What email is that? I replied to Homakov on Twitter thanking him for the discovery and stating a clear intent to get the issue resolved. What I rejected outright was the knee-jerk reaction to remove the possibility of generating JS responses from Rails. This rejection was confirmed when it got clear that the motivation behind that specific mitigation strategy was also motivated by architectural opinions on what's dinosaur and what's not.
But again, even having this discussion here or on Twitter simply isn't the proper forum to discuss 0-day exploits. It's the reason we have a standardized security reporting and response protocol. It's why we go to great lengths to coordinate proper fixes across multiple versions of Rails, following the CVE process, and other responsible steps in the process. To sidestep all that doesn't help anyone but Homakov in the short-term to build a reputation as a take-no-prisoners grey hatter. I question the business strategy of that long-term (imagine having a business dispute with Homakov after giving him access to your system -- yikes!). Again, my opinion of the process is removed from the value of finding security holes. Of course finding and responsibly disclosing security holes is a good thing. I just wish that Homakov, and others who might be inspired by his tactics, would realize that there's plenty of gain to be had personally by subscribing to these time-tested practices. On Dec 2, 2013, at 7:52 AM, Rodrigo Rosenfeld Rosas <[email protected]> wrote: > David, first I must say I admire both you and Homakov and I'd certainly hire > him if I could afford it. > > I believe what led him to create that post was exactly your reponse to his > e-mail. > > I agree he shouldn't have created this discussion publicly but you shouldn't > have replied the way you did either. You should instead try to understand the > problem first before saying it would go nowhere. > > I believe this is what caused Homakov reaction. > > Sincerely, > Rodrigo. > > Em 02-12-2013 13:47, DHH escreveu: >> Please stop conflating the discovery of a security issue with the >> philosophical waxing about architecture. It's not helping the case. As >> stated previously, responding with JS is not only a wonderful architectural >> pattern, it's also not going anywhere. Not in a gem, not in a deprecation, >> not anywhere. We'll fix the security issue, and Rails will continue to >> proudly champion the use of this great pattern. >> >> Guess what, it won't be the last security issue Rails ever has. Just like it >> won't be the last security issue any piece of software ever has. But we need >> to level up as a community in our handling of these issues. >> >> Frankly, I'm surprised that people are willing to hire Homakov for any work >> in the area given his reputation for irresponsible disclosure. Finding a >> legit security issues is a great services, but disregarding all security >> issue management protocols in their publication is doing a disservice to all >> who would otherwise benefit from the work. >> >> Rails has had a codified security process for many years now. It's available >> for all to read on http://rubyonrails.org/security. Making a blog post on >> your personal site isn't one of the channels listed as a responsible way of >> disclosing discoveries. Posting specific 0-day attack vectors against >> affected sites is not one either. >> >> Making a public report over a holiday weekend, and then, when the response >> to the report doesn't immediately follow the proposed solution (remove the >> feature), go off the reservation with specific attacks is just plain >> irresponsible. No two ways about it. It also goes to undermine any other >> recommendations or suggestions coming from said reporter. >> >> So. Damage is already done for this issue. But lest it encourages others to >> act as irresponsibly as Homakov has done of this issue, I hope others take a >> broader approach for future issues. Report systemic or framework issues per >> the reporting instructions on http://rubyonrails.org/security. Report >> specific application issues directly to application developers responsibly >> per their reporting instructions (see >> https://37signals.com/security-response for the one we use at 37signals). >> >> Presumably we're all in the same boat here: Make Rails better and more >> secure. Let's row like we mean that. The Rails security team (Michael >> Koziarski, Jeremy Kemper, and Aaron Patterson) has worked hard in the past >> to provide us with a good process, they've followed that process, and they >> deserve our thanks and support. >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Ruby on Rails: Core" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/rubyonrails-core. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google > Groups "Ruby on Rails: Core" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/rubyonrails-core/rwzM8MKJbKU/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/rubyonrails-core. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Ruby on Rails: Core" group. 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