Dear Carlos, thank you for the suggestions. Attached are the working version and the diff. My notes in-line below under GIM>> tag.
Regards, Greg On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 6:11 PM Carlos Pignataro (cpignata) < cpign...@cisco.com> wrote: > Hi, Greg, > > Thanks for the quick reply, please see inline. > > — > Carlos Pignataro, car...@cisco.com > > *“Sometimes I use big words that I do not fully understand, to make myself > sound more photosynthesis."* > > 2020/05/05 午後8:10、Greg Mirsky <gregimir...@gmail.com>のメール: > > Dear Carlos, > I'll do top-posting to highlight the remaining points of discussion. > Please correct me if my understanding is not correct: > > - the reference to Section 5 RFC 5881 in the following sentence: > > Validation of TTL or Hop Limit of the inner IP packet is performed as > described in Section 5 [RFC5881]. > > > > “Validation of TTL / Hop Limit of the inner IP packet, as long as the > related considerations for BFD control packet demultiplexing and > authentication, is performed as described in Section 5 [RFC5881].” > GIM>> Thank you, accepted. > > > I expect that a reader of BFD over VXLAN document is able to find the > relevant information in Section 5 of RFC 5881. Do you think that the > reference to Section 5 RFC 5881 might be confusing to the reader? Would you > suggest to use another reference without replicating the text from RFC 5881 > in this document? > > > - Security Considerations section > > You've suggested: > Currently the security considerations does not say “security > considerations of 5881 apply here”, nor does it say “the ttl/hl protection > isn’t useful in foobar “ > > I think it should say both. > > This draft discusses the use of BFD over VXLAN. Do you mean that 'foobar' > is BFD over VXLAN? Since security considerations in RFC 7348 are applicable > in this draft, I don't think that GTSM is not useful in the case of BFD > over VXLAN. Or I misinterpreted 'foobar'? Could you please clarify it? > > Would the following update is acceptable: > OLD TEXT: > Other than requiring control of the number of BFD sessions between > the same pair of VTEPs, this specification does not raise any > additional security issues beyond those discussed in [RFC5880], > [RFC5881], and [RFC7348]. > NEW TEXT: > Other than requiring control of the number of BFD sessions between > the same pair of VTEPs, this specification does not raise any > additional security issues beyond those discussed in [RFC5880], > [RFC5881], and [RFC7348] that apply to this document. > > > I am sorry, as I read this I do not fully understand the first part. What > is to “require _control_ of the number of sessions”? > > I would split that long sentence into two. > GIM>> I agree, the sentence is too convoluted. Would removing it altogether and adding the following at the top of the section make it clearer: Security issues discussed in [RFC5880], [RFC5881], and [RFC7348] apply to this document. > > > > - Acknowledgments > > Thank you. I'll thoroughly look through all the relevant discussion > threads in the mail archive. > > > Sounds good. > > Thanks, > > Carlos. > > > > Regards, > Greg > > > On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 7:52 PM Carlos Pignataro (cpignata) < > cpign...@cisco.com> wrote: > >> Dear Greg, >> >> As I said, I did *not* review the updated version (or the changes) >> thoroughly (or superficially for that matter) >> >> Please do not count this as a review of the new revision, and instead >> consider the context that I laid for my reply. >> >> I only checked the changes for one comment I had made. >> >> Please see inline. >> >> Thumb typed by Carlos Pignataro. >> Excuze typofraphicak errows >> >> 2020/05/04 午後10:15、Greg Mirsky <gregimir...@gmail.com>のメール: >> >> Dear Carlos, >> thank you for your thorough review of the updated version, >> >> >> I didn’t. This is what I had said: >> >> I have not checked the diff and the new text regarding the Eth MAC and >> mgmt VNI. >> >> Assuming that was clear... >> >> helpful and >> constructive suggestions. >> >> >> Thanks. That was the intent, but only for the TTL/HL change. >> >> Please find my answers in-line tagged GIM>>. >> >> Regards, >> Greg >> >> On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 5:49 PM Carlos Pignataro (cpignata) >> <cpign...