Hi Mahesh,

 

Thanks for the response. 

 

Would it be possible to have an updated document when the gates reopen?  Please 
see inline.

 

From: Rtg-bfd <rtg-bfd-boun...@ietf.org> on behalf of Mahesh Jethanandani 
<mjethanand...@gmail.com>
Date: Tuesday, February 23, 2021 at 3:03 PM
To: Reshad Rahman <res...@yahoo.com>, Jeffrey Haas <jh...@pfrc.org>
Cc: "rtg-bfd@ietf. org" <rtg-bfd@ietf.org>, 
"draft-ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numb...@ietf.org" 
<draft-ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numb...@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Shephered writeup for draft-ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers

 

Hi Reshad,

 

I never really received this e-mail, till Sonal forwarded it to me. 

<RR> You have to remove my name from the spam sender list 😊

 

Anyway, here are our responses to the comments you have provided. Please see 
inline with [mj].

 

Hi Sonal, authors,

 

Thanks for the document update. Main comments:

 
Hash has been replaced by symmetric algorithm, to be able to retrieve the 
sequence number at the receiving side, this is good. 
Section 3 mentions that the symmetric key is provisioned securely on sender and 
receiver, but there is no mention of provisioning of the algorithm/function. 
Also there is no mention of what algorithms to use, is this on purpose since 
what’s good today will not be recommended tomorrow? Should we at least say “do 
not use DES” or too obvious?
[mj] I believe this is a question for the WG, and maybe something we can bring 
up in the upcoming meeting, if it is not answered on the mailing list. Would 
the WG prefer that a (set of) algorithms MUST be defined to ensure 
interoperability, or is this something we should leave up to 
implementors/operators to agree? We are concerned what we define today might be 
obsoleted tomorrow.

<RR> it would be good to have an update on this document at the upcoming 
meeting. Having a MUST set of algorithms has the drawback you mentioned. 
Letting implementors/operators agree is fine but I think we still need a 
suggested list (as of 2021) for interop. And I believe we need some text in the 
document wrt provisioning the algorithm.

 
Was there any discussions/thoughts on using asymmetric encryption instead (I 
didn’t follow this document when it started)? It avoids the pain of having a 
shared secret. I’m not saying we should go with asymmetric, just wondering.
[mj] We chose symmetric because that is what 5880 talks about.

<RR> Good with me. I’ll defer to security experts.



 
For the key, the terms “symmetric key”, “shared secret key” and “shared key” 
are used, settle on one for clarity (I believe it should be “shared key” or 
“shared secret”?)
[mj] Ok. How about “shared secret key”?

<RR> Good.



 
For the algorithm, the terms “symmetric key algorithm”, “symmetric algorithm” , 
“symmetric encryption algorithm”, “symmetric decryption algorithm” are used. 
Again, pick 1 “symmetric algorithm”?).
[mj] Ok. We will pick “symmetric algorithm”.

<RR> Good.

 
The term “hash” is still used e.g. in section 4 header
[mj] That is deliberate. We use “hash” when we refer to the value that is 
calculated over the entire packet and appended as a value at the end of the 
packet. That is different from ciphertext, which is the value after applying 
the symmetric algorithm on the sequence number and inserted in-lieu of the 
sequence number before the hash is calculated.

<RR> Section 4 header still uses the term “hash” but the text in that section 
has been changed to “cyphertext”, I believe this is an oversight.

 
Security is not my expertise. Should we get a security review asap, as opposed 
to waiting for IESG review. Jeff/Martin?
[mj] It would not be a bad idea, although we do have a security expert as a 
co-author on the draft :-)

<RR> It would seem you’re covered then. 



 
Diagram chains are clearer now.
Sequence number validity as described at the bottom of page 3 and on P4 (at the 
end of section 3). RFC5880 sections 6.7.3 and 6.7.4 describe that received 
sequence number should be between bfd.RcvAuthSeq(+1) to 
bfd.RcvAuthSeq+(3*Detect Mult) inclusive. I don’t see why this has to be 
changed for secure sequence numbers.
[mj] We will just refer to 5880.

<RR> Good.



 
Jeff’s comment regarding “The first sequence number can be obtained…” in 
section 3. I believe the text is incorrect. RFC5880 sections 6.7.3 and 6.7.4 
explain how the first sequence number is obtained (using bfd.AuthSeqKnown and 
bfd.RcvAuthSeq).
[mj] Ditto.

<RR> Good.

 

Regards,

Reshad.

 
 

Nits:

 

Section 4: s/”while encryption/decryption”/”while doing encryption/decryption”/

[mj] Ok.

What does “non linear” mean in “monotonically increasing (but non linear) 
sequence number”?
[mj] A monotonically increasing number is just that, an increasing number, but 
it does not have to be linear. See the diagram below. That is why the mention 
of non-linear.

 




Section 7: s/Jeff Hass/Jeff Haas/

[mj] Will fix :-). Thanks


 

Regards,

Reshad.

Mahesh Jethanandani

mjethanand...@gmail.com

 

 

 

 

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