Re: Thinking About the Crypto Unthinkable

[Bill Stewart]

At 08:11 PM 08/26/2001 -0700, Tim May wrote:
>This said, I wouldn't advise _anyone_ to study "policy"
>(or its earlier incarnations, "Operations Research."
>"Systems Analysis," or the utterly execrable "General Systems," a la 
>Bertanlanffy).

Hey, I resemble that remark (Undergrad and Master's degree on Operations 
Research.)
Cool subset of applied mathematics - it touches on enough different fields,
including the algorithm-analysis stuff that overlaps computer science
and complexity theory, probability and statistics, simulation, scheduling,
inventory theory, graph theory, measure theory, abstract stuff like matroids.
Good for looking at systems design, and it worked well for me,
though you risk being too generalist and not specific enough at anything.

Unfortunately the whole field of Linear Programming changed just about
the time I left college :-), with Karmarkar's work showing that
LP could be done in polynomial time (though with a big ugly constant multiplier
that means that the theoretically-exponential Simplex algorithm tends to 
converge faster.)

There was work from operations research that was on the rather bogus side,
like the stuff that encouraged development of square pineapples because the
cans fit tighter on shelves than round ones

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Re: The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[mean-green]

At 10:46 AM 8/26/2001 -0700, Tim May <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>On Sunday, August 26, 2001, at 09:13 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

>> Right on target.  There is one aspect to this loss of nerve not 
>> mentioned: the correlation between those with the means and interest to 
>>pursue these avenues and those with merely the interest.
>
>There are a couple of points to make on this issue:
>
>First, the "correlation of interests" situation is a well-solved 
problem. Those with the financial means (and maybe some 
political/technical interest) set up a company and hire those with the 
technical abilities and interest. The company may be self-funded by the 
founders, or outside investors may be sought.
>
>However, this is not so easy to do when it comes to these technologies. 
ZKS did it and raised, we hear, something like $60 million. Quite a 
warchest for untraceability tools. ZKS has been much-discussed here.
>
>There are some major obstacles with such a public company:
>
>1. Patents and IP in general. Doing digital cash without using Chaum's 
blinding patent may be tough. (Some of the "agnostic" approaches 
discussed here may work, technically, but will probably still be 
litigated. A public company is a public target. The current owners of 
the Chaum patent, a Canadian company IIRC, will not look dispassionately 
on other companies doing an end-run.)
>
>2. A public company or traceable group of developers will become 
targets. The attacks could be just simple legal ones, but could range up 
to RICO and beyond. "Pedophile-grade untraceability" is powerful stuff. 
How long before Mojo faces lawsuits analogous to what Napster faced?

Very unlikely unless it raises to challenge the current crop of Napster replacements.

>
>(Napster is a good example of this. Utter traceability, of both music 
traders and the company itself. Those who downloaded or uploaded music 
got nastygrams and threats of civil action, and the company itself was 
sued and now faces extinction. It may be that anyone developing such 
tools should just give up on the idea of becoming a dot com tycoon and 
instead release products untraceably...perhaps benefitting in other 
ways.)
>
>> One of this list's members shopped here and elsewhere a few years back 
>> for participation in building a DBC-based payment and value system.  He 
>> had assembled a team with the banking experience, needing the 
>> technology implementors.  None were willing to put their talents to the 
>> test.  They all nodded regarding the need for such a facility but none 
<> would expend any efforts.
>
>If you are talking about Bob Hettinga, there are many things one could 
say about his schemes and plans.

Actually, I was referring to Steve Schear.  He worked at Citicorp for some time and 
attracted a number of former mid and senior VISA people, one help found Sonnet 
Financial an online foreign exchange service, to work for First eCache.

>I'm more impressed with what another person is actually doing: Orlin 
Grabbe. Do some Web searches. Orlin has good banking credentials himself 
(Wharton, coined the term "regulatory arbitrage"), good libertarian 
credentials (a powerful newsletter for many years), some technical 
abilities (writes code), has been willing to move to places like Costa 
Rica, and, most importantly, he UNDERSTANDS the "sweet spot" argument.

Steve has also argued these points.

>Bob H., in my opinion, got too fixated on coining new acronyms and in 
flitting around to various lists and focussed in on the wrong end of the 
cost/benefit continuum. He kept claiming the DBC or E$bux or whatever 
would be cheaper to use than real money.

>Anyway, it is not easy to create a public company, a public nexus of 
attack, and then deploy systems which target that high-value sweet spot. 
The real bankers and the regulators won't allow such things into the 
official banking system. (Why do people think the banking system will 
embrace "digital bearer bonds" having untraceability features when true 
bearer bonds were eliminated years ago?)

I believe First eCache intended to be compliant with know your customer regs, 
depending upon independent market makers and money changers to provide the necessary 
indirection for unlinkability.  If so it would difficult for the banking system to 
easily exclude them.  In the same down.way the regulators have had a very difficult 
time bringing the Black Market Peso Exchange down.


Free, secure Web-based email, now OpenPGP compliant - www.hushmail.com

biochemwomd crop terror in dc

[Declan McCullagh]

also today...

AGRICULTURE National Academy of Science (NAS) Agriculture and Natural 
Resources Board meeting on "Defining Science-based Concerns Associated with 
the Products of Animal Biotechnology," August 27-28. Highlights: 1:15 p.m. 
- Open session Location: NAS Building, 2100 C St., NW. Contact: Kim 
Waddell, 202-334-3889, [EMAIL PROTECTED], or http://www4.nationalacademies.org

biochemwomdterror in dc

[Declan McCullagh]

today...

