Hi James,
my comments are embedded below.
Il 29/03/2022 17:50, Gould, James ha scritto:
Mario,
My responses are embedded below.
--
JG
*James Gould
*Fellow Engineer
jgo...@verisign.com
<applewebdata://13890C55-AAE8-4BF3-A6CE-B4BA42740803/jgo...@verisign.com>
703-948-3271
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
Verisign.com <http://verisigninc.com/>
*From: *Mario Loffredo <mario.loffr...@iit.cnr.it>
*Date: *Tuesday, March 29, 2022 at 11:00 AM
*To: *James Gould <jgo...@verisign.com>, "regext@ietf.org"
<regext@ietf.org>
*Subject: *[EXTERNAL] Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about
epp-over-http
Hi James,
Il 29/03/2022 13:41, Gould, James ha scritto:
Mario,
My feedback is embedded below.
--
JG
*James Gould
*Fellow Engineer
jgo...@verisign.com
<applewebdata://13890C55-AAE8-4BF3-A6CE-B4BA42740803/jgo...@verisign.com>
703-948-3271
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
Verisign.com
<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1EaISbPmlOZzCKgUuIbmDA4rr-y-fT4gnfY0xiPotQBQC-vNT5PBKwJ1STPDcTK6y65BpvZgT5XqntG_ZysxPVZX8XjGyZXOW-P8nL-bdEwKNOkYvtyGhf1-PjTUP3gKykqkaX6QProvtyfCBkgC_m9J8xcE7yHeQ2_JycG85cc1JtO74KeQ6D9bsl9tHxNpgzRFA-IE_CZkI01GCY0-9LRrY2Tdd3mwPuBMAXYl7okYjJdszZFa2vwEdisCoAWAN/http%3A%2F%2Fverisigninc.com%2F>
*From: *Mario Loffredo <mario.loffr...@iit.cnr.it>
<mailto:mario.loffr...@iit.cnr.it>
*Date: *Monday, March 28, 2022 at 6:59 AM
*To: *James Gould <jgo...@verisign.com>
<mailto:jgo...@verisign.com>, "regext@ietf.org"
<mailto:regext@ietf.org> <regext@ietf.org> <mailto:regext@ietf.org>
*Subject: *[EXTERNAL] Re: [regext] Comments to the feedback about
epp-over-http
Hi James,
thanks for ypur quick reply.
Please find my comments below.
Il 25/03/2022 16:45, Gould, James ha scritto:
Mario,
For #4 “Cookie vs. HTTP Connection”, you asked the question
“can you further clarify why we should opt for establishing
the cookie at setup of the connection and how should it be
possible? For example, what kind of request should be used to
start the HTTP connection?”.
I implemented pluggable transports in the Verisign EPP SDK,
which included HTTP, HTTPS, TCP, and TLS. The Verisign EPP
SDK does include a client interface as well as a server stub
implementation, so I was able to see the transports from both
sides. Support for HTTP and HTTPS was removed once we stopped
supporting EPP over HTTP. The cookie is setup at the time of
the HTTP or HTTPS connection. There is no “request” that is
used to start the HTTP connection, just like the case for TCP
and TLS. A network connection is made, which includes the
underlying TLS handshake in the case of HTTPS and TLS and the
cookie is setup for HTTP and HTTPS, and then the EPP
application protocol rides on top of it.
It seems to me a very low-level implementation.
Sorry but I stiil don't understand how cookies are returned. They
should be returned in an HTTP response that doesn't correspond to
an HTTP request. Correct?
JG: HTTP is being defined as a transport for EPP, so it should be
treated as such. The setup and tear-down of the HTTP connection,
includes the setup of the cookies that is used for HTTP session
tracking. When a connection is made to the EPP / HTTPS server,
the TLS connection is first established via the TLS-handshake and
the HTTP session is established via setup of the session cookie
(e.g., JSESSIONID), which then enables the server to maintain
state. State such as tracking failed login attempts and timeouts
(idle / command / absolute), which will result in a drop in the
HTTP session / connection when the login attempt threshold is
exceeded. At the application layer, a HTTPS connection is treated
in the same way as a TLS connection, where the transport handles
the framing and the connection state, and the application layer
returns the EPP Greeting when the connection is setup and drops
the connection with a EPP logout occurs or other EPP session
conditions (e.g., exceeding timeouts). The HTTP session cookie is
returned in all the HTTP responses. There is absolutely no
intermingling of the transport layer (HTTP) with the application
layer (EPP) other than making a connection available to read and
write framed packets and the ability to close the connection when
needed.
