Mahlzeit
I have subscribed this mailinglist a few days before. I'm writing
a simple, portable and free smart card/card reader library. I will
post here an announcement, when the next public alpha(beta) release
is ready. I'm looking through the mailinglist archives and have some
comments to these older messages.
Can here only members post? I would rather use my normal account
than my mailinglist account.
Does here somebody KNOW details about the 3DES PRO-mode commands
on the cryptoflex? How is it really done? Has somebody sample
key/challenge/command/mac for me?
wjg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (15 Apr 1998):
> > o iButton from Dallas Semiconductor?
> ^ Good design. The reader is extremely cheap (~$15), the casing is
> rugged and tamperproof and the the device is large enough to
> provide room for more silicon than a chipcard.
The only (nearly) tamperproof design I know of are the US nuclear
weapons. Everything other is at best tamperresistant. SRAM can be
read out at room temperature a few minutes after disconnection from a
power suply. In liquid nitrogen even days after disconnection.
Mark Jackson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (19 Jun 1998):
> In a networked environment running X, an app will sometimes be running
> remotely on a server but displaying on the client. In order for a
> reader at a client machine to be accessed by the remote application, the
> resource manager would have to be network aware in some way. My initial
> gut feeling is that a daemon or inetd service would be a nice way to
> do this...
PINs etc. are often transmitted unencrypted to the card, so this link
should be securly encrypted. (as also Robin Cheng wrote)
Robin Cheng <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (29 Jun 1998 ):
> applications,what can we do? One solution is that we make every interface
> between all the modules very secure,and meanwhile we put as much as
> possible into kernel.Is it worth?I don't know.Maybe for some cases,it
I don't think it is a good idea to put this into the kernel. This
would make it much to inflexible. A daemon would be a much better
place. It doesn't require kernel patches and should be made portable
very easily.
Mark Jackson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (12 Jul 1998):
> 2. At the same time, a serial smartcard reader with kernel
> support should *lock* that serial port from being able to be
> accessed by anything else. The concept is simple, but after
> poking around in the kernel drivers/char/* sources I don't
> know that an implementation will be easy at all. I'm hoping
> someone reading this will have a solution!
Serial port locking is normaly done by a file in e.g. /var/spool/uucp.
Carlos Prados <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (26 Jul 1998):
> - I can't read from a specified address: towitoko reader seems to begin
> reading always from the same position (it begins on byte 254 on a 256
> bytes card, and then continues from the begining)
I can't write to I2C cards.
Eric Murray <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (4 Aug 1998):
> Does anyone have code that implements the 3DES authentication that's
> used on GPK4000 cards?
It is in my library, but I hadn't any success using it until now.
David Corcoran <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (17 Aug 1998):
> Ok, I have gotten permission to give out Cryptoflex documentation by
> Schlumberger to all Cryptoflex card owners.
Schlumberger in Germany is much more paranoid. They give it only to
"trusted developers". Is your documentation newer than August 1997?
Danny Kumamoto <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (07 Dec 1998):
> For Cryptoflex cards, you'll have to contact our people in Europe directly
> (again, we will be more than happy to forward your request(s)).
Is it really possible to get low volumes in Europe? I talked to the
manager of Schlumberger Germany and they would only sell whole
Cyberflex Development kits and nothing else.
Mahlzeit
endergone Zwiebeltuete, who is allways interested in new cards and new
card/reader manuals.
***************************************************************
Linux Smart Card Developers - M.U.S.C.L.E.
(Movement for the Use of Smart Cards in a Linux Environment)
http://www.linuxnet.com/smartcard/index.html
***************************************************************