TERRORIST ATTACKS Defense Department (DOD), Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (F.R. Page 42998) Meeting of the Advisory Panel To Assess the 
Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorist Attacks Involving Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, to run August 27-28. Location: RAND, 1200 South Hayes 
St., Arlington, VA. 12 noon Contact: 703-413-1100, ext. 5282 

Re: nodes

[Declan McCullagh]

On Sun, Aug 26, 2001 at 09:25:20PM -0700, Tim May wrote:
> Lance has not posted a message to the Cypherpunks list in several years, 
> maybe more, that I can recall.

Lance did post a message in the last month announcing that his cpunx
node was going down. Too much bandwidth devoted to spam, he said.
Other than that, I haven't seen him enter discussions in years, as you said.

-Declan

hushmail's misery

[Declan McCullagh]

http://www.silicon.com/public/door?REQUNIQ=998901774&6004REQEVENT=&REQINT1=46830&REQSTR1=newsnow
HushMail: The misery continues
2001-08-27 04:47:14

D'oh ---Scarfo's password was his dad's number

[Subcommander Bob]

Unable to crack the encryption code without a password,
agents
 went back again with a search warrant and placed on his
computer
 a high-tech device called a key logger, which monitors
every
 keystroke. After nearly two months of surveillance, the
FBI cracked
 his password: nds09813-050. A source close to the case
later
 confirmed that it's Scarfo's father's prison
identification number. The
 Feds had it all the time.

http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/aug2001/nf20010823_686.htm

Re: biochemwomdterror in dc

[Tim May]

On Monday, August 27, 2001, at 05:39 AM, Declan McCullagh wrote:

> today...
>
> TERRORIST ATTACKS Defense Department (DOD), Office of the Secretary of 
> Defense (F.R. Page 42998) Meeting of the Advisory Panel To Assess the 
> Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorist Attacks Involving 
> Weapons of Mass Destruction, to run August 27-28. Location: RAND, 1200 
> South Hayes St., Arlington, VA. 12 noon Contact: 703-413-1100, ext. 5282


I've been seeing Declan forward a bunch of these terse paragraphs 
announcing  these meetings. I never see any summaries of what was said. 
Anyone ever attend? (If they're closed to the public or journalists, why 
forward so many announcements of them?)

Or is this some stego channel I am missing?


--Puzzled in Corralitos

Re: The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[Nomen Nescio]

Tim May writes:
> Draw this graph I outlined. Think about where the markets are for tools 
> for privacy and untraceability. Realize that many of the "far out' sweet 
> spot applications are not necessarily immoral: think of freedom fighters 
> in communist-controlled regimes, think of distribution of birth control 
> information in Islamic countries, think of Jews hiding their assets in 
> Swiss bank accounts, think of revolutionaries overthrowing bad 
> governments, think of people avoiding unfair or confiscatory taxes, 
> think of people selling their expertise when some guild says they are 
> forbidden to.

It is good to see some frank discussion of morality here.  Too often
cypherpunks seem to assume that anything that can be done, should be done.

However on closer examination it's not clear that many of the examples
above satisfy both financial and moral constraints.

"Freedom fighters in communist-controlled regimes."  How much money
do they have?  More importantly, how much are they willing and able to
spend on anonymity/privacy/black-market technologies?  These guys aren't
rolling in dough.

"Revolutionaries overthrowing bad governments."  The main revolutionaries
who will be willing to pay money are those who expect to get rich from
their revolution.  These are the ones who want to throw out the tyrants
so they can set themselves up as new tyrants.  It is people like this
who would be the best customers of cypherpunk technology.  You're not
making the world a better place by giving them tools.

"Distribution of birth control information in Islamic countries."  Again,
selling to Planned Parenthood is not a business plan which will make
anyone rich.

"Jews hiding their assets in Swiss bank accounts."  Financial privacy is
in fact potentially big business, but let's face it, most of the customers
today are not Jews fearing confiscation by anti-semitic governments.
That's not in the cards.  Most of the money will be tainted, and even
if it is largely drug money and you don't think drugs should be illegal,
much drug money is dirty even by libertarian standards.  It is used for
bribes, for coercion, even for murder.  Facilitating such activities
does not help to make drugs legal, it just gives murdering drug lords
more wealth and power and provides justification for increasing military
funding to fight the drug war.

"People avoiding unfair or confiscatory taxes."  This is a good one,
lots of customers, plenty of money, few moral problems.  Even if you
support some government programs, it will take a long time before enough
people adopt privacy protection tools that it could have a significant
impact on government tax revenues.  The big problem here is coming up
with the a technology that can do the job.

"People selling their expertise when some guild says they are forbidden
to."  Morally this one seems OK.  In a net already filled with bogus
medical and legal advice it can't make things much worse.  On the other
hand it's not clear that the existing prohibitions are hurting anyone's
bottom line.  How much can you really expect to make by selling forbidden
advice?  It's not clear that there is much of a market for this technology
but possibly someone could find a killer app here.


The conclusion is that you need to add a third axis to Tim's graph:
morality, in addition to value and cost.  Many of the most lucrative
potential uses of anonymity technologies are morally questionable.
If you add this additional filter you are forced to focus on just a
few application areas (with the additional complication that few people
will agree on morality, and that morality and legality often have little
overlap).

OPT: How does one freenet (mobile) user find another (maybe freenet) user?

[Jim Choate]

One proposal is to build some complicated IP management network. Yuck!

A primary problem is one freenet user locating another freenet user and
keeping the connection live during AP changes. I believe that if this
problem can be resolved the other types of connections (ie fixed IP) go
away.

How about a 'rendevous server'. A well known address where two users can
present a 'key' to the server and when they click you open a connection.

