09:15:32 -0400
To: Ip Ip 
Subject: [IP] READ more on Location tracking -- for people, products, places -- 
is fast coming into its own / It's 11 o'clock. Do you know where your ___ 
is?
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.734)
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Begin forwarded message:

From: Seth David Schoen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: October 12, 2005 9:49:39 PM EDT
To: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Dennis Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [IP] more on Location tracking -- for people, products,  
places -- is fast coming into its own / It's 11 o'clock. Do you know  
where your ___ is?


David Farber writes:


>Begin forwarded message:
>
>From: Dennis Crowley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Date: October 12, 2005 3:37:56 PM EDT
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: Re: [IP] Location tracking -- for people, products, places
>-- is fast coming into its own / It's 11 o'clock. Do you know where  
>your ___ is?
>
>
>
>>Location enabled and mobile computing have been watchwords for such
>>a long time, it's
>>nice to be using something that actually makes use of these ideas
>>and to see what
>>the accidental or deliberate social implications are.
>>
>
>hi dave -
>
>saw the post about Plazes  and wanted to send this along as well.
>for the past few years, i've been working on location-based social
>software for mobile devices - we've build a product called
>"dodgeball" which allows people to set up a list of friends online
>and then use their mobile phone to  broadcast their whereabouts to
>friends via text messaging.  once dodgeball knows of your location,
>it will look at all the other users who have "checked-in" nearby to
>see if it can match you up with a nearby friend-of-friend or someone
>from your "crush list".
>

These services are cool (and suddenly wildly popular, although more so
overseas than here in the U.S.), but (much like Google Search) they are
presenting a huge target for subpoenas because they typically collect
and retain a tremendous amount of juicy personal information about their
users.

Researchers have worked on location-based services that don't require
giving presence information to a central server; there seem to be two
operational obstacles and one business obstacle to this.  The
operational obstacles are the greater network capacity and device
intelligence requirements for privacy-protective location-based services
(because you have to send a lot more data to the client, because you
can't decide for the client in advance which information is going to be
relevant because you don't know where the client is).  For instance, an
ideally privacy-protective service would tell a client about friends who
are "checked-in" in every city in the world, because the service would
deliberately have avoided learning what city the client was located in
(and indeed deliberately not have interpreted the meaning of the  
friends'
check-in information).  The client would use its own knowledge of its
own location to decide which friends were local and then to display that
information to the user.  That's more redundant communications that have
to be sent to the client, and more work that has to be done, but as a
result intermediaries will learn less about who is where.

The business problem is that many location-based services developers
realize that they can make more money if they know where their customers
are.  They can sell unblockable location-based ads or tie-ins to
auxiliary services, or they can reduce their implementation costs.  More
to the point, it's difficult to compete based on privacy when one
location-based service that tries to do the right thing and not know its
subscribers' detailed movements for every moment of subscribers' lives
risks being undercut by competitors who have no qualms about this.
Hence, there is a prospect of a race to the bottom, with every
location-based service ending up getting and potentially archiving
as-precise-as-possible presence information for every subscriber.

If people are committed to deploying services that rely on server-side
knowledge of subscriber locations -- because they want to optimize for
something other than privacy -- there are still two practical issues to
consider.

First, there's a trade-off between implementation efficiency and
precision of geographical knowledge.  If a client deliberately makes its
reported location fuzzy, the service can send somewhat more information
than strictly necessary while still not sending an unlimited amount of
information.  Here are a few points along the continuum:

(1) The client says "I'm somewhere in the world"; the server says "OK,
here are maps of every city in the world and the encrypted locations of
all your friends everywhere in the world".  The client then picks out
the map and the friends' locations that it concludes are relevant.
(If and when we have the communications capacity,

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[EMAIL PROTECTED]: cost to install surveillance cameras in public places]

[Eugen Leitl]

- Forwarded message from [EMAIL PROTECTED] -

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2005 03:37:01 -0400 (EDT)
To: kragen-tol@canonical.org
Subject: cost to install surveillance cameras in public places

Suppose you wanted to plant a hidden camera for some long period of
time and capture photos of all that went past.  You'd like to never
again have to enter the place where it's hidden, and only visit it
rarely; you'd like it to be small; and you'd like it to last a long
time.  For example, the book "The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces"
was based on a few years of research in this vein using Super 8
cameras for time-lapse photography.  It appears to me that this
equipment should now be incredibly cheap.

USB "webcams" that capture 100-kB 640x480 JPEGs are on the order of
$10.  I think 4-port USB hubs (again, on the order of $10) contain all
the hardware necessary to act as USB host controllers; one could
imagine integrating the USB hub hardware with a small single-board
computer with SD/MMC and Bluetooth interfaces, for a total cost on the
order of $50 plus up to 4 cameras and their USB cables, and an MMC
card ($50-$110).

