On Jun 13, 2024, at 11:04 AM, Reshad Rahman <reshad=40yahoo....@dmarc.ietf.org> 
wrote:
> Here are my comments on draft-ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers. I'm not a 
> security expert, so my comments are BFD specific, relying on SecDir for the 
> security aspects. 

  Some minor replies

> Section 3 (updating RFC5880)
> 
>   - 3rd paragraph says "SHOULD include a Sequence Number field". RFC5880 
> already has sequence number for all types except simple Password, is this 
> SHOULD targeted at future auth types?

  Yes.

>   - "Packets which indicate a state transition SHOULD use a secure AuthType." 
> Replace with a MUST or explain the SHOULD. Based on the last paragraph of 
> section 4, I believe MUST should be used. Not using a secure AuthType seems 
> to be a security risk? Also the term "secure AuthType" implies that there are 
> non-secure AuthTypes, use the term "strong authentication" as in the 
> optimizing-authentication document and as in section 12 of this document?

  I think "MUST" is a reasonable change. The insecure Auth-Type is NULL, for 
"none".

> 
> Section 4
> 
>   - Last sentence "this Auth Type must only be used when 
> bfd.SessionState=Up". s/must/MUST/? Also, Figure 1 of 
> optimizing-authentication allows OPT in Init and Down states (I've commented 
> on that already).
> 
> Section 5 (ISAAC Authentication Format)
> 
>   - Reserved: "This field MUST be set to zero on transmit". That field is 
> used for the "Optimized" field in optimizing-authentication, so there seems 
> to be a conflict here.

  I think it's OK to leave as -is, and then have the "optimizing 
authentication" document update this one.

> Section 6
> 
>   - "The Auth Type field MUST be set to TBD1 (Meticulous Keyed ISAAC)". There 
> is no IANA registration for just ISAAC anymore, so it will be one of the 2 
> auth types from optimizing-authentication?

  It may be best to update the IANA section of this document to define 
Meticulous Keyed ISAAC.  That way everything is in one document.

  Alan DeKok.

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