(this might be a good place for e-cash micro-mints)

IP Anonymizers would be one place to start. You connect up and get your IP
washed. Then you present a key to the server. It looks for an identical
key(s) and build a bridge between those users. An end-to-end anonymous
connection. The anonymizing layer is a bell, it's not critical. A simple
IP proxy will work.

This is also a good place to demonstrate the utility of a 'wrapper' around
this connection with respect to moving from one node to another. As you
move out of one zone into another, your IP changes. So, your system would
re-connect to the above server, be anonymized and hence making it's real
IP irrelevant (even if it wasn't anonymized the next step makes the actual
IP moot) - all automatically. It presents a key, finds a waiting
connection open and gets connected back up. The rendevous server sits
patiently waiting (until some watchdog barks) for new connections and
holding the old half of your connection open and waiting. In particular it
looks at each half of a connection and asks (Did_they_drop_the_line? ||
Did_we_get_norm_close?) before it closes the resource. Otherwise it
attempts to keep the connection open and in a wait state until somebody
else connects up.

It would be reasonable to run such a server on the AP.

With respect to automation of finding other proxies and presenting keys,
this could be done by having it broadcast a Proxy_alive_kicking? packet.
It would then, at a users request, broadcast out to those proxies trying
to find out if they have a matching key as presented by the user. If so,
then the proxy servers could make a connection between themselves and
bridge the users logical connection request (ie presenting a key).


 --


natsugusa ya...tsuwamonodomo ga...yume no ato
summer grass...those mighty warriors'...dream-tracks

Matsuo Basho

   The Armadillo Group   ,::;::-.  James Choate
   Austin, Tx   /:'/ ``::>/|/  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   www.ssz.com.',  `/( e\  512-451-7087
   -~~mm-'`-```-mm --'-

Re: The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[Tim May]

On Monday, August 27, 2001, at 02:00 PM, Aimee Farr wrote:

> Tim May:
>
>> So I guess my candidate submission for the P.E.T. workshop might not be
>> well-received: "BlackNet; Case History of a Practically Untraceable
>> System for Buying and Selling Corporate and National Secrets.
>
> No, you want E.E.T. -- "Espionage-enhancing Technologies."
>
> Some of you need a lawyer on your shoulder. Like a little parrot. 
> *squawk!*
> ECPA Section 2516(1)(p); FISA, if that includes being controlled by 
> aliens
> from outer-space; USC Title 18 1831.
> Section 1831 Economic espionage
> (a) In General - Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will 
> benefit
> any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent,
> knowingly -
> (1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, 
> or
> conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret;
> (2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, 
> photographs,
> downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, 
> transmits,
> delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret,
> (3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to 
> have
> been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without 
> authorization,
> (4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1)
> through (3), or
> (5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense 
> described
> in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons 
> do any
> act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall, except as provided in
> subsection (b), be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more 
> than
> 15 years, or both.
>
> Section 1837 Applicability to conduct outside the United States
> This chapter also applies to conduct occurring outside the United 
> States if
> (1) the offender is a natural person who is a citizen or permanent 
> resident
> alien of the United States, or an organization organized under the laws 
> of
> the United States or a State or political subdivision thereof-, or
> (2) an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United 
> States.
>
> Your idea does seem to offer promise as a vehicle for treason, 
> espionage,
> trade secrets, malicious mischief, piracy, bribery of public officials,
> concealment of assets, transmission of wagering information, murder for
> hire, threatening or retaliating against Federal officials, a 
> transactional
> environment for nuclear and biologic weapons, narcotic and arms
> traffickingsweet spots. *shakes head*

Despite frequently urging newcomers to "read the archives--or at least 
use some search engines!," nitwits like Aimee are only just now figuring 
out what was crystal clear in 1992-3.

No wonder she's doing scut work for the SS outpost in Waco, near Bush's 
Crawford ranch.


--Tim May

Re: Lawyers, Guns, and Money

[cubic-dog]

On Mon, 27 Aug 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:

> On Sun, Aug 26, 2001 at 10:15:19PM -0400, Faustine wrote, quoting Tim:
> > 
> > >Do you think you are preparing to have "enormous influence" on policy?
> > 
> > I'm preparing to try. 
> 
> If you want to have "enormous influence" on policy, you'd be well advised
> to spend your time flirting with a member of the appropriate sex in
> the administration, or perhaps the Senate leadership, offering the
> appropriate sexual favors, then vie for a position as a policy aide
> somewhere. A law degree will be a big help.
> 
> Not entirely joking,
> Declan

And don't forget, you must have and give up in addition
to sexual favors, lots and lots and lots and lots of 
money in 2, 3 and 4  thousand dollar chunks totalling
a few hundred thousand a year. 

No Subject

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Agents kick crypto ass....was The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[Aimee Farr]

> Despite frequently urging newcomers to "read the archives--or at least
> use some search engines!," nitwits like Aimee are only just now figuring
> out what was crystal clear in 1992-3.

The EEA wasn't passed until 96. I failed to mention Title 18 United States
Code, Section(s) 794(c).

"Agents kick crypto ass."
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/regan_complaint.html

His training in the Air Force included cryptanalysis...In the Fall of 2000,
reliable source information indicatedAlso in the Fall of 2000, reliable
source information The encrypted messages, which were decrypted by the
U.S. government, On June 21, 2001, Regan sent an email from an account
registered in his own name to an email account in the name of his wife. The
email attached one page of alphanumeric encryption key that appears to be
similar to the encryption technique described in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12,
aboveRegan was confronted by FBI special agents at the airport at
approximately 5:35 p.m. In response to a question from this affiant, Regan
denied knowledge of cryptology, coding and decoding. However, when shown
photographs of the alphanumeric tables, which appear to be related to
cryptology, which tables had been in his carry-on bag, he stated "This is my
stuff." Regan was arrested shortly thereafterAlso in Regan's carry-on
bag when he was stopped by the FBI at Dulles Airport on August 23, 2001, was
a hand-held global positioning system ("GPS"). Based on my training and
experience in intelligence matters, I know that a GPS unit can be used to
locate a specific site for drop or signal sites."