If so, it seems to me uncompliant with what is stated in the first
paragraph of Section 2.1 of RFC7230:
HTTP is a stateless request/response protocol that operates by
exchanging messages (Section 3
<https://secure-web.cisco.com/1HLyHB_XdFEjfXQwGFkG0LZSLLnG4WFNvmZ-TNjfY6OfIaLTmL1biILbx72S_U5GmIiJtbpg0x39TJ52od6XvJJ-XGkebzBiEggAwQ42v85iZAXdc75eWbMUFwdy__GSQvGqoc_3jBcXvzaJksIZ9kIaGCObuN4sNz3NQqB4Gsr44Gdw9c4U6nDx9j_3kyp9hk3Za8zxK-CiPfgUAyNLhZ53ksc5Ae9PHvSSpW9kjbB9txLir0tvwL_pUPzDpJS2Y/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfc-editor.org%2Frfc%2Frfc7230%23section-3>)
across a reliable transport- or
session-layer "connection" (Section 6
<https://secure-web.cisco.com/1vvJc-KSBR_KweDtRuo-dlLx6E_Z9fnj9TRqKJPKmI-z_MzpIyDJWDzfwvS180O64nU4M_K-HwHtvVlPkTyfnMVQ8I50S_dOCSrwzrW9QXz8ckfa9Yj0UZmgPk4aOBSCgpizCtKhPiufait2c-bik8SwDi5FGriXh2QetIDOP_N5qvkVGUCrJ7Agu0Kz55-5IRTrJpPK2rtdg6AYpfgj-5oaNCOjZ9kZcI233HN_HumLXDVcKmYklOTTqh_7mGPwt/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfc-editor.org%2Frfc%2Frfc7230%23section-6>).*An
HTTP "client" is a*
* program that establishes a connection to a server for the
purpose of*
* sending one or more HTTP requests.* *An HTTP "server" is a program*
* that accepts connections in order to service HTTP requests by
sending*
* HTTP responses.*
JG: I don’t see how using HTTP as a EPP transport would be
considered uncompliant with RFC7230. Below is the flow of using
HTTP as an EPP transport:
1.Establish TCP connection
2.Establish TLS session via TLS-handshake
3.Establish HTTP session via setup of the HTTP session cookie
(e.g., JSESSIONID)
4.Return EPP Greeting in framed HTTP response with the session
cookie (e.g., JSESSIONID)
5.Support HTTP requests in the form of framed EPP commands that
are returned in HTTP responses in the form of framed EPP responses.
6.EPP session ends that drops the connection (HTTP / TLS / TCP)
[ML] I apologize James but I still don't understand how it would be
possible to return an HTTP response including the EPP Greeting and
establish a session cookie without having previously received an HTTP
request or, to say it better, how it would be possible at the
abstraction level provided by all the libraries and frameworks
supporting HTTP communication on both client and server side.
Being HTTP used as a purely transport (L4) protocol but not as a
request/response (L7) protocol, the implementation wouldn't be
compliant with RFC7230.
The same concept is also repeated in Section 2.1 of RFC 2818 "HTTP
over TLS":
The agent acting as the HTTP client should also act as the TLS
client. It should initiate a connection to the server on the
appropriate port and then send the TLS ClientHello to begin the TLS
handshake.*When the TLS handshake has finished. The client may then*
* initiate the first HTTP request.* All HTTP data MUST be sent as TLS
"application data". Normal HTTP behavior, including retained
connections should be followed.
