On Fri, Jun 7, 2024 at 4:12 PM Jeffrey Haas <jh...@pfrc.org> wrote:

> Joseph,
>
> Thanks for the review.  Unfortunately, I think your comments run contrary
> to the entire nature of the draft. :-)
>
>
> > On Jun 7, 2024, at 10:43 AM, Joseph Salowey via Datatracker <
> nore...@ietf.org> wrote:
> > The document is well written and fairly simple.  Referencing the previous
> > security considerations does provide some good advice, but it seems that
> this
> > document perhaps adds some considerations about the size of BPDU
> packets.  It
> > seems that it would be possible for excessively large packets could cause
> > problems for the sender or receiver.  Perhaps add something to the
> security
> > considerations about: Implementations should consider this and set
> appropriate
> > upper bounds on amount of padding added to these messages and on the
> length of
> > received messages.
>
> The entire point of the feature is the user chooses the size of the PDU in
> order to test the path MTU.  Thus, the PDU may be at most the max local
> interface MTU size on purpose.
>
>
[Joe] Thanks for the explanation.  I missed the fact that there already is
a limit imposed by the MTU of the interface.  I think this is sufficient to
avoid problems with excessively large packets.  I don't think any change is
needed and the document is ready.


> Similarly, implementations must be, in circumstances where the MTU is the
> size of the PDU, be willing to receive such PDUs which may be the local
> interface MTU BFD is received over.
>
> Certainly on the receive side of things, if the operator cares to limit
> the maximum size of the received PDU smaller than the interface MTU (which
> seems perverse, but perhaps the path MTU and the interface MTU are
> intentionally different), such a thing might be doable.
>
> However, such a limitation would need to be implemented at the appropriate
> higher encapsulation layer carrying the BFD PDU.  For BFD over IP, this is
> carried in UDP.  Thus, the limiting mechanism would be a firewall on IP+UDP
> packets to the relevant BFD port for a given packet size.  This would be
> outside the scope of BFD as BFD has never made implementation
> recommendations relying on firewalls.
>
> Please note that fragmentation isn't an expected attack since the
> specification requires the don't fragment bit when using IPv4.
>
> It's finally worth noting that receive size limitations enforced at layers
> outside of BFD may negatively impact unidirectional PMTU detection.
> Dropped packets will cause the relevant BFD session to go down even if the
> PDU sent to probe the unidirectional PMTU from the sender had successfully
> made it through to the receiver.  It becomes, "I will only let you detect
> MTU up to size X".
>
-- Jeff
>
>
>
>

Reply via email to