That wouldn't be what has your little mice running in their wheels, would
it?

> No wonder she's doing scut work for the SS outpost in Waco, near Bush's
> Crawford ranch.
>
>
> --Tim May

Ah, Tim makes a funny.

~Aimee

hacking NJ: All your professionals are ours

[Subcommander Bob]

Wired.com pointed to
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/24/nyregion/24VOTE.html
which is about putting public records online.  This pointed to
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/director.htm  which lists 'professionals'
that NJ tracks.

Heh, All their professionals are 0urs.

A few minutes using the HTML CIRCUMVENTION/CRACKING tool "Netscape"
and fnord "Emacs" and we've got a nice catalog.  Physicians,
architects, veterinarians, master plumbers, beauticians of NJ, your
info is toast.  The web page limits you to, e.g., 800 physicians per
surname search; yet a search for "S" surnames yields 6974 MDs.

How-to:

Go there, pick a profession, e.g., doctors at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/bme/docdir.htm

Save as local, and edit the HTML.

1. Find "POST".  Prefix http://www.state.nj.us to the relative CGI URL
earlier
in that line.

2. Find "OPTION".  Add a few zeroes to the number of hit results there.

Open the *local*, edited page in a browser.

Enter a letter, e.g., "s" and select the larger number of results to
return.

If you enter "." you get 59,192 matches.  All the licensed MDs in NJ.
Over
23M of HTML from A to T



   NameTERZUOLI,ROBERT,J

Business Name

Address2481 STUART ST,
BROOKLYN NY, 11229-5815
License NumberMA058265
Disciplinary HistoryNone
StatusInactive

NameTESAR,JAMES,D 
Business Name

Address1002 VILLAGE LN   , WINTER
PARK  FL, 32792-3416
License NumberMA044222
Disciplinary HistoryNone
StatusExpired

NameTESCHNER,BERNARD  
Business Name

Address12 GREENRIDGE AVE , WHITE
PLAINS NY, 10605-1238
License NumberMA011599
Disciplinary HistoryNone
StatusInactive

NameTESLER,MAX,A  
Business Name

Address661 PALISADE AVE  , ENGLEWOOD
CLIFFS NJ, 07632-1800
License NumberMA028017
Disciplinary HistoryNone
StatusDeceased

NameTESLUK,GREGORY,C  
Business Name

AddressHOPKINSON HOUSE 2104 WASHNGTN , SQUARE SO
PHILA  PA, 19106 
License NumberMA041360
Disciplinary HistoryNone
StatusExpired

Re: biochemwomdterror in dc

[Faustine]

Tim wrote:
On Monday, August 27, 2001, at 05:39 AM, Declan McCullagh wrote:

> TERRORIST ATTACKS Defense Department (DOD), Office of the Secretary of 
> Defense (F.R. Page 42998) Meeting of the Advisory Panel To Assess the 
> Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorist Attacks Involving 
> Weapons of Mass Destruction, to run August 27-28. Location: RAND, 1200 
> South Hayes St., Arlington, VA. 12 noon Contact: 703-413-1100, ext. 5282

>>I've been seeing Declan forward a bunch of these terse paragraphs 
>>announcing  these meetings. I never see any summaries of what was said. 
>>Anyone ever attend? (If they're closed to the public or journalists, why 
>>forward so many announcements of them?)


Why? Because you're making a tacit admission that the fact that the panel 
is being conducted at all is significant--and has a good chance of making a 
serious impact on future policy decisions. Since RAND is 100% responsible 
for the real meat of any "assessment" going on, you might say the panel is 
part of the mechanism by which analysis gets turned into actual policy and 
legislation. 

I choose to take this (and dozens of similar panels on widely diverse 
subjects) as proof that RAND-style policy analysis is alive, well, and more 
central to the policy process than ever. Call it a "pale imitation" of the 
early days if you want to, but you have to admit you all aren't ignoring 
it. And as far as I can tell, you damn sure won't be able to ignore it in 
the years to come either. 

Given that, maybe encouraging more cypherpunk-friendly people to take the 
analysis route isn't such a bad idea after all.  

~Faustine. 

Re: The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[Tim May]

On Monday, August 27, 2001, at 12:40 PM, Nomen Nescio wrote:

> Tim May writes:
>> Draw this graph I outlined. Think about where the markets are for tools
>> for privacy and untraceability. Realize that many of the "far out' 
>> sweet
>> spot applications are not necessarily immoral: think of freedom 
>> fighters
>> in communist-controlled regimes, think of distribution of birth control
>> information in Islamic countries, think of Jews hiding their assets in
>> Swiss bank accounts, think of revolutionaries overthrowing bad
>> governments, think of people avoiding unfair or confiscatory taxes,
>> think of people selling their expertise when some guild says they are
>> forbidden to.
>
> It is good to see some frank discussion of morality here.  Too often
> cypherpunks seem to assume that anything that can be done, should be 
> done.
>
> However on closer examination it's not clear that many of the examples
> above satisfy both financial and moral constraints.
>
> "Freedom fighters in communist-controlled regimes."  How much money
> do they have?  More importantly, how much are they willing and able to
> spend on anonymity/privacy/black-market technologies?  These guys aren't
> rolling in dough.

