> > This can be avoided by not actually signing the main header. Instead, hash
> > the main header, hash the data from the signature header, and concatenate
> > the hashes. Then sign the concatenated hashes.
>
> Signing just the hash(es) kinda seems like an attractive proposal at first,
> but ... AFAICS this means the hash becomes a single point of failure: if the
> hash is broken then _all_ the signatures on it are broken at once, no matter
> what _their_ algorithm.
This is true anyway. No real scheme uses asymmetric crypto to sign the actual
data. The data is hashed, and the hash is what is signed. If you double hash,
you should use the same hash algorithm.
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