JG: The first step is a HTTP GET request that establishes the HTTP
session and receives the EPP Greeting in the HTTP GET response, which
includes the HTTP session cookie. Subsequent requests can use a HTTP
POST for the EPP command and receive the HTTPS POST response for the
EPP response. The EPP SDK Stub Server supported use of either the
HTTP GET or POST and if a HTTP session did not exist, it returned the
EPP Greeting in the HTTP response with the HTTP session cookie. After
the HTTP session was established, the responsibility of the HTTP layer
was strictly to accept HTTP requests, which works as the packet
framing of TCP, and places the EPP responses in the HTTP responses.
The HTTP request and response is fully compliance with the RFCs, since
the connection is a request with a greeting response, and subsequent
EPP command and responses are handled in HTTP requests and responses.
Connection state is maintained in the HTTP session, which would deal
with issues like a failed login threshold and timeouts (idle and
command). The Verisign EPP SDK includes an packet assembler class,
which is configurable, which deals with the marshaling and
unmarshaling of the commands and responses of the underlying EPP
transport, which included assemblers for TCP, TLS, HTTP, and HTTPS.
You could even setup client session pools using the assembler of your
choice, where a single client could interface with an EPP/TLS server
and an EPP/HTTPS server, all by specifying the desired EPP transport.
If you are to mix the EPP protocol with the underlying transport
layer, then it would remove the ability to plug in the desired transport.
[ML] Now everything is clear to me. I didn't udenstrand your previous
message because you omitted that a client starts the HTTP session via
HTTP GET :-)
Both .it and .pl implement only the POST method. HTTP and EPP sessions
are started together and linked each other after a Login command due to
the following reasons:
1) The session ID is the unique key to retrieve EPP session information
2) Except for the client IP address, the information that a server must
maintain as long as an EPP session lives is included in the Login
request (i.e. the registrar name and the XML namespaces)
3) It's very unlikely that an EPP client doesn't know the services
provided by a given EPP server
4) As a consequence of point 2 and 3, why should a client submit a
meaningless HTTP request to the server before submitting the Login
command to start an EPP session?
5) RFC5730 states that an EPP session starts with a <Login> command and
RFC6265 states that servers maintain stateful sessions over HTTP by
setting the session cookie. Hence, It seems natural to me that servers
start an HTTP session and set the session ID after a successful Login
command.
6) Application protocol sessions on server side normally start after
authenticating the client (please note that this is exactly what we are
pursuing in RDAP)
7) It seems inefficient to release an HTTP session from an EPP session
because it can result in wasting resources to maintain possible useless
HTTP sessions.
8) If an HTTP session is not established after an authentication, IP
whitelisting is a must instead of a recommendation. Even if in general
registries require registrars to declare their own clients' IP addresses
out-of-band, this is not an absolute constraint and the same IP address
might be used by multiple registrars. For the same reason, you cannot
limit the number of HTTP sessions per registrar thus mitigating the
risks pointed out in point 7.
Regarding to the EPP commands, other than Hello and Login, that don't
include a valid session ID, think it's better the server returns an EPP
error ("Command use error") instead of a Greeting response including a
new session ID.
Have a question: how do you figure out the case where a client issues
two Login commands with the same valid session ID previously received
via the GET response? I imagine that only one would be accepted.
If so, the mapping between an HTTP session and EPP session exists also
in your implementation. It occurs when the EPP session is created
instead of when the HTTP session is created.
Best,
Mario
7.
Anyway, the approach normally followed by every HTTP implementer
leverages the services provided by an application server that
incorporates an HTTP server.
You don't need to manage HTTP connections, HTTP resquest/response
marhsalling/unmarshalling and other low-level details. You just
need to focus on the core of your server.
Similarly, on the other side side, after having configured an HTTP
client instance, a client simply builds and sends an HTTP request,
and then receives and processes an HTTP response.
JG: An EPP client or server should be capable of reusing all the
same command and response processing without dealing with
transport specific logic. The transport layer can be built as a
layer that is pluggable. A client can configure the transport to
use on a per-server basis, and the server can reuse the same
command processing logic whether running on top of TLS or HTTPS,
since TLS and HTTPS are purely transports.