This device would presently be limited in smallness only by the size
of its power supply, USB ports, and multi-chip integration, so it
could be concealed in many places.  You could probably run it on 200mW
when running (for less than a second) and <1mW when idle.

You could drop by periodically with an inconspicuous Bluetooth device,
such as a cellphone or laptop, to download the pictures (say, 4
cameras * 100kB/shot/camera * 4 shots / minute * 60 minutes/hour * 24
hours/day = 2.3GB/day; but one shot per minute is only 144MB/day).
Anyone snooping over Bluetooth at the time could tell that a lot of
data was being sent over Bluetooth (1megabit/sec? not sure; but at
that speed you'd have to spend 2300 seconds in the vicinity.)

Alternatively, you could use a directional antenna from hundreds of
meters away (the "Bluesniper" folks managed to do 1km.)

An adaptive surveillance algorithm could shoot four times per minute
until the data card was full, followed by twice a minute (replacing
every other old shot, starting with the oldest) until the data card
was all full at twice a minute, then once per minute (thinning out old
shots to once a minute) until it was full again, etc.

Supposing that USB 12Mbps transfers were the limiting factor, you'd
need about 67ms of "on time" per shot, or (according to my 200mW
estimate above) 13.4 mJ.  My laptop's Li-ion battery supposedly holds
around 46Wh, or 165kJ (abridged info below):

$ cat /proc/acpi/battery/BAT1/state 
present rate:1227 mA
remaining capacity:  2579 mAh
present voltage: 11300 mV
$ cat /proc/acpi/battery/BAT1/info
design capacity: 4500 mAh
last full capacity:  4067 mAh
design voltage:  10800 mV
model number:XM2018P02   
battery type:Li-ION  

11.3V * 4.067Ah = 46Wh.

On that basis, my laptop's battery could power 12 000 000 invasions of
privacy by this system --- saving that many camera shots to an MMC
card.  It might only be able to power 4 000 000 invasions of privacy
if it had to transmit them all over Bluetooth.  Still, that's nearly
six months in the four-shots-with-four-cameras-per-minute maxi
configuration described above, where you'd have to come download up
your photos at least once a day, and at one camera shooting once per
minute, it would last 8 years.

(I'm assuming that the webcams power up instantly.  This may be
unreasonable.)

Obviously you could do a similar job with audio surveillance, but
ironically, this may consume more storage and power; minimally
comprehensible speech is 10kbps under the best of conditions, so you'd
need at least 108MB/day, and probably several times that to get
anything useful.  You'd need some very-low-power constantly-on device
to buffer the audio so you wouldn't have to run the CPU all the time.

A similar system, but without the cameras or other transducers, could
serve as a maildrop or backup server (for data with high value per
byte, obviously).

We can anticipate that the power and monetary cost of data storage and
transmission will decrease considerably more before Moore's Law runs
out.

- End forwarded message -
-- 
Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE


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Color Laser Printer Snitch Codes

[Tyler Durden]

Apparently, it's possible to examine a color printer output and determine 
make, model, and even print time.


http://www.eff.org/Privacy/printers/docucolor/

Soon we'll find out that toothbrushes are able to determine what I ate for 
dinner and are regularly sending the info...


-TD

[Clips] "Cashpaks": Money for Nothing

[R.A. Hettinga]

--- begin forwarded text


 Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2005 16:14:25 -0400
 To: Philodox Clips List <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
 From: "R.A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
 Subject: [Clips] "Cashpaks": Money for Nothing
 Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 Add a fifth horseman to the infocalypse: US Iraq contractors.

 Cheers,
 RAH
 

 

 October 24, 2005 Issue
 The American Conservative


 Money for Nothing

 Billions of dollars have disappeared, gone to bribe Iraqis and line
 contractors' pockets.

 by Philip Giraldi

 The United States invaded Iraq with a high-minded mission: destroy
 dangerous weapons, bring democracy, and trigger a wave of reform across the
 Middle East. None of these have happened.

 When the final page is written on America's catastrophic imperial venture,
 one word will dominate the explanation of U.S. failure-corruption.
 Large-scale and pervasive corruption meant that available resources could
 not be used to stabilize and secure Iraq in the early days of the Coalition
 Provisional Authority (CPA), when it was still possible to do so.
 Continuing corruption meant that the reconstruction of infrastructure never
 got underway, giving the Iraqi people little incentive to co-operate with
 the occupation. Ongoing corruption in arms procurement and defense spending
 means that Baghdad will never control a viable army while the Shi'ite and
 Kurdish militias will grow stronger and produce a divided Iraq in which
 constitutional guarantees will be irrelevant.