@cisco.com> wrote: >> >> >> Dear Greg, >> >> >> I have not checked the diff and the new text regarding the Eth MAC and >> mgmt VNI. >> >> >> However, these diffs also include a change that you did not mention: TTL >> / Hop Limit handling, which is one of the comments I had made. >> >> >> In that context, thank you very much! since this update partially >> (although largely) addresses my comment. >> >> >> Still missing: >> >> >> TTL or Hop Limit: MUST be set to 255 in accordance with the >> >> Generalized TTL Security Mechanism [RFC5881]. >> >> >> CMP: this is an incorrect citation. The GTSM is RFC 5082, not RFC 5881. I >> recommend adding a Reference to RFC 5082 (as I’d suggested before). >> >> GIM>> Agreed, will change the reference to RFC 5082 >> >> >> Thanks. >> >> >> Validation of TTL or Hop Limit of the inner IP packet is performed as >> >> described in Section 5 [RFC5881]. >> >> >> CMP: This is an oversimplification. S5 of RFC 5881 explains not only how >> to validate TTL/HL, but also about demultiplexing tulles in presence of >> auth and various header fields. >> >> GIM>> I've compared Section 3 of RFC 5082 and Section 5 of RFC 5881 >> and still believe that for this document the reference to Section 5 of >> RFC 5881 is more helpful to a reader and an implementor. >> >> >> Yes, I agree with this. I did not say “change this reference to 5082” — >> that was the previous comment on a different passage. >> >> Section 5 >> provides an explicit specification on handling TTL/HC != 255 by a >> receiving BFD system. I think that it is important to reference >> Section 5, as the handling of TTL/HC != 255 is different depending on >> whether the BFD session is in unauthenticated or authenticated mode. >> Would you agree? >> >> >> Yes, but that’s orthogonal to my comment. >> >> My point is that the relevant text from section 5 does more than simply “ >> Validation of TTL or Hop Limit ” >> >> >> 9. Security Considerations >> >> >> CMP: A discussion on the positive impact of using GTSM would help here. >> >> GIM>> The Security Consideration section in RFC 5881 provides the >> excellent text on the benefit of using GTSM in both, unauthenticated >> and authenticated, modes. the last para in the Security Consideration >> section of this document mentioned the discussion in several RFCs, >> including in RFC 5881. Do you think that an additional text about the >> use of GTSM in single-hop BFD should be added in this document? >> >> >> Yes, that’s why I made the comment! >> >> Currently the security considerations does not say “security >> considerations of 5881 apply here”, nor does it say “the ttl/hl protection >> isn’t useful in foobar “ >> >> I think it should say both. >> >> Could >> you suggest some text? >> >> >> 11. Acknowledgments >> >> >> CMP: Both professional courtesy as well as proper record and provenance >> tracking suggest keeping an updated Acknowledgements section. >> >> GIM>> My apologies, I've updated the working version accordingly. >> >> >> To be clear, I’m not talking about me but about others who invested more >> time helping with this doc, like Joel and others. It would be useful to go >> through the list archive (to also ensure all comments are captured, since >> they were made SO long ago) >> >> Best, >> >> Carlos. >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> — >> >> Carlos Pignataro, car...@cisco.com >> >> >> “Sometimes I use big words that I do not fully understand, to make myself >> sound more photosynthesis." >> >> >> 2020/05/04 午後6:58、Greg Mirsky <gregimir...@gmail..com>のメール: >> >> >> Dear All, >> >> my apologies for holding off this upload. The update is to address a >> >> set of comments related to the use of destination Ethernet MAC in the >> >> inner Ethernet frame that encapsulates a BFD control message. A new >> >> section on the use of the Management VNI has been added and the >> >> document now considers only the case of using the Management VNI to >> >> transmitted receive BFD control messages. >> >> Always welcome your questions and comments. >> >> >> Regards, >> >> Greg >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message --------- >> >> From: <internet-dra...@ietf.org> >> >> Date: Mon, May 4, 2020 at 3:50 PM >> >> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-11.txt >> >> To: Mallik Mudigonda <mmudi...@cisco.com>, Sudarsan Paragiri >> >> <sudarsan....@gmail.com>, Greg Mirsky <gregimir...@gmail.com>, Santosh >> >> Pallagatti <santosh.pallaga...@gmail.com>, Vengada Prasad Govindan >> >> <vengg...@cisco.com> >> >> >> >> >> A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-11.txt >> >> has been successfully submitted by Greg Mirsky and posted to the >> >> IETF repository. >> >> >> Name: draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan >> >> Revision: 11 >> >> Title: BFD for VXLAN >> >> Document date: 2020-05-04 >> >> Group: bfd >> >> Pages: 11 >> >> URL: >> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-11.txt >> >> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan/ >> >> Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-11 >> >> Htmlized: >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan >> >> Diff: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-11 >> >> >> Abstract: >> >> This document describes the use of the Bidirectional Forwarding >> >> Detection (BFD) protocol in point-to-point Virtual eXtensible Local >> >> Area Network (VXLAN) tunnels used to form an overlay network. >> >> >> >> >> >> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of >> submission >> >> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. >> >> >> The IETF Secretariat >> >> >> >> >
BFD S. Pallagatti, Ed.