The IRA and the Real IRA have a lot of money, as the Brits have been 
complaining about recently. Osama bin Laden is said to control more than 
a billion dollars. And so on. I disagree with you assertion that "these 
guys aren't rolling in dough."

(Note that I am _not_ saying they are likely to start using a student 
project remailer operating out of dorm room in Schenectady. A different 
issue.)

> "Revolutionaries overthrowing bad governments."  The main 
> revolutionaries
> who will be willing to pay money are those who expect to get rich from
> their revolution.  These are the ones who want to throw out the tyrants
> so they can set themselves up as new tyrants.  It is people like this
> who would be the best customers of cypherpunk technology.  You're not
> making the world a better place by giving them tools.

You make the assumption that overthrowing, say, the PRC or USSR 
governments, would result in a "worse or just as bad" regime. I 
disagree. And the same tools are still available to deconstruct interim 
replacement regimes.

> "Distribution of birth control information in Islamic countries."  
> Again,
> selling to Planned Parenthood is not a business plan which will make
> anyone rich.

Planned Parenthood is not envisaged as the user

>
> The conclusion is that you need to add a third axis to Tim's graph:
> morality, in addition to value and cost.  Many of the most lucrative
> potential uses of anonymity technologies are morally questionable.
> If you add this additional filter you are forced to focus on just a
> few application areas (with the additional complication that few people
> will agree on morality, and that morality and legality often have little
> overlap).

The technology is agnostic to "morality."

Choate argues that at least 5 or 6 axes are needed. Ever the nitwit, he 
fails to realize that the main debate doesn't even use the _two_ that I 
have outlined. Yes, I know about phase spaces and multi-dimensional 
diagrams. But given that the debate about privacy tools is mired at the 
1D level ("untracebility good, traceability bad...why don't the proles 
see this?"), graphing the major users and suppliers on the 2D graph I 
outlined is a step in the right direction. It goes a long way to 
explaining why people will spend thousands to fly to the Caymans to set 
up a bank account while others won't even bother using PGP.

You want to add "morality" to the chart. Fine, except I don't see how it 
gives different answers than my chart gave.


--Tim May

RE: The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[Aimee Farr]

Tim May:

> So I guess my candidate submission for the P.E.T. workshop might not be
> well-received: "BlackNet; Case History of a Practically Untraceable
> System for Buying and Selling Corporate and National Secrets.

No, you want E.E.T. -- "Espionage-enhancing Technologies."

Some of you need a lawyer on your shoulder. Like a little parrot. *squawk!*
ECPA Section 2516(1)(p); FISA, if that includes being controlled by aliens
from outer-space; USC Title 18 1831.

>Think about where the markets are for tools for privacy and untraceability.

Believe me, I am.

Section 1831 Economic espionage
(a) In General - Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will benefit
any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent,
knowingly -
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or
conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs,
downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits,
delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret,
(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have
been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization,
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1)
through (3), or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described
in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall, except as provided in
subsection (b), be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than
15 years, or both.

Section 1837 Applicability to conduct outside the United States
This chapter also applies to conduct occurring outside the United States if
(1) the offender is a natural person who is a citizen or permanent resident
alien of the United States, or an organization organized under the laws of
the United States or a State or political subdivision thereof-, or
(2) an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States.

Your idea does seem to offer promise as a vehicle for treason, espionage,
trade secrets, malicious mischief, piracy, bribery of public officials,
concealment of assets, transmission of wagering information, murder for
hire, threatening or retaliating against Federal officials, a transactional
environment for nuclear and biologic weapons, narcotic and arms
traffickingsweet spots. *shakes head*

This is not legal advice. It's an obituary. :)

> think of people selling their expertise when some guild says they are
> forbidden to.

I talked about this before, as an OSINT channel for the U.S. Government.

o BlackNet has legitimate intelligence applications.

o For it to work in a "secrets market," you would need to tap the ground
channels and have the analytics. Intelligence isn't a Chia pet..."just add
BlackNet and watch it grow!" Surely, untraceability does not equivocate to
instant source cultivation.

o You can get what you need by listening to the right person. Once you've
spotted and recruited the right person, THEN you need a transactional
channel, but only if you want to pursue a source relationship -- and you
usually do. You need analysis, not information. The problem isn't the lack
of a fence -- but the difficulty in defining your collection goals, spotting
the right person, knowing what to elicit, and having the analytics to refine
an intelligence product. Self-offerings are viewed with suspicion. Can a
third-party spot talent for you?  Talent: businessmen, academics and
informants. That's a very HUMAN high-touch problem.

o A holistic solution would cut down the costs of stealth, transfer risk,
and possibly would assist in spotting, but I don't know that zero-contact is
all it is represented to be. Is the equivalent of an anon e-bay going to
answer your strategic issues? You have to define and meet your collection
goals.

o Anonymity can be a problem. You need authentication. You would like
blinded biometrics.

o I would think the ROI would be where you can shoehorn into existing
intelligence channels and groundwork. That's either a sovereign, an
intermediary wrapped in the skirts of a sovereign, a defense contractor, or
an untouchable intermediary. If not bona-fide intelligence, you're left with
the criminal element, IRA and so forth. Most move product and still have
distribution channels. Yeah, the IRA would like digital cash, they are
buying arms with offshore debit cards.

o It seems like _damn bad timing_ for a discussion in this context. This
should be couched in terms of a beneficial application, rather than
something subversive. It's like the fall of Knights Templar in here. What
happened to the pilgrims' safe passage?

~Aimee
L'Empireur doit jtre considiri comme le messie des idies nouvelles.

