On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 07:12:10PM +0530, Vishal Annapurve wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 3:27 AM Kirill A . Shutemov
> <kirill.shute...@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Oct 17, 2022 at 06:39:06PM +0200, Gupta, Pankaj wrote:
> > > On 10/17/2022 6:19 PM, Kirill A . Shutemov wrote:
> > > > On Mon, Oct 17, 2022 at 03:00:21PM +0200, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> > > > > On 9/15/22 16:29, Chao Peng wrote:
> > > > > > From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shute...@linux.intel.com>
> > > > > >
> > > > > > KVM can use memfd-provided memory for guest memory. For normal
> > > > > > userspace
> > > > > > accessible memory, KVM userspace (e.g. QEMU) mmaps the memfd into
> > > > > > its
> > > > > > virtual address space and then tells KVM to use the virtual address
> > > > > > to
> > > > > > setup the mapping in the secondary page table (e.g. EPT).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > With confidential computing technologies like Intel TDX, the
> > > > > > memfd-provided memory may be encrypted with special key for special
> > > > > > software domain (e.g. KVM guest) and is not expected to be directly
> > > > > > accessed by userspace. Precisely, userspace access to such encrypted
> > > > > > memory may lead to host crash so it should be prevented.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > This patch introduces userspace inaccessible memfd (created with
> > > > > > MFD_INACCESSIBLE). Its memory is inaccessible from userspace through
> > > > > > ordinary MMU access (e.g. read/write/mmap) but can be accessed via
> > > > > > in-kernel interface so KVM can directly interact with core-mm
> > > > > > without
> > > > > > the need to map the memory into KVM userspace.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > It provides semantics required for KVM guest private(encrypted)
> > > > > > memory
> > > > > > support that a file descriptor with this flag set is going to be
> > > > > > used as
> > > > > > the source of guest memory in confidential computing environments
> > > > > > such
> > > > > > as Intel TDX/AMD SEV.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > KVM userspace is still in charge of the lifecycle of the memfd. It
> > > > > > should pass the opened fd to KVM. KVM uses the kernel APIs newly
> > > > > > added
> > > > > > in this patch to obtain the physical memory address and then
> > > > > > populate
> > > > > > the secondary page table entries.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The userspace inaccessible memfd can be fallocate-ed and
> > > > > > hole-punched
> > > > > > from userspace. When hole-punching happens, KVM can get notified
> > > > > > through
> > > > > > inaccessible_notifier it then gets chance to remove any mapped
> > > > > > entries
> > > > > > of the range in the secondary page tables.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The userspace inaccessible memfd itself is implemented as a shim
> > > > > > layer
> > > > > > on top of real memory file systems like tmpfs/hugetlbfs but this
> > > > > > patch
> > > > > > only implemented tmpfs. The allocated memory is currently marked as
> > > > > > unmovable and unevictable, this is required for current confidential
> > > > > > usage. But in future this might be changed.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shute...@linux.intel.com>
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.p...@linux.intel.com>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > >
> > > > > ...
> > > > >
> > > > > > +static long inaccessible_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode,
> > > > > > + loff_t offset, loff_t len)
> > > > > > +{
> > > > > > + struct inaccessible_data *data =
> > > > > > file->f_mapping->private_data;
> > > > > > + struct file *memfd = data->memfd;
> > > > > > + int ret;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) {
> > > > > > + if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(offset) || !PAGE_ALIGNED(len))
> > > > > > + return -EINVAL;
> > > > > > + }
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > + ret = memfd->f_op->fallocate(memfd, mode, offset, len);
> > > > > > + inaccessible_notifier_invalidate(data, offset, offset +
> > > > > > len);
> > > > >
> > > > > Wonder if invalidate should precede the actual hole punch, otherwise
> > > > > we open
> > > > > a window where the page tables point to memory no longer valid?
> > > >
> > > > Yes, you are right. Thanks for catching this.
> > >
> > > I also noticed this. But then thought the memory would be anyways zeroed
> > > (hole punched) before this call?
> >
> > Hole punching can free pages, given that offset/len covers full page.
> >
> > --
> > Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
>
> I think moving this notifier_invalidate before fallocate may not solve
> the problem completely. Is it possible that between invalidate and
> fallocate, KVM tries to handle the page fault for the guest VM from
> another vcpu and uses the pages to be freed to back gpa ranges? Should
> hole punching here also update mem_attr first to say that KVM should
> consider the corresponding gpa ranges to be no more backed by
> inaccessible memfd?
We rely on external synchronization to prevent this. See code around
mmu_invalidate_retry_hva().
--
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