Internet-Draft VMware
Intended status: Standards Track S. Paragiri
Expires: November 8, 2020 Individual Contributor
V. Govindan
M. Mudigonda
Cisco
G. Mirsky
ZTE Corp.
May 7, 2020
BFD for VXLAN
draft-ietf-bfd-vxlan-12
Abstract
This document describes the use of the Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD) protocol in point-to-point Virtual eXtensible Local
Area Network (VXLAN) tunnels used to form an overlay network.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 8, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Use of the Management VNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Reception of BFD Packet from VXLAN Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Echo BFD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
"Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network" (VXLAN) [RFC7348] provides an
encapsulation scheme that allows building an overlay network by
decoupling the address space of the attached virtual hosts from that
of the network.
One use of VXLAN is in data centers interconnecting virtual machines
(VMs) of a tenant. VXLAN addresses requirements of the Layer 2 and
Layer 3 data center network infrastructure in the presence of VMs in
a multi-tenant environment by providing a Layer 2 overlay scheme on a
Layer 3 network [RFC7348]. Another use is as an encapsulation for
Ethernet VPN [RFC8365].
This document is written assuming the use of VXLAN for virtualized
hosts and refers to VMs and VXLAN Tunnel End Points (VTEPs) in
hypervisors. However, the concepts are equally applicable to non-
virtualized hosts attached to VTEPs in switches.
In the absence of a router in the overlay, a VM can communicate with
another VM only if they are on the same VXLAN segment. VMs are
unaware of VXLAN tunnels as a VXLAN tunnel is terminated on a VTEP.
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VTEPs are responsible for encapsulating and decapsulating frames
exchanged among VMs.
The ability to monitor path continuity, i.e., perform proactive
continuity check (CC) for point-to-point (p2p) VXLAN tunnels, is
important. The asynchronous mode of BFD, as defined in [RFC5880], is
used to monitor a p2p VXLAN tunnel.
In the case where a Multicast Service Node (MSN) (as described in
Section 3.3 of [RFC8293]) participates in VXLAN, the mechanisms
described in this document apply and can, therefore, be used to test
the connectivity from the source NVE to the MSN.
This document describes the use of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD) protocol to enable monitoring continuity of the path between
VXLAN VTEPs, performing as Network Virtualization Endpoints, and/or
availability of a replicator MSN using a Management VNI (Section 4).
All other uses of the specification to test toward other VXLAN
endpoints are out of the scope.
2. Conventions used in this document
2.1. Terminology
BFD Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
CC Continuity Check
p2p Point-to-point
MSN Multicast Service Node
NVE Network Virtualization Endpoint
VFI Virtual Forwarding Instance
VM Virtual Machine
VNI VXLAN Network Identifier (or VXLAN Segment ID)
VTEP VXLAN Tunnel End Point
VXLAN Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network
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2.2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Deployment
Figure 1 illustrates the scenario with two servers, each of them
hosting two VMs. The servers host VTEPs that terminate two VXLAN
tunnels with VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) number 100 and 200
respectively. Separate BFD sessions can be established between the
VTEPs (IP1 and IP2) for monitoring each of the VXLAN tunnels (VNI 100
and 200). Using a BFD session to monitor a set of VXLAN VNIs between
the same pair of VTEPs might help to detect and localize problems
caused by misconfiguration. An implementation that supports this
specification MUST be able to control the number of BFD sessions that
can be created between the same pair of VTEPs. BFD packets intended
for a VTEP MUST NOT be forwarded to a VM, as a VM may drop BFD
packets, leading to a false negative. This method is applicable
whether the VTEP is a virtual or physical device.