No More Secrecy Bills

[Jon Beets]

Found this article on an Air Force web 
site...
 
Jon BeetsPacer Communications
 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/opinion/A54690-2001Aug23.html
 
Washington PostAugust 24, 2001Pg. 26No More Secrecy Bills
LAST YEAR President Clinton properly vetoed an intelligence 
authorization bill that would have criminalized virtually all leaks of 
classified information. Unfortunately, this year the idea has resurfaced and is 
due to be considered by the Senate intelligence committee in September. The 
leaks bill is still a bad idea and should again be rejected.
 
We don't pretend to be neutral on this subject. Newspapers publish leaked 
material; our reporters solicit leaks. And some of the leaked material we 
publish is classified. But it is a mistake to imagine that all leaks of 
classified information are bad. Some expose wrongdoing or allow the public to 
debate relatively nonsensitive matters that government would prefer to handle 
without scrutiny. The government massively overclassifies information, so a law 
banning all leaks of supposedly sensitive material would inevitably criminalize 
conversations between officials and citizens about subjects that are not 
genuinely sensitive and chill in dangerous ways the ability of officials and 
former officials to speak out on important policy questions.
 
Traditionally, the law has respected this fact and has made criminal only 
leaks of specific types of classified information -- the names of intelligence 
agents, for example, or material related to encoding systems used in 
intelligence work. Certain disclosures of defense information, if done with 
intent to harm national security, can be prosecuted under espionage laws. And no 
one is suggesting that every government employee should be free to decide what 
remains secret and what does not. Generally speaking, leaks are handled under 
administrative personnel rules; if you get caught, you can lose your job.
 
One trouble with creating a blanket criminalization of classified leaks is 
that it gives the executive branch almost unchecked authority to remove 
information from public discussion. Classification rules are generally not made 
under statutes but by executive orders, meaning that the president would have 
the authority both to decide what information is classified and to prosecute 
people for leaking it. Such unchecked power would be dangerous even if 
overclassification weren't rampant.
 
But there is hardly an area where government is more capricious than in its 
determination of what secrets it needs to keep. Several years ago, to cite one 
example, the Federation of American Scientists sought historical and 
contemporary data on the aggregate intelligence budget under the Freedom of 
Information Act. After some litigation, the government released the figure for 
fiscal year 1997 and then, voluntarily, for 1998. It has refused, however, to 
release data for subsequent years and claims that releasing the figures for the 
years 1947-1970 could compromise "the interest of national defense or foreign 
policy" and "intelligence sources and methods." There have been times when the 
disclosure of irrationally or unjustifiably classified information has served 
the public. Certainly, in a system that depends on an informed and skeptical 
electorate, the government should not be moving in the direction of 
criminalizing public debate. 

RE: Agents kick crypto ass....was The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[Aimee Farr]

> Your role as an agent provocateur here is noted.

Your role as a son-uv-a-bitch to me is noted.

Trying to keep people out of trouble is a "provocateur?" Gee, sorry to
dampen your conspiracy.

I posted Regan because it was directly relevant to this discussion, and it
makes a couple of points -- some of which run in your favor.

Considering the incredibly bad timing of this discussion in light of world
events, I don't see how you could call ME a provocateur. My jibe was
good-natured. You keep posting the equivalent of classified ads. I know who
wants this shit now, and it's not "little bad men."

> Not so bright, though. And you've outed yourself by not-so-subtle hints
> about the SS "prime rib."

I have not tried to sex the SS. This is not to say I don't pay attention to
detail.

> People like you deserve what you get.
>
> --Tim May

My AP# is on file with your organization.

~Aimee

Re: Agents kick crypto ass....was The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[Tim May]

On Monday, August 27, 2001, at 09:22 PM, Aimee Farr wrote:

>> Your role as an agent provocateur here is noted.
>
> Your role as a son-uv-a-bitch to me is noted.
>
> Trying to keep people out of trouble is a "provocateur?" Gee, sorry to
> dampen your conspiracy.
>
> I posted Regan because it was directly relevant to this discussion, and 
> it
> makes a couple of points -- some of which run in your favor.
>
> Considering the incredibly bad timing of this discussion in light of 
> world
> events, I don't see how you could call ME a provocateur. My jibe was
> good-natured. You keep posting the equivalent of classified ads. I know 
> who
> wants this shit now, and it's not "little bad men.

You complained a few weeks ago about the timing of the "help me make 
bombz" posts...as if we have any choice about when AOL-accounted narcs 
post such requests.

And now, bizarrely, you think the "timing" of a reference to Blacknet, 
which was deployed in 1993, is "bad timing."

Fuck off, twit.


--Tim May

Re: biochemwomdterror in dc

[Declan McCullagh]

It's a little outside my beat, so I don't usually go. Maybe next time
I'll go and post a summary or write a Wired article. --Declan


On Mon, Aug 27, 2001 at 09:25:07AM -0700, Tim May wrote:
> I've been seeing Declan forward a bunch of these terse paragraphs 
> announcing  these meetings. I never see any summaries of what was said. 
> Anyone ever attend? (If they're closed to the public or journalists, why 
> forward so many announcements of them?)
> 
> Or is this some stego channel I am missing?
> 
> 
> --Puzzled in Corralitos

Re: Agents kick crypto ass....was The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[Tim May]

On Monday, August 27, 2001, at 07:53 PM, Aimee Farr wrote:

> The EEA wasn't passed until 96. I failed to mention Title 18 United 
> States
> Code, Section(s) 794(c).
>
> "Agents kick crypto ass."
> http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/regan_complaint.html'


> That wouldn't be what has your little mice running in their wheels, 
> would
> it?
>


Your role as an agent provocateur here is noted.

