Re: [PATCH V2] ACPI: APEI: Use ERST timeout for slow devices

2023-10-24 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Tue, Oct 24, 2023 at 04:32:48PM +0200, Rafael J. Wysocki wrote: > So there are 3 designated reviewers for APEI: Tony Luck, Borislav > Petkov and James Morse. I need an ACK or Reviewed-by from one of > them, so I can proceed with an APEI patch. Here's what I see: cat /tmp/pat

Re: [PATCH V2] ACPI: APEI: Use ERST timeout for slow devices

2023-10-25 Thread Borislav Petkov
Hi, On Wed, Oct 25, 2023 at 02:09:37PM +, Jeshua Smith wrote: <... snip a very detailed and good explanation... > > Writing 128 nor-flash pages would then take 120us * 128 = 15ms > typical, or 1800us * 128 = 230.4ms max. This is perfectly suitable to be in the commit message - it explains in

Re: [PATCH V3] ACPI: APEI: Use ERST timeout for slow devices

2023-10-28 Thread Borislav Petkov
g a > timeout and will return success to pstore after the operation completes. > > Signed-off-by: Jeshua Smith > --- Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

Re: KFENCE: included in x86 defconfig?

2024-02-07 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Wed, Feb 07, 2024 at 07:05:31PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote: > I think this would belong into some "hardening" config - while KFENCE > is not a mitigation (due to sampling) it has the performance > characteristics of unintrusive hardening techniques, so I think it > would be a good fit. I think tha

Re: KFENCE: included in x86 defconfig?

2024-02-07 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Wed, Feb 07, 2024 at 07:35:53PM +0100, Matthieu Baerts wrote: > Sorry, I'm sure I understand your suggestion: do you mean not including > KFENCE in hardening.config either, but in another one? > > For the networking tests, we are already merging .config files, e.g. the > debug.config one. We ar

Re: KFENCE: included in x86 defconfig?

2024-02-08 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Thu, Feb 08, 2024 at 08:47:37AM +0100, Marco Elver wrote: > That's a good question, and I don't have the answer to that - maybe we > need to ask Linus then. Right, before that, lemme put my user hat on. > We could argue that to improve memory safety of the Linux kernel more > rapidly, enableme

Re: KFENCE: included in x86 defconfig?

2024-02-08 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Thu, Feb 08, 2024 at 12:12:19PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote: > git log --grep 'BUG: KFENCE: ' > > There are more I'm aware of - also plenty I know of in downstream > kernels (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.09394.pdf - Section 5.7). Good. > This is a problem shared by all other diagnostic and error r

Re: [PATCH] x86, relocs: Ignore relocations in .notes section on walk_relocs

2024-03-18 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Mon, Mar 18, 2024 at 02:40:50PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > Applied to for-next/hardening Why? This is a patch that should go through the tip tree, if at all. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

Re: [PATCH] x86, relocs: Ignore relocations in .notes section on walk_relocs

2024-03-19 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Mon, Mar 18, 2024 at 04:45:45PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > The commit it refs to landed via -hardening, Yap, saw that. It should've gone through tip too as it is clearly a tip tree patch. > responsibility of landing this fix too. But it's fine to go via -tip > if you prefer? Yes, please. Just

Re: [PATCH] x86, relocs: Ignore relocations in .notes section on walk_relocs

2024-03-22 Thread Borislav Petkov
s, please refrain from taking tip patches in the future. You know how this works - get_maintainers.pl. Thx. Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 14:47:05 -0400 From: Sasha Levin To: stable-comm...@vger.kernel.org, keesc...@chromium.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x...@kern

Re: [PATCH] x86, relocs: Ignore relocations in .notes section on walk_relocs

2024-03-23 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 04:40:11PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > The earlier patch, commit aaa8736370db ("x86, relocs: Ignore relocations > in .notes section"), landed via my tree. It was sent out on Feb 22nd > (v1[1]) and got a suggestion from HPA and a Review from Juergen Gross. > I sent v2 Feb 27th[

Re: [PATCH] x86/boot: add prototype for __fortify_panic()

2024-05-30 Thread Borislav Petkov
On May 30, 2024 6:23:36 PM GMT+02:00, Jeff Johnson wrote: >On 5/30/2024 8:42 AM, Nikolay Borisov wrote: >> >> >> On 29.05.24 г. 21:09 ч., Jeff Johnson wrote: >>> As discussed in [1] add a prototype for __fortify_panic() to fix the >>> 'make W=1 C=1' warning: >>> >>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/mis

Re: [PATCH] x86/boot: add prototype for __fortify_panic()

2024-05-31 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 09:53:28AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > Under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, the boot code *does* still uses > fortify-string.h. It lets us both catch mistakes we can discover at > compile and will catch egregious runtime mistakes, though the reporting > is much simpler in the boot cod

Re: [PATCH] x86/boot: add prototype for __fortify_panic()

2024-05-31 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 01:46:37PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > Please do not do this. It still benefits from compile-time sanity > checking. Care to elaborate how exactly it benefits? -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

Re: [PATCH] x86/boot: add prototype for __fortify_panic()

2024-05-31 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 02:06:48PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > ... > or refactors and forgets to change some name, etc. It's all for catching > bugs before they happen, etc. And when source string lengths aren't > known, the runtime checking can kick in too. Aha, thanks for explaining. > It happens

Re: [PATCH] x86/boot: add prototype for __fortify_panic()

2024-05-31 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 02:34:07PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 11:20:09PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote: > > So I get an allergic reaction everytime we wag the dog - i.e., fix the > > code because some tool or option can't handle it even if it is > >

Re: [PATCH] x86/hpet: Read HPET directly if panic in progress

2024-06-05 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Wed, Jun 05, 2024 at 02:23:32PM +0800, Tony W Wang-oc wrote: > After MCE has occurred, it is possible for the MCE handler to execute the > add_taint() function without panic. For example, the fake_panic is > configured. fake_panic is an ancient debugging leftover. If you set it, you get what yo

Re: [PATCH] x86/hpet: Read HPET directly if panic in progress

2024-06-05 Thread Borislav Petkov
On Wed, Jun 05, 2024 at 06:10:07PM +0800, Tony W Wang-oc wrote: > It may also happen without setting fake_panic, such as an MCE error of the > UCNA/SRAO type occurred? Which types exactly do you mean when you're looking at the severities[] array in severity.c? And what scenario are you talking ab