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+------------+-------------+
| Server 1 |
| +----+----+ +----+----+ |
| |VM1-1 | |VM1-2 | |
| |VNI 100 | |VNI 200 | |
| | | | | |
| +---------+ +---------+ |
| VTEP (IP1) |
+--------------------------+
|
| +-------------+
| | Layer 3 |
+---| Network |
+-------------+
|
+-----------+
|
+------------+-------------+
| VTEP (IP2) |
| +----+----+ +----+----+ |
| |VM2-1 | |VM2-2 | |
| |VNI 100 | |VNI 200 | |
| | | | | |
| +---------+ +---------+ |
| Server 2 |
+--------------------------+
Figure 1: Reference VXLAN Domain
At the same time, a service layer BFD session may be used between the
tenants of VTEPs IP1 and IP2 to provide end-to-end fault management
(this use case is outside the scope of this document). In such a
case, for VTEPs BFD Control packets of that session are
indistinguishable from data packets.
For BFD Control packets encapsulated in VXLAN (Figure 2), the inner
destination IP address SHOULD be set to one of the loopback addresses
from 127/8 range for IPv4 or to one of IPv4-mapped IPv4 loopback
addresses from ::ffff:127.0.0.0/104 range for IPv6. There could be a
firewall configured on VTEP to block loopback addresses if set as the
destination IP in the inner IP header. It is RECOMMENDED to allow
addresses from the loopback range through a firewall only if they are
used as the destination IP addresses in the inner IP header and the
destination UDP port is set to 3784 [RFC5881].
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4. Use of the Management VNI
In most cases, a single BFD session is sufficient for the given VTEP
to monitor the reachability of a remote VTEP, regardless of the
number of VNIs. When the single BFD session is used to monitor the
reachability of the remote VTEP, an implementation SHOULD choose any
of the VNIs. An implementation that supports this specification MUST
support the use of the Management VNI as control and management
channel between VTEPs. The selection of the VNI number of the
Management VNI MUST be controlled through a management plane. An
implementation MAY use VNI number 1 as the default value for the
Management VNI. All VXLAN packets received on the Management VNI
MUST be processed locally and MUST NOT be forwarded to a tenant.
5. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel
BFD packets MUST be encapsulated and sent to a remote VTEP as
explained in this section. Implementations SHOULD ensure that the
BFD packets follow the same forwarding path as VXLAN data packets
within the sender system.
BFD packets are encapsulated in VXLAN as described below. The VXLAN
packet format is defined in Section 5 of [RFC7348]. The value in the
VNI field of the VXLAN header MUST be set to the value selected as
the Management VNI. The Outer IP/UDP and VXLAN headers MUST be
encoded by the sender as defined in [RFC7348].
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Outer Ethernet Header ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Outer IPvX Header ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Outer UDP Header ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ VXLAN Header ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Inner Ethernet Header ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Inner IPvX Header ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Inner UDP Header ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ BFD Control Packet ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Outer FCS |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: VXLAN Encapsulation of BFD Control Packet
The BFD packet MUST be carried inside the inner Ethernet frame of the
VXLAN packet. The choice of Destination MAC and Destination IP
addresses for the inner Ethernet frame MUST ensure that the BFD
Control packet is not forwarded to a tenant but is processed locally
at the remote VTEP. The inner Ethernet frame carrying the BFD
Control packet- has the following format:
Ethernet Header:
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Destination MAC: since a Management VNI is the VNI that does
not have any tenants, the value of this field is not analyzed
by the receiving VTEP.
Source MAC: MAC address associated with the originating VTEP.