Not so bright, though. And you've outed yourself by not-so-subtle hints 
about the SS "prime rib."

People like you deserve what you get.

--Tim May

Re: nodes

[Declan McCullagh]

It was actually bounced messages, not spam, the was the problem. That's
what he told me in private email, not on the list, my mistake.

-Declan


On Mon, Aug 27, 2001 at 06:14:46AM -1000, Reese wrote:
> At 08:25 8/27/2001 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>  >On Sun, Aug 26, 2001 at 09:25:20PM -0700, Tim May wrote:
>  >> Lance has not posted a message to the Cypherpunks list in several
>  >> years, maybe more, that I can recall.
>  >
>  >Lance did post a message in the last month announcing that his cpunx
>  >node was going down. Too much bandwidth devoted to spam, he said.
>  >Other than that, I haven't seen him enter discussions in years, as you
>  >said.
> 
> I do not recall the spam attribution, but I've delved and quote it below
> for posterity.  It was the fact that the cyberpass node lost its list of
> screibers, then that it would go down for days at a time, that motivated
> me to jump ship.  Especially since there was no reply and no explanation
> for any of the above occurrences.  I figured Lance wanted to shut that
> node down and move on to other things.
> 
> Reese
> 
> 
> 
> X-Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Message-Id: 
> Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2001 08:51:22 -0700
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> From: "Lance M. Cottrell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Old-Subject: [EMAIL PROTECTED] closing
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed"
> Subject:  [EMAIL PROTECTED] closing
> Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Precedence: bulk
> Return-Path: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 
> The [EMAIL PROTECTED] node of the cypherpunks list will be
> closing on Friday August 10.
> 
> You should ensure that you are subscribed to a different node of the
> cypherpunks list before that time.
> 
>   -Lance
> 
> 
> Lance M. Cottrell  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Anonymizer, Inc. President
> Voice: (619) 725-3180 X304 Fax: (619) 725-3188
> www.Anonymizer.com
> 
> 

RE: Agents kick crypto ass....was The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[Aimee Farr]

> Not so bright, though. And you've outed yourself by not-so-subtle hints
> about the SS "prime rib."

When I said "prime rib," I meant PRIME RIB. Our little hamburger joint has
taken on greater culinary responsibility.

~Aimee

RE: Agents kick crypto ass....was The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[Aimee Farr]

> You complained a few weeks ago about the timing of the "help me make
> bombz" posts...as if we have any choice about when AOL-accounted narcs
> post such requests.

I don't think I complained about their timing, I think I complained about
their very existence.

> And now, bizarrely, you think the "timing" of a reference to Blacknet,
> which was deployed in 1993, is "bad timing."

Yep.


~Aimee

RE: The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[Aimee Farr]

Reese wrote:

>  >This is not legal advice. It's an obituary. :)
>
> Owning a vehicle that will exceed the speed limit is not a crime.
> Driving a vehicle that will exceed the speed limit is not a crime.
> Exceeding the speed limit is a crime and is a ticketable offense,
> at the least.
>
> Mechanisms to maintain privacy and anonymity are no different, use of

Damn it, Reese, I didn't say that. Can anybody here read between the lines?
Hell? *echo-echo-echo*

> those same mechanisms to commit crime is not a death knell for those
> mechanisms just as manufacturers do not stop producing and selling
> vehicles that are capable of exceeding the speed limit, even though
> some people do speed and are ticketed or given warnings, at least.
>
> You are entirely too smug and happy, at the thought of these various
> mechanisms useful for preserving privacy and anonymity going the way
> of the dodo.

That is not my attitude at all, Reese. I obviously like Tim's Blacknet.
However, I don't like it being characterized as a subversive tool, and damn
sure not in terms that might indicate a criminal conspiracy for shopping out
secrets to Libya.

> Tim may be correct, in his assessment on your deserving
> what you receive.

Oh, Noo!

>  >> think of people selling their expertise when some guild says they are
>  >> forbidden to.
>  >
>  >I talked about this before, as an OSINT channel for the U.S. Government.
>  >
>  >o BlackNet has legitimate intelligence applications.
>
> It also has legitimate applicability for Joe Sixpack and Suzy Winecooler,
> who don't want a zillion ads and cookies clogging their bandwidth and
> cache, who don't want targetted ads or their surfing habits tracked and
> monitored, who certainly don't want their health insurance premiums to
> go up after they do research on some rare, incurable disease they are
> mildly curious about or after researching a more common ailment when a
> friend happens to be diagnosed - to lean on those old standbys.

No shit.

>  >o Anonymity can be a problem. You need authentication. You would like
>  >blinded biometrics.
>
> The maintenance of privacy can be a problem, from a marketers POV, other
> things can be viewed as problems too, when the end consumer has proper
> control of self-identifying information.  If the money is good, that
> level of authentication can be conducted in meatspace if it is truly
> needed - most times, it is not.

Again, I was speaking within the confines of a very limited application
where authentication can be rather critical.

>  >o I would think the ROI would be where you can shoehorn into existing
>  >intelligence channels and groundwork. That's either a sovereign, an
>  >intermediary wrapped in the skirts of a sovereign, a defense contractor,
>  >or an untouchable intermediary. If not bona-fide intelligence, you're
>  >left with the criminal element, IRA and so forth.
>
> You leave many possible things out, you present a false summation of all
> the possible uses of Blacknet and maintenance of anonymity.

