On Jan 9, 8:39 am, William Stein <wst...@gmail.com> wrote: > When I originally pushed to have secure=True easily available by > default in Sage for all users, I > (1) didn't understand that secure=False is safe on localhost,
Via the absolutely zero-configuration one-time certificate opening of the notebook, I agree. However, on a machine with multi-account login (nearly any unix/linux/mac workstation in a department network), even listening on localhost provides a larger attack surface. If I'm running notebook() and someone logs in to the machine and connects to the notebook, there is now another way someone could try to run code under a different (my!) identity. Normally people will probably not realize that by starting notebook() they are increasing their attack surface. I don't think including GnuTLS solves this problem, so I'm not against dropping it. Are there things we can do to improve (perceived) security around this? -- To post to this group, send an email to sage-devel@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to sage-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/sage-devel URL: http://www.sagemath.org