[ML] It's unclear to me how two communications working at different
layers could be handled in the same way. As I wrote in my previous
reply to Matthias, the approach proposed aims to preserve EPP commands
semantics so that the EPP server core should be the same regardless
the fact that it is supported by HTTP or TCP.
JG: It's very straight forward to make the EPP transport pluggable if
you treat the EPP transport as purely a transport. The application
layer does need to go through a pluggable transport layer to enable
the transport layer to frame, and marshal/unmarshal the commands and
responses. In the case of the Verisign EPP SDK, that assembler layer
took care of it for TCP, TLS, HTTP, and HTTPS. The EPP command
processing is not dependent on the transport layer, meaning the EPP
command processing layer doesn’t need to be concerned with setting a
HTTP session cookie upon a successful EPP Login or handling the EPP
Hello in any special way as it relates to HTTP cookies. EPP is a
stateful protocol, where the underlying transport needs to support
being stateful. If the desire was to move towards stateless, then
you’re not defining an EPP transport but a new EPP protocol. My
recommendation is to keep the EPP over HTTP simple and establish the
HTTP cookie at the setup of the HTTP connection and separate the EPP
sessions from the HTTP session.
Mario
If there is a HTTP transport for EPP, then it should be purely
a transport and not intermingle with the application
protocol. There is no need to directly tie a HTTP session
with the established EPP session. By keeping them separate,
it makes it much easier for the client and the server to have
pluggable transports, where the processing of the EPP commands
including the hello, login, and logout treat the transport as
simply a connection with no intermingling of session management.
If it means that you have to reimplement what has commonly been
used for years, it isn't clear to me how it could be much easier.
On the contrary, it seems to me much trickier, especially if you
implement EPP-over-HTTP from scratch.
If the goal is using the same approach for mapping every transport
layer without considering the peculiarites of each transport
protocol and the technology the implementers are accostumed to use
to deal with them, it doesn't make sense to me.
For example, I cannot figure out how HTTP load balancing could
support your solution.
JG: The HTTP transport for EPP can easily be defined as a pure
transport, which provides a connection for the application layer
to leverage in the same fashion as TLS. The load balancer can
leverage the TLS session id to route to the EPP gateway and in the
case of HTTP, the HTTP session can be used to route the request to
the appropriate application server that contains the connection
state. Some HTTP application server proxies leverage the HTTP
session to route the requests to the application server that
contains the HTTP session and state. You need to establish the
HTTP session when the connection is established to support the
needed routing. There are other load balancing options, but by
simplifying EPP over HTTP to have HTTP as purely a transport, it
provides maximum flexibility in routing and maximum pluggability
of transports (TCP, TLS, HTTP, HTTPS).
Best,
Mario
--
JG
*James Gould
*Fellow Engineer
jgo...@verisign.com
<applewebdata://13890C55-AAE8-4BF3-A6CE-B4BA42740803/jgo...@verisign.com>
703-948-3271
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
Verisign.com
<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1ojxKstUEceETR7pe4khQ2dcwgGUwoOuZu4vhcT-TZcTCCpM93jXl6eq5i46tfTPt6lE9M6FO7hPqFZQVgxN5su1ozpEIXrOmp6SzB5kEB5SXCcRaJIg-vRb2B_SxGeDcgjxTqmZNEVO_Z0LtwZEFTLbzsLhmMMT-MlZ9pX7rpBY6Q8K0RxXyklhUEXCOqlJ0RMcZX2tEZNHp0Pr6XFhgw4X7OA0XCs0tk_jqiJbYMrkAFF0PXiAItfCmm_MR8whC/http%3A%2F%2Fverisigninc.com%2F>
*From: *regext <regext-boun...@ietf.org>
<mailto:regext-boun...@ietf.org> on behalf of Mario Loffredo
<mario.loffr...@iit.cnr.it> <mailto:mario.loffr...@iit.cnr.it>
*Date: *Friday, March 25, 2022 at 11:01 AM
*To: *"regext@ietf.org" <mailto:regext@ietf.org>
<regext@ietf.org> <mailto:regext@ietf.org>
*Subject: *[EXTERNAL] [regext] Comments to the feedback about
epp-over-http
Hi folks,
here are in the following some comments grouped by subject to
last meeting's feedback about EPP-over-HTTP:
*1) Draft title*
Ulrich suggested to call the document EPP-over-HTTPS.