As I stated, I was examining it in the context of an _intelligence
application_. I wonder if that's a good contract, but obviously notwhy
do I even bother? *sigh*

>  >Most move product and still have
>  >distribution channels. Yeah, the IRA would like digital cash, they are
>  >buying arms with offshore debit cards.
>
> This event by people acting criminally in another country (according to
> the rules imposed by past-rulers of that other country, heh) should be
> used to shape and mold US domestic policy and legislation for the care
> and feeding of US citizen-units how, exactly?

I was merely pointing out that people that crypto does not "beam" product.
Solve the ship-submarine ditching problem if you want to help that scum.

>  >o It seems like _damn bad timing_ for a discussion in this context.
>
> Bad timing?  Who is disadvantaged by the timing of this discussion?
> Your handler said to slow the conversation down while they run some
> numbers and gets some surveillance in place, or something?

They've caught on to our "slow-the-conversation" tactic!! Oh, whatever shall
we do now? *slap to side of face* "Run some numbers?" What?

I flag posts in here that might qualify for Title I interceptions. This
month is looking to be a record-breaker.

Excuse me, my "handlers" are calling.Sorry, I'm not allowed to talk
about this.

>  >This should be couched in terms of a beneficial application, rather
>  >than something subversive.
>
> Principle is like that.  You don't like what others have to say?  You
> should remove your own right to freedom of speech, before you attempt
> to censor others.  (Good luck, once you've effectively removed your own
> right to free speech, on censoring anyone else).

Damnit, I'm not censoring anybody. I believe in the First Amendment. It's
such a good source of intelligence and so often leads to probable cause.
*kidding*

> As a lawyer, you know or should know that most (if not all) of the 

Re: The Privacy/Untraceability Sweet Spot

[Nomen Nescio]

On Monday, August 27, 2001, at 12:56 PM, Tim May wrote:
> On Monday, August 27, 2001, at 12:40 PM, Nomen Nescio wrote:
> > "Freedom fighters in communist-controlled regimes."  How much money
> > do they have?  More importantly, how much are they willing and able to
> > spend on anonymity/privacy/black-market technologies?  These guys aren't
> > rolling in dough.
>
> The IRA and the Real IRA have a lot of money, as the Brits have been 
> complaining about recently. Osama bin Laden is said to control more than 
> a billion dollars. And so on. I disagree with you assertion that "these 
> guys aren't rolling in dough."

Members of the IRA are not freedom fighters in a communist-controlled
country.  bin Laden did fall under that definition when he was fighting
to get the Russians out of Afghanistan but that was a long time ago.
Now he's opposing American influence in Saudi Arabia.

Some developers may nevertheless sympathize politically with such these
groups and so could work on technology for them with a clear conscience.

> > "Revolutionaries overthrowing bad governments."  The main 
> > revolutionaries
> > who will be willing to pay money are those who expect to get rich from
> > their revolution.  These are the ones who want to throw out the tyrants
> > so they can set themselves up as new tyrants.  It is people like this
> > who would be the best customers of cypherpunk technology.  You're not
> > making the world a better place by giving them tools.
>
> You make the assumption that overthrowing, say, the PRC or USSR 
> governments, would result in a "worse or just as bad" regime. I 
> disagree. And the same tools are still available to deconstruct interim 
> replacement regimes.

The point is that those who will pay large sums to acquire access to
these technologies, even for the purpose of overthrowing an evil regime,
are not doing it out of altruism.  They're not good-guy libertarians
who only want to set up a John Galt state.  Realistically they're more
likely to be interested in taking over the reins of power themselves.

And it's pretty questionable to salve your conscience by saying that
even if these guys use the tools to bad ends, someone else will then
be able to use the same tools against them.  The problem is, we're
doing this for profit, right?  We won't give the tools away once
the first generation uses them to take over.  We should sell them to
the highest bidder.  (Better to think of a service than a tool here.
Most cypherpunk technologies require a distributed infrastructure that
you can charge for.)  The high bidders are once again going to be the
bad guys who want to take over for selfish reasons.

> > "Distribution of birth control information in Islamic countries."  
> > Again,
> > selling to Planned Parenthood is not a business plan which will make
> > anyone rich.
>
> Planned Parenthood is not envisaged as the user

Pray tell, who exactly will pay large sums to be able to distribute birth
control information in Islamic countries?

> > The conclusion is that you need to add a third axis to Tim's graph:
> > morality, in addition to value and cost.  Many of the most lucrative
> > potential uses of anonymity technologies are morally questionable.
> > If you add this additional filter you are forced to focus on just a
> > few application areas (with the additional complication that few people
> > will agree on morality, and that morality and legality often have little
> > overlap).
>
> The technology is agnostic to "morality."

This is trivial; the same can be said for any technology.  It is the users
and implementors who are moral actors, and that is who we are considering.

> Choate argues that at least 5 or 6 axes are needed. Ever the nitwit, he 
> fails to realize that the main debate doesn't even use the _two_ that I 
> have outlined. Yes, I know about phase spaces and multi-dimensional 
> diagrams. But given that the debate about privacy tools is mired at the 
> 1D level ("untracebility good, traceability bad...why don't the proles 
> see this?"), graphing the major users and suppliers on the 2D graph I 
> outlined is a step in the right direction. It goes a long way to 
> explaining why people will spend thousands to fly to the Caymans to set 
> up a bank account while others won't even bother using PGP.

Fine, if the only point you want to make is that costs must be considered.
But eventually we need to move beyond that simplistic analysis.  At that
point we do need to consider morality and other issues.

> You want to add "morality" to the chart. Fine, except I don't see how it 
> gives different answers than my chart gave.

The answers it gives depends on the questions you ask.  If your questions
are simple enough (untraceability good?) then your chart will answer
them.  If your questions are more interesting (what technologies can
be practically implemented and make a positive difference in the world)
then you need a better chart.

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