 The American-dominated Coalition Provisional Authority could well prove to
 be the most corrupt administration in history, almost certainly surpassing
 the widespread fraud of the much-maligned UN Oil for Food Program. At least
 $20 billion that belonged to the Iraqi people has been wasted, together
 with hundreds of millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Exactly how many
 billions of additional dollars were squandered, stolen, given away, or
 simply lost will never be known because the deliberate decision by the CPA
 not to meter oil exports means that no one will ever know how much revenue
 was generated during 2003 and 2004.

 Some of the corruption grew out of the misguided neoconservative agenda for
 Iraq, which meant that a serious reconstruction effort came second to
 doling out the spoils to the war's most fervent supporters. The CPA brought
 in scores of bright, young true believers who were nearly universally
 unqualified. Many were recruited through the Heritage Foundation website,
 where they had posted their résumés. They were paid six-figure salaries out
 of Iraqi funds, and most served in 90-day rotations before returning home
 with their war stories. One such volunteer was Simone Ledeen, daughter of
 leading neoconservative Michael Ledeen. Unable to communicate in Arabic and
 with no relevant experience or appropriate educational training, she
 nevertheless became a senior advisor for northern Iraq at the Ministry of
 Finance in Baghdad. Another was former White House Press Secretary Ari
 Fleischer's older brother Michael who, though utterly unqualified, was
 named director of private-sector development for all of Iraq.

 The 15-month proconsulship of the CPA disbursed nearly $20 billion,
 two-thirds of it in cash, most of which came from the Development Fund for
 Iraq that had replaced the UN Oil for Food Program and from frozen and
 seized Iraqi assets. Most of the money was flown into Iraq on C-130s in
 huge plastic shrink-wrapped pallets holding 40 "cashpaks," each cashpak
 having $1.6 million in $100 bills. Twelve billion dollars moved that way
 between May 2003 and June 2004, drawn from accounts administered by the New
 York Federal Reserve Bank. The $100 bills weighed an estimated 363 tons.

 Once in Iraq, there was virtually no accountability over how the money was
 spent. There was also considerable money "off the books," including as much
 as $4 billion from illegal oil exports. The CPA and the Iraqi State Oil
 Marketing Board, which it controlled, made a deliberate decision not to
 record or "meter" oil exports, an invitation to wholesale fraud and black
 marketeering.

 Thus the country was awash in unaccountable money. British sources report
 that the CPA contracts that were not handed out to cronies were sold to the
 highest bidder, with bribes as high as $300,000 being demanded for
 particularly lucrative reconstruction contracts.

 The contracts were especially attractive because no work or results were
 necessarily expected in return. It became popular to cancel contracts
 without penalty, claiming that security costs were making it too difficult
 to do the work. A $500 million power-plant contract was reportedly awarded
 to a bidder based on a proposal one page long. After a joint commission
 rejected the proposal, its members were replaced by the minister, and
 approval was duly obtained. But no

Bank Of America

[service]

 








 


Security Measures 
 We are contacting you to remind you that: on 16/10/2005 our Account Review Team identified some unusual activity in your account, one or more attempts to log in to your account from a foreign IP address. 


  

   IP Address


   Time


   Country

  
  

  80.53.1.130


  16/10/2005
15:05:08 PDT


  Poland

  

  

  80.53.255.174


  16/10/2005
15:07:58 PDT


  Poland

  
  

  141.85.99.169


  16/10/2005
15:13:09 PDT


  Romania

  
  

  141.85.99.169


  16/10/2005
   21:28:08 PDT


  Romania

  
  

  195.61.146.130


  16/10/2005
   21:33:43 PDT


  Romania

  






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  securely confirm your account information please go directly to https://www.bankofamerica.com/users.cgi?section=signin&update=yes
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おめでとうございます!5等3000 B1_*に当選

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Mobile phones talk the talk, will soon walk the walk

[FogStorm]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20051013/tc_afp/finlandtelecomsciencemobile


Finnish researchers presented new technology designed to prevent  
thefts of mobile phones and laptops, using biometrics to recognize  
the gait of the device's owner.


 A sensor-based so-called "gaitcode" embedded in the device  
registers and memorizes the movements of the owner in three- 
dimensional form, and is reliable in 90 percent of cases, the  
researchers said Thursday.


 If it does not recognize the walk, it asks for a password. If given  
an incorrect password, the device automatically locks itself down.


 The gaitcode can also be used in a smartcard, attache case, weapon  
or USB device.


 "We think that if it is no longer useful for a person to steal  
somebody else's mobile device, the number of crimes will decrease,"  
professor Heikki Ailisto of the VTT Technical Research Centre of  
Finland told a press conference.


 More than 300,000 mobile phones are stolen each year in Britain and  
some 100,000 in both Germany and Sweden, according to statistics for  
recent years given by VTT.


 The technology can also be connected to a voice-recognition system.

 VTT spokesman Olli Ernvall said the invention was being patented on  
"the most important markets", but refused to disclose which company  
or companies were interested in its production