Thanks for the clarification, Greg.

Here are my thoughts on the issues:

I'd break it into couple more specific questions:
·         can the periodic Optimized Authentication mode be used without 
authorization o state changes;
·         if the answer to the previous question "yes", then when the first 
authorized BFD control packet must be transmitted by the system;
·         does the BFD state machine (section 6.2 RFC 5880) changes resulting 
from introduction of periodic optimized authentication mode;
[AM] The optimized authentication can be used without state changes and the 
first auth packet will be the DOWN state frame to kick-off the session 
negotiation as the proposal suggests that all DOWN state frames are 
authenticated. The state machine does not change in this proposal but it only 
indicates which frames should be authenticated and which ones can use NULL-AUTH 
TLV (un-authenticated frames).
And additional comments:
·         "For example, the two ends can decide that BFD frames that indicate a 
state change should be authenticated and enable authentication on those frames 
only."
I don't think that nodes "decide" anything but are configured to do something.

[AM] I agree that the language is not accurate. We’ll change it in the next 
revision. The intention is to use indicate configuration rather than 
negotiation.
·         "If the two ends have not previously negotiated which frames they 
will transmit or receive with authentication enabled ..."
I couldn't find the negotiation procedure being described in the document. Is 
it out-of-band, i.e. by control or management plane, not part of this BFD 
enhancement?

[AM] The language should indicate configuration instead of negotiation.
·         "The configuration of the periodic authentication interval for BFD CC 
UP frames is an open issue."
I believe that this open issue must be resolved in the definitive manner before 
the draft moved to WGLC.

[AM] This line should be removed and the preceding text should indicate that 
the parameters for authentication should be configured on the session 
end-points.

Regards,
Ashesh

From: Greg Mirsky <gregimir...@gmail.com>
Date: Monday, April 2, 2018 at 12:34 PM
To: Ashesh Mishra <mishra.ash...@outlook.com>
Cc: Jeffrey Haas <jh...@pfrc.org>, "rtg-bfd@ietf.org" <rtg-bfd@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: WGLC BFD Authentication Drafts

Hi Asheh,
thank you for taking time to review the minutes from BFD WG meeting at IETF-98. 
I don't think that we had enough time to discuss in details my question:
Greg Mirsky: One of the possible modes when the session is up is to use 
authentication with periodic timer trigger?
I'd break it into couple more specific questions:

  *   can the periodic Optimized Authentication mode be used without 
authorization o state changes;
  *   if the answer to the previous question "yes", then when the first 
authorized BFD control packet must be transmitted by the system;
  *   does the BFD state machine (section 6.2 RFC 5880) changes resulting from 
introduction of periodic optimized authentication mode;
And additional comments:

  *   "For example, the two ends can decide that BFD frames that indicate a 
state change should be authenticated and enable authentication on those frames 
only."
I don't think that nodes "decide" anything but are configured to do something.

  *   "If the two ends have not previously negotiated which frames they will 
transmit or receive with authentication enabled ..."
I couldn't find the negotiation procedure being described in the document. Is 
it out-of-band, i.e. by control or management plane, not part of this BFD 
enhancement?

  *   "The configuration of the periodic authentication interval for BFD CC UP 
frames is an open issue."
I believe that this open issue must be resolved in the definitive manner before 
the draft moved to WGLC.

Regards,
Greg


On Sun, Apr 1, 2018 at 6:11 PM, Ashesh Mishra 
<mishra.ash...@outlook.com<mailto:mishra.ash...@outlook.com>> wrote:

Hi Greg,



Your questions in the IETF-98 meeting seemed to stem from the challenges of 
authentication in fast BFD sessions at high scale.



I'll address the issue in two parts -



"Is there a need for authenticated BFD sessions?" - I believe we can all agree 
that there is a clear market need for BFD authentication. So we should direct 
the conversation to the way in which we can address this requirement.



"How can authentication work at scale?" - BFD authentication puts significant 
stress on the system and a non-meticulous method alleviates this computation 
pressure. That's the premise of this draft as it presents a way to relieve the 
BFD authentication requirement based on the capability of the system to handle 
the additional stress which maintaining the session scale.



There are some BFD systems in the market, which are not conducive to 
authentication (even the optimized method), where the impediment to 
authentication is due to the implementation details specific to that vendor or 
system.



I believe all these issues were address during the meeting. Are there any 
specific questions that I missed or any recommendations for the method in which 
the requirements can be addressed?



Thanks,

Ashesh

________________________________
From: Rtg-bfd <rtg-bfd-boun...@ietf.org<mailto:rtg-bfd-boun...@ietf.org>> on 
behalf of Greg Mirsky <gregimir...@gmail.com<mailto:gregimir...@gmail.com>>
Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2018 4:09:32 AM
To: Jeffrey Haas
Cc: rtg-bfd@ietf.org<mailto:rtg-bfd@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: WGLC BFD Authentication Drafts

Dear WG Chairs, et. al,
I cannot support WG LC for draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication as my 
comments at BFD WG meeting dating back to 
IETF-98<https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/98/materials/minutes-98-bfd-00> 
still not have been addressed nor even there was an attempt to address. As I've 
asked to clarify impact of the proposed mechanism, particularly periodic 
authentication, on the BFD State Machine, I'd point that the proposed mechanism 
directly affects BFD security as discussed in RFC 5880 and the section Security 
Considerations in the document, in my view, does not adequately reflects that 
and doesn't explain how the security of the BFD session maintained when the 
periodic authentication is in use.

Regards,
Greg

On Wed, Mar 28, 2018 at 7:38 PM, Jeffrey Haas 
<jh...@pfrc.org<mailto:jh...@pfrc.org>> wrote:
Working Group,

The authors of the following Working Group drafts have requested
Working Group Last Call on the following documents:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers-01
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-04
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-bfd-stability-01

Given the overlap of functionality, WGLC will conclude for the bundle
simultaneously.

Authors, please positively acknowledge whether or not you know about any IPR
for your documents.  Progression of the document will not be done without
that statement.

Last call will complete on April 20.

-- Jeff


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