> On Jan 22, 2024, at 2:20 PM, Jeffrey Haas <jh...@pfrc.org> wrote:
> 
> Mahesh,
> 
> 
>> On Jan 22, 2024, at 5:15 PM, Mahesh Jethanandani <mjethanand...@gmail.com 
>> <mailto:mjethanand...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>>> On Jan 19, 2024, at 4:14 PM, Mahesh Jethanandani <mjethanand...@gmail.com 
>>> <mailto:mjethanand...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> At the same time, if 'secure-seq-num' is configured as ’true’, the sequence 
>>> number is generated as defined by I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers, and 
>>> inserted into the packet. The only question I ask is, if “optimized auth” 
>>> is enabled, and when there is a state transition, the packet is “fully” 
>>> authenticated by selecting bfd.AuthType as one of the non-zero values (but 
>>> not NULL-auth). Do we need to generate a secure sequence number at that 
>>> time? Or is it easier/simpler to let it continue generating the secure 
>>> sequence number, and not deal with “lost” packets as the session 
>>> transitions from bfd.AuthType with a non-zero value and NULL-auth.
>> 
>> Want to make sure that this is clear enough (here), and if you think text to 
>> that effect should be added to the draft.
> 
> I'm not really looking for text that says the procedure sets specific bfd 
> variables in order to say what is going on the wire.
> 
> However, what's needed is discussing that we're switching from a primary 
> configuration for authentication with "strong" properties to a "weaker" one 
> for the optimization.  We also need to discuss that for certain "weaker" 
> authentications, like NULL, we may need to periodically do the strong 
> authentication to ensure we haven't been MITMed.
> 
> And for that periodic strong auth check, what's the configuration element and 
> what's the recommended time to do it?  For example, a few times an hour?  I 
> suspect we'll pick a value and it'll immediately get hate mail from the 
> security directorate no matter what so my recommendation is to pick something 
> the authors think is reasonable and we'll iterate that conversational point 
> in that thread.

I am proposing two config variables that I think that are pertinent to 
optimized configuration, and I can put a small YANG model that augments BFD 
YANG model to demonstrates it. They are:

- optimized-auth flag: A boolean flag, when set to true, the implementation 
would like to make use of optimized auth for the session in question.
- strong-auth-interval: A uint32 value that takes a microsecond value for the 
interval after which the session MUST try a strong authentication mechanism to 
prevent a MITM attack. The default value is default value of 
required-min-rx-interval as defined in the BFD YANG model, times the 
local-multiplier with a default value of 3 for a total of 3000000.

Both these variables can be protected with a feature statement that 
implementations will enable if they want to support optimized authentication.

Is that what you were looking for?


Mahesh Jethanandani
mjethanand...@gmail.com






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