IP header:
Destination IP: IP address MUST NOT be of one of tenant's IP
addresses. The IP address SHOULD be selected from the range
127/8 for IPv4, for IPv6 - from the range ::ffff:127.0.0.0/104.
Alternatively, the destination IP address MAY be set to VTEP's
IP address.
Source IP: IP address of the originating VTEP.
TTL or Hop Limit: MUST be set to 255 in accordance with the
Generalized TTL Security Mechanism [RFC5082].
The fields of the UDP header and the BFD Control packet are
encoded as specified in [RFC5881].
6. Reception of BFD Packet from VXLAN Tunnel
Once a packet is received, the VTEP MUST validate the packet. If the
packet is received on the management VNI and is identified as BFD
control packet addressed to the VTEP, and then the packet can be
processed further. Processing of BFD control packets received on
non-management VNI is outside the scope of this specification.
Validation of TTL / Hop Limit of the inner IP packet, as long as the
related considerations for BFD control packet demultiplexing and
authentication, is performed as described in Section 5 [RFC5881].
7. Echo BFD
Support for echo BFD is outside the scope of this document.
8. IANA Considerations
This specification has no IANA action requested. This section may be
deleted before the publication.
9. Security Considerations
Security issues discussed in [RFC5880], [RFC5881], and [RFC7348]
apply to this document.
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This document recommends using an address from the Internal host
loopback addresses 127/8 range for IPv4 or an IP4-mapped IPv4
loopback address from ::ffff:127.0.0.0/104 range for IPv6 as the
destination IP address in the inner IP header. Using such an address
prevents the forwarding of the encapsulated BFD control message by a
transient node in case the VXLAN tunnel is broken as according to
[RFC1812]:
A router SHOULD NOT forward, except over a loopback interface, any
packet that has a destination address on network 127. A router
MAY have a switch that allows the network manager to disable these
checks. If such a switch is provided, it MUST default to
performing the checks.
If the implementation supports establishing multiple BFD sessions
between the same pair of VTEPs, there SHOULD be a mechanism to
control the maximum number of such sessions that can be active at the
same time.
10. Contributors
Reshad Rahman
rrah...@cisco.com
Cisco
11. Acknowledgments
Authors would like to thank Jeff Haas of Juniper Networks for his
reviews and feedback on this material.
Authors would also like to thank Nobo Akiya, Marc Binderberger,
Shahram Davari, Donald E. Eastlake 3rd, Anoop Ghanwani, Dinesh Dutt,
Joel Halpern, and Carlos Pignataro for the extensive reviews and the
most detailed and constructive comments.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC1812] Baker, F., Ed., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
RFC 1812, DOI 10.17487/RFC1812, June 1995,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1812>.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5082] Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., Ed., and C.
Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism
(GTSM)", RFC 5082, DOI 10.17487/RFC5082, October 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5082>.
[RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.
[RFC5881] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)", RFC 5881,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5881, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5881>.
[RFC7348] Mahalingam, M., Dutt, D., Duda, K., Agarwal, P., Kreeger,
L., Sridhar, T., Bursell, M., and C. Wright, "Virtual
eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN): A Framework for
Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over Layer 3
Networks", RFC 7348, DOI 10.17487/RFC7348, August 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7348>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
12.2. Informational References
[RFC8293] Ghanwani, A., Dunbar, L., McBride, M., Bannai, V., and R.
Krishnan, "A Framework for Multicast in Network
Virtualization over Layer 3", RFC 8293,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8293, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8293>.
[RFC8365] Sajassi, A., Ed., Drake, J., Ed., Bitar, N., Shekhar, R.,
Uttaro, J., and W. Henderickx, "A Network Virtualization
Overlay Solution Using Ethernet VPN (EVPN)", RFC 8365,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8365, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8365>.
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Authors' Addresses
Santosh Pallagatti (editor)
VMware
Email: santosh.pallaga...@gmail.com
Sudarsan Paragiri
Individual Contributor
Email: sudarsan....@gmail.com
Vengada Prasad Govindan
Cisco
Email: vengg...@cisco.com
Mallik Mudigonda
Cisco
Email: mmudi...@cisco.com
Greg Mirsky
ZTE Corp.
Email: gregimir...@gmail.com
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