I replied that the name was assigned to be consistent with
RFC5734, i.e. EPP-over-TCP.
SImilarly to RFC5734, the draft states, first in the abstract
and then in the security considerations, that TLS is required.
That being said, the authors don't object to renaming the
dcocument EPP-over-HTTPS if the WG agrees.
*2) Cookies*
Jim (Reed) asked why cookies should be used in this case.
The reasons why we have used session cookiea are that they
represent a standard method (RFC6265), well known to the
community of REST service implementers, largely used and
natively supported by libraries and frameworks on both client
and server side. For example, it is the same method used by
rdap-openid to map an RDAP session and tie it to an access
token :-)
.it and .pl have been using this method since the beginning
and the registrars, after being informed that they had to
enable cookies in their HTTP clients, have no longer
complained about cookie management.
In addition, the implementation of such a method doesn't
introduce any change to the EPP core spec. Indeed, it
preserves EPP comands semantics and doesn't mix the
application layer with the transport layer.
I would like to say that, regarding the clear distinction
between those layers, this proposal is even better than
RFC5734 as every EPP response is returned by the server as a
consequence of receiving an EPP request.
On the contrary, in RFC5734, an EPP <greeting> is returned to
the client after the TCP connection has been established so,
at least in this case, the**two layers get mixed.
Which method other than session cookie shoud be used instead ?
*3) Security Considerations*
Ulirch recommended to review the security considerations by
inheriting those from TLS WG about which versions and ciphers
of TLS to use.
Thanks a lot for the heads up, Ulrich. Surely, we'll do.
Gavin noted that, unlike EPP-over-TCP, this draft states that
client IP address check is optional.
As a matter of fact, it is stated as recommended.
Anyway, the authors don't object to changing it into an
absolute rquirement if the WG agrees.
*4) Cookie vs. HTTP Connection*
One comment from James in the chat is about establishing the
cookie at setup of the connection and not linking it to the
EPP Login command.
James, can you further clarify why we should opt for
establishing the cookie at setup of the connection and how
shoudl it be possible? For example, what kind of request
should be used to start the HTTP connection?
IMO, an HTTP session is something that is inherently unlinked
to the HTTP connections.
HTTP connections can be broken but sessions don't get lost.
Programmatically, REST implementers are in charge of
processing HTTP requests and building responses rather than
managing HTTP connections, which is instead delegated to the
application servers.
Finally, I would like to outline that Section 2.9.1 of RFC5730
states that an EPP session starts with a Login command and the
mechanism described by RFC6265 lets (I'm quoting here) "the
servers maintain a stateful session over the mostly stateless
HTTP protocol". As a consequence, it seems much more practical
to start the EPP/HTTP session as a result of a Login command.
*5) EPP/HTTP Sessions vs. HTTP3 Connections*
Ulrich remarked that, in HTTP3, it is possible to have
multiple sessions on an HTTP connection.
This is valid also for the other HTTP versions.
In fact, an HTTP connection can be kept alive and, over it, a
client could submit multiple login-commands-logout sequences.
This is quite usual for a smart client managing a pool of HTTP
connections.
Instead, It is unlikely but not impossible to come across HTTP
connections supporting multiple concurrent sessions.
What should be the possible drawbacks for a server in allowing
the scenarios above?
*6) Client authentication in HTTP3*
Another note pointed out that HTTP3 client authentication
requirements are different from this draft and they need to be
reconciled.
Think that it could be sufficient to add to the security
considerations some text similar to what is included in
section 4.4 "Peer authentication" of RFC 9001 "Using TLS to
secure QUIC":
A client MUST authenticate the identity of the server. This
typically involves verification that the identity of the server is
included in a certificate and that the certificate is issued by a
trusted entity (see for example [RFC2818
<https://secure-web.cisco.com/1tkPqD6aAMfTp6t6KppHDGdn0xpgOWSMeCqwZR-hs9Duph9SiceA0vCbaJJVqywNzcZscc6vUZkCPH9lCdtXq_nVJ3OfnNMz-XTQvhBuSBLsXa0VfO5ZNrGo47fSin8GRaQOWRSvSQP_7vRecBdddhF6L0Yqx3KcxAGpvdxpFCsPhLcd5bm-aVy3vTko6TfGBlohe2XEw3bwUmH-u56ZuZz50CUXUqA3YDFgBENAwPrLBjwdDxwgG1JFVGPZF_LEQ/https%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc2818>]).
