All good, and thanks.  Go ahead and post a revised I-D when you're ready.

>>     The answer to all of that might be “no”, but it would be good to… as
>>     we used to say in school, show your work.
>
> Yes, the quick answer is that I don't see the server using this as a
> source for an attack, but we can add a consideration to help mitigate
> it.  I can add the sentence "Since the unhandled namespace context is
> XML that is not processed in the first pass by the XML parser, the
> client SHOULD consider validating the XML when the content is
> processed to protect against the inclusion of malicious content."  The
> content is not processed by a client that doesn't support the service,
> where the <extValue> element provides a signal of the lack of client
> support along with the XML content that is initially unprocessed.  If
> the client does decide to process the XML content systematically, the
> additional sentence can provide guidance to not open up a security
> hole.  Do you believe this will help?  Do you have any additional
> recommended text?

I have nothing further to recommend, and I do think it will help -- if
at least to show that it was thought about, and that the "nothing new
here" statement isn't just perfunctory.  Thanks.

Barry

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