The draft has only considered the optional use of a
certificate on server side (not on client side). In doing
that, the draft is consistent with another sentence in the
same paragraph of RFC9001:
A server MAY request that the client authenticate during the
handshake. A server MAY refuse a connection if the client is unable
to authenticate when requested.
Would it address the feedback?
That's all for now.
Hope I did not miss anything.
Thanks a lot for your interest and feedback.
Looking forward to your further comments.
Best,
Mario
--
Dr. Mario Loffredo
Technological Unit “Digital Innovation”
Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT)
National Research Council (CNR)
via G. Moruzzi 1, I-56124 PISA, Italy
Phone: +39.0503153497
Web:http://www.iit.cnr.it/mario.loffredo
<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1Af0lIvD4wj2TkngfEVwrFVEVRozLiVIU2m1Gi1AH1GN4-eWP-IREXsOLCh8OJ03YAxRNYqVCPHQSwgj-tMCyzvN3jokOBTIBx4-5n1pJdiRXxl-ShJCaHkCjGNPa8EA5qw4kPjkxIrFAy1qOTcPFhieqdc_xyu8yisYoXzily9ozVw3GZaUtkKrLnmnDJhlFv2LRTCTnw913LzH8bX-hB6FpPlyFi_0v2_H1NFCgZYjuu4pgUeOeIqQJRQwtzNLS/http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iit.cnr.it%2Fmario.loffredo>
--
Dr. Mario Loffredo
Technological Unit “Digital Innovation”
Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT)
National Research Council (CNR)
via G. Moruzzi 1, I-56124 PISA, Italy
Phone: +39.0503153497
Web:http://www.iit.cnr.it/mario.loffredo
<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1OpUT5efcRPCKu9ZmpfyFmbeoIexTqMIlduFKl7VTUSeET1W3oogufCAfJPPw-WSQ0iyo_wkztY_7M69qw0yf13C4w7OWB_Zk5w2FsV-GGCSLot8lFQdslU0DvCpCTw9FjZr0AsFsubGH-kToYrLxzzEj7vGDKuxIFxPK92P5bu2CDOE4UFtRPRGvu9rzX83rks8X2le_j1uSS1SD5B8CyvSp0tsne0HWMS5luho_DIhdOil7-0a_7ZX6CQA08GQq/http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iit.cnr.it%2Fmario.loffredo>
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--
Dr. Mario Loffredo
Technological Unit “Digital Innovation”
Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT)
National Research Council (CNR)
via G. Moruzzi 1, I-56124 PISA, Italy
Phone: +39.0503153497
Web:http://www.iit.cnr.it/mario.loffredo
<http://secure-web.cisco.com/1yKvefSSzzB1xtPf0Zt9UvXnOkA28n5LvF1HkMnNZqV6Dwz7x7ZD06GbmS94ZAQwsmSA6iszQPAkGi5fNCSMjCHwEbful0vNQc0bfu7a2ydpIkKyqCYgjHlBp7I_-3eCZXAtMTjU_xfTEae9EnXNbksctYNkGyOsHDR02jSoOeVLa3lgW8hWUZ20zgxxFQlt_HdsERDtOQY4EoiE3orLFHDV3wtSA-ChHIYVp1pfMvU2aCEBQ3tWEhFOLp740jUPP/http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iit.cnr.it%2Fmario.loffredo>
--
Dr. Mario Loffredo
Technological Unit “Digital Innovation”
Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT)
National Research Council (CNR)
via G. Moruzzi 1, I-56124 PISA, Italy
Phone: +39.0503153497
Web:http://www.iit.cnr.it/mario.loffredo
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